On Point: A. Plea agreements

Lafler v. Anthony Cooper, USSC No. 10-209, 3/21/12, vacating and remanding, 376 Fed. Appx. 563 (6th Cir. 2010); prior post; companion case: Missouri v. Frye, 10-444

Cooper turned down a favorable plea bargain and instead went to trial, after his attorney erroneously told him the prosecution would be unable to establish intent to kill because the victim had been shot below the waist.

United States Supreme Court decision, vacating and remanding, 311 S.W.2d 350 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010); prior post; companion case: Lafler v. Cooper, 10-209

Counsel – Effective Assistance – Plea Bargaining 

Counsel’s failure to communicate to Frye a favorable plea bargain offer from the prosecutor was deficient performance under 6th amendment analysis of effective assistance of counsel.

Gregory L. Payne v. Basinger, 7th Cir No. 10-1869, 11/10/11

seventh circuit decision

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel – Guilty Pleas – Prejudice 

The state court erroneously concluded that, because Basinger would have been convicted anyway had he gone to trial, he suffered no prejudice from counsel’s erroneous advice as to the maximum sentence he faced on acceptance of the plea bargain:

That was a mistake.

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Wells: Matthew Murray; case activity

Plea Bargaining – Judicial Participation 

Neither the trial court’s allusion to the disposition it would impose if Wells pleaded guilty (“I’ll probably go along with the recommendation,” but proceeding to trial “would be a whole different ballgame”) nor its own assessment of the representation advice it would have given (“I’d probably tell that client to take the deal … because you got [] big exposure”) amounted to prohibited judicial participation in the plea bargaining process:

¶10      We conclude that,

State v. Christina L. Contizano, 2011AP477-CR, District 4, 10/27/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Contizano: Robert C. Howard III; case activity

At Contizano’s sentencing for obstructing, based on lying to the police about her daughter’s location, the trial court didn’t erroneously exercise discretion in allowing Contizano’s ex-husband to advocate as a “victim” of the offense, in favor of a term of incarceration.

¶7        We conclude the court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it considered the Walworths’ statements at sentencing.  

Premo v. Moore, USSC No. 09-659, 1/19/11, vacating grant of habeas relief, in 574 F.3d 1092

Moore, who admitted brutalizing the victim and shooting him in the temple, accepted a plea bargain on advice of counsel: he pleaded guilty to felony-murder, and received the minimum allowable sentence, thus avoiding a capital-offense charge. He raised a postconviction challenge to counsel’s failure to seek suppression of his statement to the police,

Docket

Decision below (CTA6)

Questions Presented:

Anthony Cooper faced assault with intent to murder charges. His counsel advised him to reject a plea offer based on a misunderstanding of Michigan law. Cooper rejected the offer, and he was convicted as charged. Cooper does not assert that any error occurred at the trial. On habeas review, the Sixth Circuit found that because there is a reasonable probability that Cooper would have accepted the plea offer had he been adequately advised,

State v. Mark Allan Campbell, 2011 WI App 18; for Campbell: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate; Campbell BiC; State Resp.; Reply

(Sentencing issue in the case discussed separately, here.)

Plea Bargain – Breach

The plea agreement required the prosecutor to recommend a 20-year sentence, comprised of 5-7 years’ confinement and the balance on extended supervision,

State v. Christopher Jones, 2009AP2761-CR, District 1, 9/28/10

court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Jones: Jeremy C. Perri, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; BiC; Resp.; Reply

The court rejects a claim of an “end-run” around the plea bargain, which limited the State’s recommendation to 10 years imprisonment while leaving the “configuration” of confinement and supervision to judicial discretion, based on prosecutorial comments:

• the “whole matter was “aggravated by the defendant’s record,”

State v. James Stoner, III, 2009AP2963, District 2, 9/22/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Stoner: Joshua Davis Uller; BiC; Resp.; Reply

“Reopen-and-amend” plea bargains, “referring to those plea bargains where the State and defendant agree that a judgment of conviction, once announced, will be amended by the State upon the happening of some future event.