On Point: c. Collateral consequence

State v. Matthew Robert Mayotte, 2022AP1695, 1/23/24, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Given the state of the postconviction record and COA’s narrow reading of precedent, Mayotte fails to establish he is entitled to plea withdrawal given his misunderstanding of the consequences of his Alford plea.

State v. Anthony M. Schmidt, 2021 WI 65, 6/18/21, on bypass from the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

“We also conclude that the child pornography surcharge applies to images of child pornography that form the basis of read-in charges of sexual exploitation of a child or possession of child pornography, so long as those images of child pornography are connected to and brought into relation with the convicted individual’s offense of sexual exploitation of a child or possession of child pornography.” (¶61). What does it mean for images to be “brought into relation with” an offense? What kind of inquiry is it? Factual? Legal? We don’t know, the partial dissent doesn’t know, and as it observes, the majority seems also not to know, as they refrain from addressing any facts but the ones before them. The most reliable SCOW imperative–upholding criminal sanctions–seems once again to have made the “law development” function an afterthought.

According to a cert petition that SCOTUSblog has named a “petition of the week,” courts are split on this issue. See the question presented below. This petition is pending (not granted). We’ll keep you posted on its status.

In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) and Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017), this Court held that lawful permanent residents that received deficient advice regarding immigration-law consequences of a plea can assert claims under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Although this Court has not yet addressed how these precedents apply to unlawfully present aliens, the lower courts are deeply divided as to how they do.

James P. Moran v. Wisconsin Department of Justice, 2019 WI App 38; case activity (including briefs)

James Moran was convicted of a felony in Virginia. That state has a procedure by which a person can petition to have his or her right to own a gun restored, and Moran’s petition was successful. So he can buy a gun there. Can he buy one here?

State v. Corey R. Fugere, 2019 WI 33, 3/28/19, affirming a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Pretend you’re a defendant trying to decide whether to enter a plea. You know that maximum term of imprisonment you face. You also know that pleading NGI is one of your options. However, the circuit court doesn’t tell you (or perhaps misinforms you) about the nature and length of the commitment that will follow from pleading NGI. How can you make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary NGI plea if you don’t know the consequences of it?

State v. Corey R. Fugere, 2016AP2258-CR, petition for review of a published court of appeals decision granted 9/4/18; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (composed by On Point):

When a person enters a guilty plea to a criminal charge coupled with the defense of not responsible due to mental disease or defect under § 971.15, is a circuit court required to advise the person of the maximum term of commitment under ¶ 971.17 in addition to the maximum penalties provided for the offense?

State v. DeAnthony K. Muldrow, 2018 WI 52, 5/18/18, affirming a published court of appeals decision, 2017 WI App 47; case activity (including briefs)

A unanimous supreme court holds that lifetime GPS monitoring is not punishment, so a judge doesn’t have to advise a defendant that he or she is pleading to a crime that will require lifetime monitoring.

State v. Arthur Allen Freiboth, 2015AP2535-CR, District IV, 2/26/18; case activity (including briefs)

Issue:

…[W]e certify the present appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court to decide whether a defendant who was not advised at the time of the plea that he or she faced multiple mandatory DNA surcharges has grounds for plea withdrawal.

State v. Amanda L. Longley, 2017AP659-CR, District 4, 2/8/18 (1-judge opinion. ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals here answers this questions “no,” based on SCOW’s recent and narrow reading of Padilla in State v. Le Mere, 2016 WI 41, 368 Wis. 2d 624, 879 N.W.2d 580. See Mike Tobin’s post on Le Mere here). But Wisconsin’s case law is conflicting, suggesting that this issue may be worthy of scrutiny by a higher court.

State v. Marcos Rosas Villegas, 2018 WI App 9; case activity (including briefs)

This opinion resolves 2 issues worthy of publication and has already generated a petition for review (from an earlier version of the opinion, which was withdrawn and has now been replaced).  According to the court of appeals, an attorney does not perform deficiently by failing to inform his client, an undocumented immigrant, that a plea would render him inadmissible to the U.S. and ineligible for DACA. Furthermore–for the first time–the court of appeals holds that the “guilty plea waiver” rule applies to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, unless such a claim is offered as a reason to overturn the plea itself.