On Point: 15. Evidence

State v. Andrew G. Chitwood, 2016 WI App 36; case activity (including briefs)

In theory, Wisconsin’s new test for the admissibility of expert testimony “is flexible but has teeth.” State v. Giese, ¶19. In practice, it’s flexible and has dentures. Literally every Daubert challenge litigated on appeal since Wis. Stat. §907.02 became effective has failed. The court of appeals has held that expert testimony regarding the retrograde extrapolation of a person’s blood alcohol concentration passes Daubert (See Giese). So does a doctor’s testimony based solely on his personal experience with prenatal and delivery case (see Seifert). So does a social worker’s testimony based solely on her observations of behavior in child abuse victims (see Smith). And now with Chitwood so does expert testimony by a drug recognition evaluator.

State v. Luis Calderon-Encarnacion, Jr., 2014AP2252-CR, 04/12/2016 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Calderon was found guilty at trial of shooting up the house of his child’s mother. The evidence against him included the fact that he was pulled over 20 minutes after the shooting in a vehicle matching an eyewitness description of the shooter’s, with a silver-and-black revolver containing five spent casings concealed in the fuse panel.

State v. Tony Phillip Rogers, 2015AP921-CR, 4/12/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Though the complainant in Rogers’s child sexual assault prosecution made statements to her mother about “hearing voices” and needing mental health assistance, trial counsel was not deficient for failing to move for an in camera review of her treatment records because he could not have made the materiality showing needed under State v. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d 600, 608-09, 499 N.W.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1993), and State v. Green, 2002 WI 68, ¶¶32-34, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298.

State v. Raymond L. Nieves, 2014AP1623-CR, 4/5/16, District 1 (recommended for publication, but not published); petition for review granted 9/13/16; case activity (including briefs).

This case explores the line between Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 (1968)(which holds that at a joint trial the confession of one defendant is inadmissible against the co-defendant unless the confessing defendant testifies and is subject to cross examination) and Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987)(which holds that a non-testifying defendant’s written confession can be admitted if it is redacted to eliminate all references to his co-defendant). Nieves and his codefendant, Maldonado, were accused of 1st degree intentional homicide. The trial court denied severance and allowed a witness testify about Maldonado’s confession while repeatedly use the term “they” (implicating Maldonado and Nieves). The court of appeals ordered a new trial because admission of the confession evidence violated the Confrontation Clause.

State v. Esequiel Morales-Pedrosa, 2016 WI App 38; case activity (including briefs)

The case law prohibiting vouching by one witness for the credibility of another witness didn’t clearly cover a forensic interviewer’s testimony that 90% of child sexual assault reports are true. Thus, trial counsel wasn’t deficient for failing to object to the testimony.

State v. Beverly Reshall Holt, 2013AP2738-CR, 3/8/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The trial court did not err in admitting the audiovisual recording of the forensic interview of Caleb, one of the child victims, at Holt’s trial for child sexual assault.

State v. Anthony R. Owens, 2016 WI App 32; case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court properly admitted the victim’s statements about who shot him under the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule, and the admission of the victim’s statements didn’t violate the Confrontation Clause.

State v. Robert A. Schoengarth, 2015AP1834-CR, 2/11/16, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it ordered that police could not testify about Schoengarth’s performance on field sobriety tests.

Review of a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (copied from the State’s petition for review):

No witness, expert or otherwise, may give an opinion at a trial that another mentally and physically competent witness is telling the truth. Here, the social worker who interviewed a child regarding her claim that she had been sexually assaulted  testified that there was no indication that the child had been coached and no indication that the child was not being honest during the interview. Did the social worker’s testimony constitute a prohibited opinion that, during this interview, the child was telling the truth?

State v. Trista J. Ziehr, 2015AP994-CR, 1/13/16, District 2 (one-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity, including briefs

There isn’t much case law on Wisconsin’s “mandatory reporter” requirement, and this opinion makes no attempt to fill the gaps. Ziehr ran a daycare center and thus had a mandatory duty to report child abuse to the proper authorities whenever she had reasonable cause to suspect that such abuse had occurred. Wis. Stat. §48.981(2) & (6). A jury convicted her of failing to report abuse by her son. On appeal she argued primarily that: (1) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury; (2) the State’s complaint was duplicitous, and (3) the trial court erroneously admitted “other acts” evidence. She lost on all issues.