On Point blog, page 50 of 68
§ 902.01(2), Judicial Notice — Generally
State v. Leonard A. Sarnowski, 2005 WI App 48
For Sarnowski: Michael K. Gould, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate
Issue/Holding:
¶13. Trial courts may take judicial notice in limited areas-“fact[s] generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court,” or “fact[s] capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Wis. Stat. Rule 902.01(2). Significantly, a court may not take judicial notice unless the parties have at some point “an opportunity to be heard.”
§ 904.01, Relevance – Generally – FSTs
State v. Richard B. Wilkens, 2005 WI App 36
For Wilkens: Waring R. Fincke
Issue/Holding:
¶14. In Wisconsin, the general standard for admissibility is very low. Generally, evidence need only be relevant to be admissible. See Wis. Stat. § 904.02; State v. Eugenio, 219 Wis. 2d 391, 411, 579 N.W.2d 642 (1998) (“All relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise provided by law.”).
§ 904.01, Relevance – Field Sobriety Test
State v. Richard B. Wilkens, 2005 WI App 36
For Wilkens: Waring R. Fincke
Issue/Holding: Field sobriety tests (alphabet and finger-to-nose tests; and heel-to-toe walk) “are observational tools, not litmus tests that scientifically correlate certain types or numbers of ‘clues’ to various blood alcohol concentrations,” ¶17. Thus, the officer’s observations of Wilkens’ performance isn’t treated “any differently from his other subjective observations of Wilkens, i.e., his red and glassy eyes,
§ 904.01, Relevance – Gun Possession, on Charges of Drug Trafficking While Armed
State v. Sheldon C. Stank, 2005 WI App 236
For Stank: Dennis P. Coffey
Issue/Holding: On charges of drug trafficking while armed, possession of guns (along with flash suppressor and bulletproof vest) was admissible as relevant for purposes other than “bad character,” ¶¶35-39. (State v. Spraggin, 77 Wis. 2d 89, 252 N.W.2d 94 (1977) and State v. Wedgeworth, 100 Wis.
Particular Examples of Misconduct, § 904.04(2) – Intent — Child Abuse
State v. Kimberly B., 2005 WI App 115
For Kimberly B.: Anthony G. Milisauskas
Issue/Holding: Other acts evidence that on two prior occasions the defendant, while disciplining her child, had struck the child with sufficient force to cause injury and require government intervention, was relevant and admissible under § 904.04 to prove the intent element of the charged offense of abuse of a child, § 948.03(2)(b), and also to disprove the defense of reasonable discipline.
§ 904.10, Defendant’s Unsolicited Statement to Court Asking for Care by “Mental Doctors”
State v. Van G. Norwood, 2005 WI App 218
For Norwood: Terry Evans Williams
Issue: Whether defendant’s letter to the trial court, stating that he did not want the case to go to trial; that he wished to be placed in a facility in the care of “mental doctors”; and that the court sentence him for a Class B felony, was admissible.
Holding:
¶20 We agree with Norwood that Wis.
Privilege – Patient-Counselor, § 905.04(4) (2001-02) – Extinguished by Mandatory Reporting Obligations
State v. Denis L.R., 2005 WI 110, affirming as modified 2004 WI App 51
For Intervenor Dawn R.: Dwight D. Darrow
Issue/Holding: Revelation of a child’s statement to a counselor, discussing whether or not she had been sexually abused, may not be resisted on ground of privilege:
¶7 We do not address these issues regarding waiver because we conclude that there is no privilege here.
Privilege – Comment on Silence, Permissible Impeachment, § 905.13
State v. Maurice S. Ewing, 2005 WI App 206
For Ewing: David R. Karpe
Issue/Holding: Where the defendant waived his rights and gave pre-trial statements to the police and presented an alibi defense at trial, prosecutorial evidence that the defendant had not revealed the alibi during those statements, and exploitation of that omission during closing argument, did not amount to impermissible comment on silence. “Rather, the prosecutor was highlighting the inconsistency between what Ewing did say and what his alibi witnesses testified to at trial.” ¶¶10-13.
“Maday” Examination of Complainant Where State’s Expert Never Conducted Exam
State v. Lionel N. Anderson, 2005 WI App 238
For Anderson: Harry R. Hertel; Steven H. Gibbs
Issue/Holding: Where the State’s expert witness never interviewed the victim (nor viewed a videotape of the victim’s statement), the defendant wasn’t entitled to a psychological examination of the victim pursuant to State v. Maday, 179 Wis. 2d 346, 359-60, 507 N.W.2d 365 (Ct. App. 1993), ¶27.
Controlled Substance – Sufficiency of Evidence, Proof of Substance — Presumptive and Confirmatory Testing
State v. Sheldon C. Stank, 2005 WI App 236
For Stank: Dennis P. Coffey
Issue/Holding: Proof of the controlled substance is sufficient where a “presumptive” test is followed by a “confirmatory” one (State v. Dye, 215 Wis. 2d 281, 572 N.W.2d 524 (Ct. App. 1997), followed), with the PDR being used to establish the presumption:
¶42 Here,