On Point blog, page 4 of 44
SCOW rejects 2nd Amendment challenge to felon-in-possession statute
State v. Leevan Roundtree, 2012 WI 1, 1/7/21, affirming a per curiam court of appeals opinion, 2018AP594-CR; case activity (including briefs)
In 2003, Roundtree was convicted of multiple felony counts of failure to pay child support. Twelve years later, police executed a search warrant at his home and found a firearm and ammunition under his mattress. He pled guilty to one count of felon in possession. On appeal, he argued that §941.29(2)(2013-2014), which barred him from possessing a firearm, is unconstitutional as applied to his case. The statute has no time limit and draws no distinction between serious or violent felonies versus less serious felonies like failure to pay child support. In a 5-2 decision SCOW upheld the statute.
SCOW: No special procedure required to establish factual basis for Alford plea
State v. Kevin L. Nash, 2020 WI 85, 11/19/20, affirming a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Before accepting a plea entered under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), a circuit court must determine whether there is “strong proof of guilt” sufficient to “substantially negate” the defendant’s claims of innocence. State v. Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d 845, 859-60, 532 N.W.2d 111 (1995); State ex rel. Warren v. Schwartz, 219 Wis. 2d 615, 645, 579 N.W.2d 698 (1998). The supreme court declines to exercise its superintending authority to require circuit courts to employ a specific procedure to establish a sufficient factual basis for an Alford plea.
Subsequent mitigating action didn’t extinguish factual basis for reckless endangering conviction
State v. Jonathan N. Reiher, 2019AP2321-CR, District 4, 10/29/20 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The court of appeals rejects the defendant’s claim that his pleas to reckless endangerment lacked a factual basis.
COA denies Bangert plea withdrawal
State v. Victoria L. Conley, 2019AP902, 9/10/20, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Conley pleaded to one count of disorderly conduct related to a couple of altercations occurring over a few minutes in Madison. After sentencing she moved to withdraw her plea alleging that the court failed to apprise her of the nature of the charge, and that she did not otherwise understand. The court of appeals holds that, assuming the colloquy was deficient, the record shows she understood the charges.
COA affirms denial of plea withdrawal though circuit court applied the wrong standard
State v. Brian Anthony Taylor, 2019AP1770-CR, District 1, 7/28/20 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
What a frustrating decision. Taylor filed a pre-sentencing motion to withdraw his plea for repeated sexual assault of a child, but the circuit court denied it applying the more stringent post-sentencing plea withdrawal standard. “No problem,” says the court of appeals, “we’ll apply the correct standard for you and affirm.”
Allegations in complaint provided sufficient factual basis for guilty pleas to invasion of privacy charges
State v. Jeffrey T. Ziegler, 2019AP858-CR & 2019AP859-CR, District 4, 7/23/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
To commit invasion of privacy in violation of § 942.08(2)(d), a person must, among other things, look into another’s dwelling “for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification….” § 942.08(2)(d)1. Contrary to Ziegler’s claim, the allegations in the complaints in his cases provided a sufficient factual basis for this element, and thus his guilty pleas stand.
Defense win: state breached plea by asking for more prison than it had agreed to
State v. Desmond Myers LaPean, 2019AP1448, 7/14/20, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
LaPean pleaded to a sexual assault of a child with an agreement that the state would cap its recommendation at 10 years of initial confinement and 10 of extended supervision. But at sentencing, the state first recommended 12 and 12. After defense counsel’s objection, the state instead requested 10 and 14. Counsel didn’t notice the second breach, but the prosecutor eventually did, telling the court the agreement was for 10 and 10. The court gave 12 and 10.
Defense win! Life sentence is “substantially higher” than 25-year sentence for Bangert purposes
State v. Russell L. Wilson, 2019AP49, 6/23/20, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Wilson was charged with repeated second-degree sexual assault of a child under Wis. Stats. §§ 948.02(2) and 948.025(1)(e). That’s a Class C felony carrying a max of 25 in and 15 out. But the state alleged that he also qualified for the repeater enhancer in Wis. Stat. § 939.618(2)(b). That would change the max to life without the possibility of parole or ES. Everybody–Wilson, his lawyer, and the judge–apparently believed the repeater applied, but, after Wilson pleaded and was sentenced, DOC informed the court that it did not. So the correct max IC term for the crime Wilson pleaded to was 25 years, not life. He moved to withdraw his plea, alleging the error meant it wasn’t knowing, voluntary and intelligent. The circuit court denied the motion, and the court of appeals now reverses.
COA rejects defendant’s claim that he thought counsel decided whether to accept or reject plea offer
State v. Nathaniel Lee Mattson, 2019AP201-CR, 6/16/20, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Mattson pled guilty to domestic battery and disorderly conduct and moved to withdraw his pleas after sentencing. Argued that he did not realize that the decision as to whether accept a plea or go to trial was exclusively his. And during the colloquy the circuit court did not inform him of that fact.
Trial counsel’s failure to disclose officer’s mental health issues before plea wasn’t prejudicial
State v. Jacqueline A. Ziriax Anderson, 2018AP2410-CR, District 3, 2/11/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The state offered Anderson a deal: plead to OWI 2nd and it would recommend the minimum mandatory penalties. The state made that offer because the arresting officer had resigned from the department due to some “mental health issues” and the prosecutor apparently wasn’t eager to call him as a witness. Anderson’s lawyer found this out immediately before Anderson entered her plea—but didn’t tell Anderson. She learned about it afterward. (¶¶3-4, 8-11). While trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to tell Anderson that information before she pled, that doesn’t entitle her to plea withdrawal because she fails to show she would have insisted on going to trial if trial counsel would have told her, as required by State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 312, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996).