On Point: 16. Ex Post Facto

State v. Tabitha A. Scruggs, 2015 WI App 88, petition for review granted, 3/7/16, affirmed, 2017 WI 15; case activity (including briefs)

Addressing a question left open by State v. Radaj, 2015 WI App 50, 363 Wis. 2d 633, 866 N.W.2d 758, the court of appeals holds that the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws does not bar the mandatory imposition of a DNA surcharge for a single felony conviction based on conduct that was committed before the mandatory DNA surcharge requirement took effect.

Michael Belleau v. Edward Wall, Case No. 12-CV-1198 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 21, 2015); reversed (1/29/16).

“The question presented in this case is whether … a person who has already served his sentence for his crimes and is no longer under any form of court ordered supervision can be forced by the State to wear such a device and to pay the State for the cost of monitoring him for the rest of his life.” (Slip op. at 11). A federal district judge answers “no” to that question, and holds that requiring Belleau to comply with § 301.48 by wearing a GPS tracking device for the rest of his life after he had finished his criminal sentence and was discharged from his ch. 980 commitment violates the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws and the Fourth Amendment.

State v. Gregory Mark Radaj, 2015 WI App 50; case activity (including briefs)

A defendant who committed a felony before the effective date of the law mandating a $250 DNA surcharge for each felony conviction, but who is sentenced after that effective date, cannot be made to pay the surcharge on each felony conviction because that violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Instead, the defendant may only be subject to a single discretionary surcharge of $250.

State v. Garett T. Elward, 2015 WI App 51; case activity (including briefs)

Defendants who committed a misdemeanor offense before April 1, 2015 January 1, 2014, cannot be made to pay the mandatory $200 DNA surcharge that is supposed to be imposed for each misdemeanor conviction beginning January 1, 2014, because imposition of the surcharge on that class of defendants violates the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions. [See UPDATE below regarding the date change.]

State v. David E. Hull, 2015 WI App 46; case activity (including briefs)

The recently enacted statute allowing the admission of hearsay evidence at preliminary hearings is not an unconstitutional ex post facto law because it affects only the evidence that may be admitted at the preliminary hearing and does not alter the quantum or nature of evidence necessary to convict the defendant. In addition, the court commissioner properly refused to allow Hull to call the alleged victim to testify at the preliminary hearing because the anticipated testimony was not relevant to the probable cause inquiry.

State ex rel. Aman Singh v. Paul Kemper, 2014 WI App 43, petitions for review and cross review granted 11/4/15, affirmed in part and reversed in part, 2016 WI 67; case activity

When Singh committed, or was convicted and sentenced for, his offenses, he was eligible for early release under statutes enacted by 2009 Wisconsin Act 28. But by the time he arrived at prison,

Marvin Peugh v. United States, USSC No. 12-62, 6/10/13

United States Supreme Court decision, reversing United States v. Peugh, 675 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2012)

Resolving a split between federal circuit courts, the Supreme Court holds that a sentencing court violates the Ex Post Facto Clause by using the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing instead of the Guidelines in effect at the time of the offense,

City of South Milwaukee v. Todd J. Kester, 2013 WI App 50; case activity

Sex offender residency restrictions – constitutionality; ex post facto and double jeopardy

 South Milwaukee’s ordinance prohibiting persons convicted of certain child sex offenses from living within 1,000 feet of a school or other facility frequented by children does not violate the double jeopardy or ex post facto prohibitions of the state or federal constitution:

¶31      Kester fails to offer the “clearest proof”

Question Presented:

The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual directs a court to “use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the defendant is sentenced” unless “the court determines that use of the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the defendant is sentenced would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.” Eight courts of appeals have held that the Ex Post Facto Clause is violated where retroactive application of the Sentencing Guidelines creates a significant risk of a higher sentence.

U.S. v. Marcus, USSC No. 08-1341, 5/24/10

… (A)n appellate court may,in its discretion, correct an error not raised at trial only where the appellant demonstrates that (1) there is an “error”; (2) the error is “clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute”; (3) the error “affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means” it “affected the outcome of the district court proceedings”; and (4) “the error seriously affect[s] the fairness,