On Point: A. Overbreadth

State v. Peter J. King, 2020 WI App 66;  case activity (including briefs)

Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S Ct. 1730 (2017) struck down a law making it a felony for a registered sex offender to use any social networking site that permits minors to become members or to create personal web page. The statute was so broad that it violated the 1st Amendment. See our post here. In this case, the court of appeals holds that Packingham’s reasoning does not apply to court-ordered conditions of extended supervision that sharply restrict a defendant’s access to the internet. 

State v. James L. Jackson, 2020 WI App 4; case activity (including briefs)

Jackson pleaded to the crime of failing to give updated information to the sex offender registry. The information at issue was the fact that he’d created a Facebook account and email address. This ran afoul of Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(a)6m., which requires a registrant to turn over (among other things) the “name or number of every electronic mail account the person uses” and “the name and Internet address of every public or private Internet profile the person creates, uses, or maintains.” On appeal, he argues that this provision unconstitutionally burdens his right to engage in anonymous speech.

State v. Norris W. Culver, 2018 WI App 55; case activity (including briefs)

Wisconsin Stat. § 942.09(3m)(a)2. prohibits a person from posting or publishing “private representations” without the consent of the person depicted in the representation. The court of appeals rejects Culver’s claim that the statute is void because it’s overbroad and vague. The court also rejects his claim that the felon-in-possession statute is unconstitutional as applied to him because of the non-violent nature of his prior felony conviction.

State v. Christopher J. Oatman, 2015 WI App 76; case activity (including briefs)

The statute prohibiting a registered sex offender from intentionally photographing a minor without parental consent, § 948.14, violates the First Amendment because it “indiscriminately casts a wide net over expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment ….” (¶18, quoting State v. Stevenson, 2000 WI 71, ¶22, 236 Wis. 2d 86, 613 N.W.2d 90).

State of Wisconsin ex rel. Two Unnamed Petitioners v. The Honorable Gregory Peterson et al.; State of Wisconsin ex rel. Francis D. Schmitz v. the Honorable Gregory Peterson, & State of Wisconsin ex rel. Three Unnamed Petitioners v. The Honorable Gregory Peterson, et al., 2015 WI 85, issued 7/16/15; case activity: Two Unnamed Petitioners; Schmitz v. Peterson; Three Unnamed Petitioners

Unless you’ve just returned from a trip to a remote corner of the globe that’s beyond the reach of news media, you know by now that the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided the so-called “John Doe” cases. The court’s decision ordered a halt into the investigation of coordinated fundraising and spending between candidate committees and certain independent groups during the 2011-12 recall campaigns. Gargantuan by any standard, the decision goes on for almost 400 pages, with a majority opinion, two concurrences (Prosser and Ziegler), and two dissents/concurrences (Abrahamson and Crooks). It contains almost nothing of relevance to ordinary criminal law practice. However, in the interest of helping orient readers who may want to look more closely at the decision, below the break is a summary of the major issues and how the various opinions address them.

Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion County, Indiana, Case No. 12-2512, 1/23/13; Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision

A recent Indiana statute prohibits most registered sex offenders from using social networking websites, instant messaging services, and chat programs. John Doe, on behalf of a class of similarly situated sex offenders, challenges this law on First Amendment grounds. We reverse the district court and hold that the law as drafted is unconstitutional. Though content neutral,

State v. Bradley S. Johnson, Outagamie Co. Circ. Ct. No. 12CM495

circuit court decision; case activity

Panhandling prosecution under § 947.02(4) is dismissed with prejudice because the vagrancy statute is unconstitutional under first amendment analysis: panhandling (“begging”) is a form of protected speech and its criminalization under § 947.02(4) is fatally vague and overbroad. State v. Starks, 51 Wis.2d 256, 186 N.W.2d 245 (1971) (loitering statute unconstitutional as providing insufficient notice of prohibited conduct,

State v. Gary M. Hemmingway, 2012 WI App 133; case activity

Stalking,  § 940.32(2m)(a), which previously survived overbreadth and vagueness challenges based on rights to travel and equal protection, State v. Ruesch, 214 Wis. 2d 548, 571 N.W.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1997), now withstands a free-speech challenge: The statute isn’t a facially overbroad regulation of protected speech, in that the first amendment doesn’t immunize intentional conduct aimed at causing serious distress or fear of bodily harm.

United States v. Alvarez, USSC No. 11-210 (6/28/12), affirming 638 F.3d 666 (9th Cir. 2011).

The Nation well knows that one of the costs of the First Amendment is that it protects the speech we detest as well as the speech we embrace.  Though few might find respondent’s statements anything but contemptible, his right to make those statements is protected by the Constitution’s guarantee of freedom of speech and expression.

State v. Christopher J. Lesik, 2010 WI App 12, PFR filed
For Lesik: Anthony Cotton

Issue/Holding: Sexual assault (intercourse) of a child, § 948.02, isn’t unconstitutionally overbroad, against a theory that it criminalizes acts undertaken for “proper medical purpose.” Although the statute is silent with respect to medical conduct, potential overbreadth may be cured through judicial construction and the court therefore “conclude(s) here that ‘sexual intercourse’ as used in the sexual assault of a child statute does not include ‘bona fide medical,