On Point: 15. Evidence

State v. Alan M. Johnson, 2018AP2318-CR, review of published opinion granted 9/16/20; case activity (including briefs)

Issues for review (from the State’s Petition)

1. Was Johnson entitled to a jury instruction for perfect self-defense based on his testimony concerning his motivation for trespassing with a loaded firearm in KM’s house, despite the fact that KM was unarmed, shot five times, and Johnson could not recall anything about the shooting other than that KM “lunged” at him?

2. Was Johnson entitled to submission of the lesser-included offense of second-degree reckless homicide under the above circumstances?

3. Did the circuit court erroneously exercise its discretion in excluding evidence of alleged child pornography Johnson found on KM’s computer before he killed KM?

State v. M.E., 2019AP2228, 9/1/2020, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

M.E. was adjudicated delinquent after a bench trial. During the trial, the judge overheard a conversation between a state’s witness and the prosecutor that led her to believe her sequestration order had been violated. M.E. argues the judge was disqualified because she was now a witness in her own case; the court of appeals concludes she cured any problem by striking the witness’s testimony.

Rock County v. R.J., 2020AP93, 8/13/20, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Thank heavens this opinion is not published. R.J’s initial commitment expired before he filed his notice of appeal. According to the court of appeals, R.J. should have sua sponte addressed mootness in his initial brief–before the County ever argued the point. Because R.J. waited to see whether the County would even raise mootness and then addressed the matter in his reply, the court of appeals dismissed his appeal. The court of appeals also made an error of law regarding the “contemporaneous objection” requirement.  Hopefully, R.J. will move for reconsideration or petition for review.

State v. Bobby L. McNeil, 2019AP467-CR & 2019468-CR, District 1, 7/21/10 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

McNeil was convicted of drug offenses, obstructing, and bail jumping after a trial in two consolidated cases. His challenges to the joinder of the cases and to various evidentiary issues are rejected, but he prevails on the challenge to his sentence because the circuit court relied on inaccurate information at sentencing.

State v. Samuel L. Nichols, Jr., 2019AP802-CR, District 4, 7/16/20 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Nichols was charged with capturing images of nudity without consent and sexual assault. He argues the police didn’t have probable cause to seize his cell phone and therefore the images they found on it must be suppressed. He also asserts other-acts evidence was erroneously admitted at his trial. The court of appeals rejects both claims.

State v. Timothy E. Dobbs, 2020 WI 64, 7/3/20, affirming an unpublished per curiam court of appeals opinion, 2018AP319; case activity (including briefs)

There’s really only one important holding here: despite adoption of the Daubert standard, Wisconsin continues to permit expert testimony in the form of “dissertation or exposition.” That is, an expert can educate the jury about the principles or findings of his or her field without talking about the facts of the case, and an expert who does so is not subject to the requirement that he or she “appl[y] the principles and methods” of that field “reliably to the facts of the case.” Though the court also decides a separate Miranda issue, the discussion is fact-intensive and breaks no legal ground. What’s notable (and regrettable) about the Miranda decision is a meandering three-justice concurrence that repeats the court’s error in State v. Bartelt, 2018 WI 16, 379 Wis. 2d 588, 906 N.W.2d 684, by grafting a third step onto the familiar two-part Miranda-custody inquiry.

State v. Alan M. Johnson, 2020 WI App 50, state’s petition for review granted, 9/16/20, affirmed in part, reversed in part, 2021 WI 61; case activity (including briefs)

Johnson killed his brother-in-law, K.M., while he was in K.M.’s house, uninvited, to look to see whether K.M. had child porn on his computer. The court of appeals orders a new trial for Johnson because the trial court erred in denying Johnson’s perfect self-defense instruction and lesser-included offense instruction and in excluding evidence that there was, in fact, child porn on K.M.’s computer.

County of Milwaukee v. Christann Spannraft, 2018AP1553 & 1554, 6/23/20, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including respondent’s brief)

This is a pro se appeal of an OWI-1st conviction. Spannraft raises three claims, all of which are rejected.

State v. Mark J. Bucki, 2020 WI App 43; case activity (including briefs)

[UPDATED POST – Scroll to the bottom for very useful commentary by Chris Zachar. Many thanks to him for sharing his knowledge.]

The headline tells you the only legal proposition you need to take from this soon-to-be-published case: under Daubert, evidence that trained dogs indicated the defendant had been at a particular location, and also that there had once been human remains in other locations, is not subject to a per se rule requiring corroboration before it can be admitted at trial. In a given case, a circuit court could conclude that particular dog-sniff evidence is not sufficiently reliable to come in (with or without corroboration). But Bucki’s argument–that dog-sniff evidence is so inherently unreliable that it necessarily requires corroboration–is rejected. We read the 50-page opinion, so you don’t have to.

State v. David Gutierrez, 2020 WI 52, reversing in part a published court of appeals opinion, 6/3/20; case activity (including briefs)

In a 5-0 decision, SCOW affirms all parts of this published court of appeals decision but one. The court of appeals held that the circuit court erred in refusing to admit evidence that excluded Gutierrez as the source of male DNA in the underwear and around the mouth of a victim of child sexual assault. The assaults involved oral sex and attempted vaginal intercourse. SCOW reversed the court of appeals on that point.