On Point blog, page 31 of 44
Finality of Order – Trial Court’s Inherent Authority to Reconsider Non-Final Order
State v. Frederick W. Rushing, 2007 WI App 227, PFR filed 10/25/07
For Rushing: Randall E. Paulson, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate
Issue/Holding: Trial courts possess inherent authority to reconsider any non-final ruling prior to entry of final order or judgment, ¶13, citing State v. Bobby R. Williams, 2005 WI App 221, ¶17, 287 Wis. 2d 748, 706 N.W.2d 355.
The trial court reconsidered its own prior sua sponte vacatur of a guilty plea.
“Alford” Plea – Challenge to Trial Court’s Refusal to Accept
State v. William F. Williams, 2000 WI App 123, 237 Wis.2d 591, 614 N.W.2d 11
For Williams: Steven P. Weiss, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue: Whether the trial court’s express policy of never accepting an “Alford” plea worked an erroneous refusal to accept such a plea.
Holding:
¶8 Even if we were to determine that the trial court erred in rejecting the tendered Alford plea,
Guilty Pleas – Required Knowledge – Maximum Punishment: Possible Consecutive Sentences
State v. James E. Brown, 2006 WI 100, reversing summary order
For Brown: Richard D. Martin, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate
Issue/Holding: A plea colloquy is not required to caution the defendant that punishment for each of multiple charges could be imposed consecutively, ¶78.
Guilty Plea Waiver Rule – Generally, Exception for IAC Claim
State v. Juan F. Milanes, 2006 WI App 259, PFR filed 12/7/06
For Milanes: Joan M. Boyd
Issue/Holding:
¶13 A valid guilty or no contest plea waives all nonjurisdictional defenses to a conviction, including constitutional violations. See State v. Riekkoff, 112 Wis. 2d 119, 122-23, 332 N.W.2d 744 (1983). One exception to this rule is the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
Guilty Plea Waiver Rule – Plea Bargain Agreement to Relinquish Attack on Guilty Plea
State v. Lawrencia Ann Bembenek, 2006 WI App 198, PFR filed 10/3/06
For Bembenek: Joseph F. Owens, Woehrer, Mary L.
Issue: Whether Bembenek’s postconviction motion for DNA testing at State’s expense, as part of an effort to establish her innocence, was barred by her plea agreement whose terms included waiver of her right to direct appeal and collateral attack and “any challenges that might be brought to the underlying factual basis for this plea.”
Holding:
¶15 The record demonstrates that an exchange of promises in return for specific benefits occurred: (1) Bembenek would no longer be convicted of first-degree murder;
Plea-Withdrawal – Post-sentence – Procedure, Generally
State v. James E. Brown, 2006 WI 100, reversing summary order
For Brown: Richard D. Martin, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate
Issue/Holding:
¶39 After sentencing, in cases that involve an alleged deficiency in the plea colloquy, an attempt to withdraw a guilty plea proceeds as follows. The defendant must file a postconviction motion under Wis. Stat. § 809.30 or other appropriate statute. The motion must (1) make a prima facie showing of a violation of Wis.
Plea-Withdrawal, Post-sentencing – Procedure – Shackled, Deaf Defendant: Must Show Actual Interference with Effective Signing
State v. Jeremy D. Russ, 2006 WI App 9
For Russ: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding: A deaf defendant who had been shackled when he entered a guilty plea and was sentenced must show actual inability to communicate effectively in order to meet his burden of showing a violation of rights. Thus, even though the defendant adduced expert proof at the postconviction hearing “that communication would be limited and difficult if a deaf person who used sign language were handcuffed,” he did not meet his burden of proof:
¶10 As the trial court observed,
Plea-Withdrawal – Pre-Sentence – Fair and Just Reason: Desire to Avoid Prison
State v. Steven A. Harvey, 2006 WI App 26
For Harvey: Christopher William Rose
Issue/Holding: Defendant’s recalculation of his chance’s at trial after pleading guilty in an effort to maximize chances of avoiding or reducing prison term, uncoupled to any claim of confusion about the nature of the offense, was not a fair and just reason for pre-sentencing plea withdrawal, ¶¶24-29.
Plea-Withdrawal – Pre-Sentence – “Substantial Prejudice” to State: Absence of Assertion
State v. Barry M. Jenkins, 2006 WI App 28, overruled on other grounds, 2007 WI 96
For Jenkins: Melinda A. Swartz, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate
Issue/Holding:
¶31 Our conclusion that Jenkins had a fair and just reason for plea withdrawal does not end our inquiry. We must consider whether the State would be substantially prejudiced by the plea withdrawal. See id.
Plea-Withdrawal, Post-sentencing — Procedure — Pleading Requirements, Generally: Bangert and Hampton, Compared
State v. Timothy J. Goyette, 2006 WI App 178
For Goyette: E.J. Hunt, Kathleen M. Quinn
Issue/Holding:
¶17 The purpose of filing a Bangert plea withdrawal motion is to obtain an evidentiary hearing at which the State bears the burden of producing evidence showing that, despite a defective plea colloquy, the defendant’s plea was nonetheless knowing and voluntary. State v.