On Point: 15. Evidence

State v. John P. Hunt, 2003 WI 81, reversing unpublished order of court of appeals
For Hunt: Rex R. Anderegg

Issue/Holding:

¶72. In determining whether a piece of evidence is unfairly prejudicial, we have held that cautionary instructions help to limit any unfair prejudice that might otherwise result. Plymesser, 172 Wis. 2d at 596-97.¶73. Contrary to Hunt’s argument and the court of appeals’

State v. John P. Hunt, 2003 WI 81, reversing unpublished order of court of appeals
For Hunt: Rex R. Anderegg

Issue/Holding:

¶43. The State maintains that the court of appeals erred in interpreting Sullivan. We agree. Sullivan does not state, as the decision of the court of appeals suggests, that in situations where the circuit court fails to set forth a detailed analysis for admitting or excluding other-acts evidence,

State v. John P. Hunt, 2003 WI 81, reversing unpublished order of court of appeals
For Hunt: Rex R. Anderegg

Issue/Holding:

¶58. First, the circuit court could reasonably have concluded, as it did, that the other-acts evidence was admissible for the purpose of establishing context. Other-acts evidence is permissible to show the context of the crime and to provide a complete explanation of the case. 

State v. John P. Hunt, 2003 WI 81, reversing unpublished order of court of appeals
For Hunt: Rex R. Anderegg

Issue/Holding:  

¶59. The other-acts evidence was permissible to show the victims’ state of mind, to corroborate information provided to the police, and to establish the credibility of victims and witnesses in light of their recantations. Such purposes have been held to be permissible purposes in Wisconsin. 

State v. John P. Hunt, 2003 WI 81, reversing unpublished order of court of appeals
For Hunt: Rex R. Anderegg

Issue/Holding:

¶60. Next, the circuit court could reasonably have concluded that the other-acts evidence was admissible for the purpose of establishing opportunity and motive. When a defendant’s motive for an alleged sexual assault is an element of the charged crime, we have held that other crimes evidence may be offered for the purpose of establishing opportunity and motive. 

State v. Timothy M. Ziebart, 2003 WI App 258
For Ziebart: Robert R. Henak

Issue: Whether the holding of State v. Alsteen, 108 Wis. 2d 723, 324 N.W.2d 426 (1982) (re sexual assault where the defendant admits the act but claims consent: prior sexual misconduct has no probative value) imposes an absolute bar against admissibility of prior other-acts to prove the contested issue of consent.

State v. Robert Jamont Wright, 2003 WI App 252
For Wright: Ann Auberry

Issue/Holding:

¶44. Alternatively, Wright argues that Lomack’s testimony was admissible as other acts evidence of a third-party perpetrator pursuant to Scheidell. Scheidell involved the admissibility of other acts evidence committed by an unknown third party, which was proffered by the accused on the issue of identity.

State v. William A. Silva, 2003 WI App 191, PFR filed 9/4/03
For Silva: Martin E. Kohler, Brian Kinstler, Donald E. Chewning

Issue/Holding: Prior sexual assaults were admissible at Silva’s trial for 1st-degree sexual assault of his 6-year old niece: Silva’s 13-year old niece; Silva’s girlfriend’s 13-year old daughter; and Silva’s 9-year old daughter. ¶¶27-28.

State v. Richard G.B., 2003 WI App 13, PFR filed 1/13/03
For Richard G.B.: Bridget E. Boyle

Issue: Whether the “third-party exception” to spousal privilege — which overrides the privilege for crimes committed “against” the spouse, § 905.05(3) — is triggered by sexual assault of a non-spouse, on the theory that such an act amounts to adultery, § 944.16(1), hence a crime against the spouse.

Holding:

¶15.

State v. Phonesavanh Vanmanivong, 2003 WI 41, reversing, 2001 WI App 299
For Vanmanivong: John J. Grau

Issue/Holding:

¶33. With the benefit of these above-stated standards, we now move to the second issue: the application of the procedures in this case. The parties here agree, as do we, that it was error for the circuit court to rely upon an unsworn memo in determining whether the identities of the confidential informants should be disclosed.