On Point: 3. Required knowledge

State v. Matthew Robert Mayotte, 2022AP1695, 1/23/24, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Given the state of the postconviction record and COA’s narrow reading of precedent, Mayotte fails to establish he is entitled to plea withdrawal given his misunderstanding of the consequences of his Alford plea.

Pugin v. Garland, USSC Nos. 22-23 & 22-331, 2023 WL 4110232 (June 22, 2023), affirming Pugin v. Garland, 19 F.4th 437 (4th Cir. 2021) and reversing Garland v. Cordero-Garcia, 44 F.4th 1181 (9th Cir. 2022); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary

Noncitizens convicted of an “aggravated felony” may be deported from the United States. The definition of “aggravated felony” includes federal or state offenses “relating to obstruction of justice.” 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(43)(S). The question in these consolidate cases is whether an offense “relat[es] to obstruction of justice” even if the offense does not require that an investigation or proceeding be pending at the time of the defendant’s acts. In a 6 to 3 ruling, the Supreme Court holds that an investigation or proceeding need not be pending for the offense to be an aggravated felony.

State v. Ahmed A.M. Al Bawi, 2021AP432-CR, District 3, 1/18/23 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Al Bawi’s trial attorney was not ineffective in advising him about the immigration consequences of his plea.

The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. renders deportable noncitizens who are convicted of aggravated felonies after they admitted to the U.S.. Under the I.N.A., “an offense relating to the obstruction of justice” where the term of imprisonment is at least one year qualifies as an aggravated felony whether it is committed in violation of state or federal law.  In Pugin v. Garland, Case No. 22-23,

State v. Damon D. Taylor, 2021AP272-CR, District 4, 12/30/22 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Taylor moved to withdraw his Alford pleas to three crimes. The court of appeals agrees his plea to one of the three crimes was not knowing and intelligent because the circuit court failed to ascertain that he understood the elements of the offense.

State v. Caroline J. Arndt, 2022AP450-CR, District 2, 10/12/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Arndt pleaded no contest to disorderly conduct, but the circuit court’s plea colloquy was defective in two crucial ways, so on the merits—and because the state declined to file a brief in the court of appeals—she’s entitled to withdraw her plea.

State v. William C. MacDonald, 2020AP605-CR, 10/14/21, District 4 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Section 973.042(2) mandates a $500 surcharge for each image “associated with the crime” of possession of child pornography. The State charged MacDonald with 10 counts of possessing child porn. He pled “no contest” to a single charge. The State dismissed and read in 9 charges at sentencing. It then requested a $5,000 surcharge for the 10 images supporting the conceded and read-in charges. But it also requested (and received) $45,000 for MacDonald’s possession of an additional 90 images for which he was not charged.

State v. Anthony M. Schmidt, 2021 WI 65, 6/18/21, on bypass from the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

“We also conclude that the child pornography surcharge applies to images of child pornography that form the basis of read-in charges of sexual exploitation of a child or possession of child pornography, so long as those images of child pornography are connected to and brought into relation with the convicted individual’s offense of sexual exploitation of a child or possession of child pornography.” (¶61). What does it mean for images to be “brought into relation with” an offense? What kind of inquiry is it? Factual? Legal? We don’t know, the partial dissent doesn’t know, and as it observes, the majority seems also not to know, as they refrain from addressing any facts but the ones before them. The most reliable SCOW imperative–upholding criminal sanctions–seems once again to have made the “law development” function an afterthought.

State v. Jacob Richard Beyer, 2021 WI 59, 6/15/21, on certification from the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

On Point is proud to present a guest post by Tom Aquino of the Madison appellate office:

State v. Russell L. Wilson, 2019AP49, 6/23/20, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Wilson was charged with repeated second-degree sexual assault of a child under Wis. Stats. §§ 948.02(2) and 948.025(1)(e). That’s a Class C felony carrying a max of 25 in and 15 out. But the state alleged that he also qualified for the repeater enhancer in Wis. Stat. § 939.618(2)(b). That would change the max to life without the possibility of parole or ES. Everybody–Wilson, his lawyer, and the judge–apparently believed the repeater applied, but, after Wilson pleaded and was sentenced, DOC informed the court that it did not. So the correct max IC term for the crime Wilson pleaded to was 25 years, not life. He moved to withdraw his plea, alleging the error meant it wasn’t knowing, voluntary and intelligent. The circuit court denied the motion, and the court of appeals now reverses.