On Point: 15. Evidence

State v. Brian K. Avery, 2011 WI App 148 (recommended for publication), supreme court review granted, 2/23/12; for Avery: Keith A. Findley; case activity; prior 974.06 appeal: 2008AP500-CR; direct appeal: 1997AP317

Newly Discovered Evidence – New Forensic  Method – Photogrammetric Analysis 

Expert photogrammetric opinion, derived from video enhancement technology (“VISAR”) not commercially available until after Avery’s trial,

State v. Dion M. Echols, 2010AP2626-CR, District 1, 9/27/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Echols: Amelia L. Bizzaro; case activity

Evidence held sufficient to establish “great bodily harm” element of 1st-degree sexual assault, § 940.225(1)(a), where the harm was inflicted a short time after the assault.

¶23      In this case, the trial court properly determined that Echols’ shooting M.F. subsequent to the nonconsensual sexual contact constituted great bodily harm.  

State v. James T. Kettner, 2011 WI App 142 (recommended for publication); for Kettner: Andrew R. Hinkel, Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Hearing-Impaired Juror – Inability to Hear Certain Testimony 

A juror’s inability to hear most of alleged victim S.K.’s answers in a videotaped interview didn’t violate Kettner’s rights to impartial jury or due process, given that S.K. also testified in person consistent with her videotaped answers. 

seventh circuit court of appeals decision, denying habeas relief on review of Wis. COA No. 2008AP1533-CR; prior history: 2001AP713-CR, 1995AP1856-CR

Habeas – Exculpatory Evidence – Available to Defendant

Jardine argues that the State suppressed exculpatory evidence, namely that post-conviction testing of the gun he admittedly possessed but denied using to club the victim didn’t reveal the presence of the victim’s DNA.

State v. Stuart J. Gasper, 2010AP1973-CR, District 2, 9/14/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Gasper: Mark A. Schoenfeldt; case activity

On a trial for hit-and-run and OWI, evidence that just before the charged events, the defendant’s car struck another car, was not “other acts” evidence within § 904.04(2) but, rather, was admissible to show “context”:

¶13      At the postconviction motion hearing,

State v. William M. Hart, 2011AP582, District 1, 8/30/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Hart: Craig S. Powell; case activity

Although a (DOT-prepared) blood alcohol chart is admissible without expert testimony, State v. Hinz, 121 Wis. 2d 282, 284–85, 360 N.W.2d 56 (Ct. App. 1984), nonethless, “the proponent must lay the proper foundation for the evidence, and the burden does not shift to the opponent unless the proponent does so,” 

seventh circuit court of appeals decision, denying habeas relief in Wis COA No. 2008AP398-CR

Habeas – Duty to Preserve Apparent Exculpatory Evidence 

Pretrial destruction of car driven by McCarthy didn’t violate State’s duty to preserve exculpatory evidence, the court rejecting McCarthy’s argument that the destruction unconstitutionally impaired his affirmative defense of brake failure (against charge of causing great bodily harm by operating vehicle while under the influence,

State v. Gregg B. Kandutsch, 2011 WI 78, affirming unpublished decision; for Kandutsch: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Computer-Generated Report (Electronic Monitoring Device) – Foundation

Expert testimony isn’t necessary to lay a foundation for admissibility for a computer-generated EMD report:

¶28  Closing down a trial is not to be taken lightly, which is why the requirement of expert testimony is an extraordinary one.  

State v. Albert M. Virsnieks, 2010AP1967, District 2 / 1, 6/21/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); pro se; case activity

Virsnieks’ plea-based conviction for burglary supported  ch. 980 commitment.

¶35      A Wis. Stat. ch. 980 petition must allege, among other things, that a “person has been convicted of a sexually violent offense.”[5] Wis. Stat. § 980.02(2)(a)1.  A “[s]exually violent offense” is defined,

State v. Crystal P. Keith, 2010AP1667-CR, District 1, 5/24/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Keith: John A. Pray; case activity

On Keith’s conviction for reckless homicide in beating death of foster son, statements of her biological daughter (such as, “Why does mama have to go to jail for what my daddy did”) didn’t satisfy the test for newly discovered evidence. Keith’s confession to the police “was so detailed”