On Point: 18. Extradition/detainers

State ex rel Frederick Lee Pharm v. Bartow, 2007 WI 13, affirming 2005 WI App 215
For Pharm: Jon G. Furlow, Nia Enemuch-Trammell,Roisin H. Bell (Pro Bono)

Issue/Holding: The IAD applies only during “imprisonment,” and is therefore inapplicable to “parole”:

¶25      Pharm also argues that his Nevada parole is “imprisonment,” as that term is used in the IAD. Imprisonment is not defined in the IAD.

State v. Jeffrey Townsend, 2006 WI App 177, PFR filed 8/18/06
For Townsend: Ellen Henak, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding: Because the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, § 976.05, doesn’t prescribe dismissal as a sanction for a state’s failure to notify a prisoner of a lodged detainer, dismissal as a remedy for such a violation is not supported:

¶17 Any IAD violation was the fault of Illinois,

State ex rel. Kenneth Onapolis  v. State, 2006 WI App 84, PFR filed 5/25/06
Pro se

Issue/Holding: Extradition from Australia to Wisconsin to face bank fraud and federal tax charges did not preclude, under the Rule of Specialty, Onapolis’s return on an outstanding parole violation warrant, at least where the parole violations included the fraud and tax offenses. (“The Rule of Specialty generally requires that an extradited defendant be tried for the crimes on which extradition has been granted,

State v. Michael D. Lewis, 2004 WI App 211
For Lewis: Timothy A. Provis

Issue/Holding:

¶10. The State does not dispute that it failed to bring Lewis’s case to trial within 120 days after the district attorney’s office received his request for prompt disposition of his case. …

¶11. The statute mandates that when the case is not brought to trial within 120 days,

State v. Andrew S. Miller, 2003 WI App 74, PFR filed 4/11/03
For Miller: Brian C. Findley, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶12. This court has found that rights under the Detainer Act “are statutory in nature and may be waived by a defendant’s request for a procedure inconsistent with its provisions.” Brown, 118 Wis. 2d at 386. By firing his lawyer six days before the scheduled start of trial and twenty-eight days before the expiration of the time period,

State ex rel. Bradley Jones v. Smith, 2002 WI App 90, PFR filed 4/19/02

Issue: Whether a prisoner is entitled to discharge of sentence if transported through another state without use of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, § 976.03.

Holding: 

¶5                        According to Jones and Morey, the government is required to use the extradition process whenever and wherever prisoners are transported through noncontracting states on their way to incarceration in a contracting state. 

State v. Christopher Lee Davis, 2001 WI 136, reversing 2001 WI App 61
For Davis: Jane Krueger Smith

Issue1: Whether a circuit has discretion to dismiss a case with prejudice under § 971.11(7), for failure of the state to bring it on for trial within the 120-day period set by § 971.11(2).

Holding:

¶14. We agree with the court of appeals that ‘the legislature has left the matter up to the courts to exercise its [sic] discretion to dismiss with prejudice in a proper case lest the statute have no meaning at all.’ This interpretation of Wis.

State v. Mohammed A. Nonahal, 2001 WI App 39
For Nonahal: David R. Karpe

Issue: Whether the defendant waived a claimed violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers’ anti-shuttling provision, by requesting to be sent back to the sending jurisdiction before trial.

Holding:

¶8; … we conclude that rights granted under the anti-shuttling provision of the IAD are statutory in nature and may be waived if the prisoner requests a procedure inconsistent with the statute’s provisions….¶9;

State v. Danny C. Eesley, 225 Wis.2d 248, 591 N.W.2d 846 (1999), affirming unpublished decision
For Eesley: Kyle H. Torvinen, Hendricks, Knudson, Gee, Hayden & Torvinen, S.C.

Issue/Holding: A writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, § 782.44 (1993-94), is not a detainer and therefore doesn’t trigger the trial deadline of the Interstate Act on Detainers, § 976.05.

The court declines, on waiver grounds, to address a potential argument that using the writ to transfer a defendant from federal prison to state court violates the Executive Privilege Clause in U.S.