On Point blog, page 1 of 1
SCOTUS to consider mental state requirement for “true threats”
Counterman v. Colorado, USSC No. 22-138; cert. granted 1/13/23; reversed 6/27/23 Scotusblog page (containing links to briefs and commentary)
Question presented:
Whether, to establish that a statement is a “true threat” unprotected by the First Amendment, the government must show that the speaker subjectively knew or intended the threatening nature of the statement, or whether it is enough to show that an objective “reasonable person” would regard the statement as a threat of violence.
Court of Appeals rejects constitutional challenges to ban on posting or publishing private pictures, felon in possession statute
State v. Norris W. Culver, 2018 WI App 55; case activity (including briefs)
Wisconsin Stat. § 942.09(3m)(a)2. prohibits a person from posting or publishing “private representations” without the consent of the person depicted in the representation. The court of appeals rejects Culver’s claim that the statute is void because it’s overbroad and vague. The court also rejects his claim that the felon-in-possession statute is unconstitutional as applied to him because of the non-violent nature of his prior felony conviction.
SCOTUS: Federal statute criminalizing threatening communication requires proof of scienter
Elonis v. United States, USSC No. 13-983, 2015 WL 2464051 (June 1, 2015), reversing United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3rd Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
This case involved a prosecution of Elonis for threats he made in postings on his Facebook page, and it was being widely watched for the First Amendment question it raised. But the Court sidestepped the constitutional question, and holds instead that 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), the federal statute he was prosecuted under, requires the government to prove some sort of mental state regarding the threatening nature of the communication.
Exposing genitals to a child, § 948.10, is limited to situations involving face-to-face contact and therefore doesn’t cover “sexting”
State v. Zachary P. Stuckey, 2013 WI App 98; case activty
The court of appeals concludes that the prohibition in § 948.10 against exposing genitals to a child is a “variable obscenity” statute, and to avoid unconstitutional application it must be read to require proof the defendant knew he was exposing himself to someone under the age of 18. Because the statute does not explicitly include that element,
§ 948.11(2) — Exposing Minors to Harmful Materials — Constitutionality
State v. John T. Trochinski, 2002 WI 56, affirming unpublished decision
For Trochinski: James L. Fullin, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue: Whether § 948.11(2) is unconstitutional because it doesn’t require proof of knowledge of the age of the person to whom harmful materials are displayed (minority being the sole differentiating factor between noncriminal/protected and criminal conduct.
Holding:
¶39. We conclude that the constitutionality of Wis.
First Amendment – Scienter – Exposure to Harmful Materials via Internet, § 948.11
State v. Lane R. Weidner, 2000 WI 52, 235 Wis. 2d 306, 611 N.W.2d 684, on certification
For Weidner: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue: Whether § 948.11(2) is unconstitutional.
Holding:
¶43 In sum, we determine that Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2) is unconstitutional in the context of the internet and other situations that do not involve face-to-face contact. Because the statute does not require the State to prove a defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s age when disseminating materials deemed harmful to children,