On Point: B. Speech

State v. Michael W. Crute, 2015 WI App 15; case activity

An administrative rule (§ Adm 2.14(2)(vm)(intro.) and 5.) requires a permit for any rally, meeting, or similar event held in a state building, and persons participating in an unpermitted event can be ticketed for “unlawful assembly.” But the rule did not contain a minimum group size, so it covered unpermitted events undertaken by as few as one person. The court of appeals holds the rule is not a valid time, place, and manner regulation under the First Amendment because it was not narrowly tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest. It also rejects the state’s attempt to save the rule by construing it to apply only to groups over 20 persons.

State v. Thomas G. Smith, 2013AP2516-CR, District 4, 7/3/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The profane comments Smith posted on a police department’s Facebook page are not “fighting words” because that category of unprotected speech only covers statements made in the context of a face-to-face communication.

McCullen v. Coakley, USSC No. 12-1168, 2014 WL 2882079 (June 26, 2014), reversing McCullen v. Coakley, 708 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

In this decision the Supreme Court strikes down a Massachusetts law making it a crime to stand on a public road or sidewalk within thirty-five feet of a reproductive health care facility. While all the justices agree the law violates the First Amendment, they do not agree on the reasons for reaching that result.

Questions presented

Whether, consistent with the First Amendment and Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), conviction of threatening another person requires proof of the defendant’s subjective intent to threaten, as required by the Ninth Circuit and the supreme courts of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont; or whether it is enough to show that a “reasonable person” would regard the statement as threatening, as held by other federal courts of appeals and state courts of last resort.

Whether, as a matter of statutory interpretation, conviction of threatening another person under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) requires proof of the defendant’s subjective intent to threaten.

State v. Donald W. Maier, 2013AP1391-CR, District 4, 5/8/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

The First Amendment did not preclude prosecuting Maier for stalking based on letters he sent because the letters constituted a “true threat” and thus were not protected speech.

State v. Kaleb K., 2013AP839, District 4, 11/27/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Kaleb posted a video on YouTube that depicted him “rapping” a song about his Spanish teacher. The song used “crude and vulgar sexual language” about the teacher. (¶2). (The trial court was harsher, characterizing the video as “obscene and hate-filled” and “shocking, hard to watch, really disgusting.” (¶3).) Based on the video Kaleb was charged in juvenile court with disorderly conduct under § 947.01(1) and unlawful use of a computerized communication system under § 947.0125(2)(d).

Questions presented:

1.     Massachusetts has a law that makes it a crime for speakers other than clinic employees or agents acting within the scope of employment to “enter or remain on a public way or sidewalk” within 35 feet of an entrance, exit, or driveway of  “a reproductive health care facility.” Did the First Circuit err in upholding this law under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, on its face and as applied to petitioners?

State v. James D. Hills, 2012AP1901-CR, District 4, 4/11/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Hills sent letters and made at least one phone call to an assistant city attorney (ACA) who, he believed, had wrongfully prosecuted him under the city’s disorderly conduct ordinance. In those communications he berated the ACA (calling her incompetent, corrupt, dishonest, deceitful, worthless, and worse), accused her of prosecuting him with perjured testimony so she could collect money for the city,

State v. Christopher Baron, 2009 WI 58, affirming 2008 WI App 90
For Baron: Daniel P. Dunn

Issue/Holding: The identity theft charge against Baron, sending emails from Fischer’s account without authorization and with intent to harm his reputation as a government official, survives strict scrutiny analysis under the First Amendment (freedom of speech clause):

¶45      To survive strict scrutiny, the State has the burden to show that the “‘regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.’” 

State v. Christopher Baron, 2009 WI 58, affirming 2008 WI App 90
For Baron: Daniel P. Dunn

Issue/Holding: The charge of identity theft, based on Baron’s alleged conduct in sending emails from Fischer’s account without authorization and with intent to harm his reputation, is “content based” within the meaning of First Amendment analysis:

¶38      In the case at hand, we conclude that Wis.