On Point: 15. Evidence

State v. Todd J. Giese, 2014 WI App 92; case activity

Expert testimony regarding retrograde extrapolation of Giese’s blood alcohol concentration is admissible under new version of § 907.02(1) despite the fact some experts doubt its reliability because it was the product of reliable principles and methods and based upon sufficient facts and data.

State v. Ricky H. Jones, 2013AP1731-CR, District 2, 7/30/14 (unpublished); case actvity

Exclusion of expert testimony about defendant’s lack of propensity toward child sexual assault

In defending Jones against two counts of 1st-degree sexual assault of a child, his lawyer wanted to elicit expert testimony that Jones posed a low risk of committing a sexual offense–a strategy authorized by State v. Richard A.P., 223 Wis. 2d 777, 589 N.W.2d 674 (Ct. App. 1998).  Unfortunately, trial counsel failed to give the expert report to the State pursuant to its discovery demand, so the trial court excluded it under §971.23(7m)(a) and State v. Gribble, 2001 WI App 227, 248 Wis. 2d 409, 636 N.W.2d 488.  Jones was convicted and appealed.

State v. Jessica A. Nellessen, 2014 WI 84, 7/23/14, reversing a published court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity

Under the two-step procedure for determining whether a confidential informant’s identity should be disclosed, a court must first determine whether there is reason to believe that the informant “may be able to give testimony necessary to a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.” If so, the court must determine (usually after an in camera examination of either affidavits or the informant) whether “there is a reasonable probability that the informer can give the testimony.” § 905.10(3)(b); State v. Outlaw, 108 Wis. 2d 112, 124-26, 321 N.W.2d 145 (1982). In this case, the supreme court elaborates on what a defendant must show to satisfy the first step, concludes that the required showing is “a reasonable possibility, grounded in the facts and circumstances of the case, that a confidential informer may have information necessary to the defendant’s theory of defense” (¶2), and applies the test in a way that ultimately collapses the previous two-step procedure into a single step.

State v. Muhammad Sarfraz, 2014 WI 78, 7/22/14, reversing a published court of appeals opinion; opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity

The supreme court holds the circuit court incorrectly concluded that evidence of prior sexual activity between Sarfraz and I.N., the complainant in his sexual assault prosecution, was not relevant to a material fact in the case, but correctly concluded that the probative value of the evidence did not outweigh the prejudice to the complainant. Thus, the evidence was properly excluded.

State v. Luis M. Rocha-Mayo, 2014 WI 57, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; 7/11/14; majority opinion by Justice Crooks; case activity

Why tackle thorny legal issues surrounding Wis. Stat. §343.303’s prohibition against the use of PBTs at OWI trials when you can decide the case on harmless error grounds?  In this case, the PBT was ordered and administered by ER staff, not law enforcement. SCOW gets to pick and choose its cases. So when it grants review, the parties, their lawyers, the lower courts, and the bar hope the court will decide the legal issues, not re-review the evidence presented to the jury.  This fractured decision deserves a close look in order to understand what has and has not been decided about the use of PBTs in OWI trials.

State v. Rafeal Lyfold Myrick, 2014 WI 55, 7/10/14, affirming a published court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Roggensack; case activity

When does negotiation become agreement? In State v. Myrick, the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s resolution of this question was critical in determining whether the State could use incriminating statements that the defendant had made at a co-defendant’s preliminary hearing. The issue arose because the plea negotiations (one theory) or the plea agreement (alternate theory) fell apart, leading to the defendant’s trial on the original homicide charge.  On Point’s Special Guest Michael Tobin, Deputy SPD, offers his take on the issues.

State v. Antonio D. Williams, 2013AP814; 6/3/14; District 1; (not recommended for publication); case activity

This appeal raises a host of issues but the most interesting concern the trial court’s decisions to: (1) prohibit defense counsel from cross-examining the State’s cooperating witnesses, all of whom were testifying in the hopes of receiving reduced sentences for themselves, about the maximum penalties they faced; and (2) allow the State to use a letter police found in an envelope marked “for my lawyer” to impeach Williams’s alibi witness.

Fond du Lac County v. Douglas L. Bethke, 2013AP2297, District 2, 4/30/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it excluded evidence of particular crime lab errors that happened years before Bethke’s blood sample was analyzed.

State v. Daniel K. Rogers, 2012AP186-CR, District 4, 4/17/14; (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The defendant, having been charged with sexual assault and released on bond, allegedly choked his victim to make her to lie on his behalf at trial. The circuit court admitted this as § 904.04(2) “other acts” evidence at the sexual assault trial, and the COA affirmed because the evidence showed consciousness of guilt.

State v. Brian J. Anderson,  2013AP913-CR, District 1, 4/15/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

Anderson appealed his conviction for 1st-degree intentional homicide arguing that the trial court should have admitted evidence of his victim’s violent character under State v. McMorris and excluded “other acts” evidence under State v. Sullivan and § 904.04(2) and 904.03. The court of appeals rejects both arguments.