On Point: d. Deportation

Pugin v. Garland, USSC Nos. 22-23 & 22-331, 2023 WL 4110232 (June 22, 2023), affirming Pugin v. Garland, 19 F.4th 437 (4th Cir. 2021) and reversing Garland v. Cordero-Garcia, 44 F.4th 1181 (9th Cir. 2022); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary

Noncitizens convicted of an “aggravated felony” may be deported from the United States. The definition of “aggravated felony” includes federal or state offenses “relating to obstruction of justice.” 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(43)(S). The question in these consolidate cases is whether an offense “relat[es] to obstruction of justice” even if the offense does not require that an investigation or proceeding be pending at the time of the defendant’s acts. In a 6 to 3 ruling, the Supreme Court holds that an investigation or proceeding need not be pending for the offense to be an aggravated felony.

State v. Ahmed A.M. Al Bawi, 2021AP432-CR, District 3, 1/18/23 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Al Bawi’s trial attorney was not ineffective in advising him about the immigration consequences of his plea.

The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. renders deportable noncitizens who are convicted of aggravated felonies after they admitted to the U.S.. Under the I.N.A., “an offense relating to the obstruction of justice” where the term of imprisonment is at least one year qualifies as an aggravated felony whether it is committed in violation of state or federal law.  In Pugin v. Garland, Case No. 22-23,

Hatem M. Shata v. Denise Symdon, No. 16-CV-574 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 12, 2018)

Shata’s case was one of two our supreme court decided on the same day–both held counsel not ineffective for failing to give accurate advice on immigration consequences. You can see our prior post for the facts and our analysis of those decisions. Basically, counsel told Shata that pleading to the charged drug count would carry a “strong chance” of deporation, when in fact deportation was mandatory. Unlike our supreme court, the federal court now says that this wasn’t good enough–and further, that the supreme court’s conclusion that it was good enough was an unreasonable application of the law that SCOTUS clearly established in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).

State v. Marcos Rosas Villegas, 2018 WI App 9; case activity (including briefs)

This opinion resolves 2 issues worthy of publication and has already generated a petition for review (from an earlier version of the opinion, which was withdrawn and has now been replaced).  According to the court of appeals, an attorney does not perform deficiently by failing to inform his client, an undocumented immigrant, that a plea would render him inadmissible to the U.S. and ineligible for DACA. Furthermore–for the first time–the court of appeals holds that the “guilty plea waiver” rule applies to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, unless such a claim is offered as a reason to overturn the plea itself.

State v. Jose Alberto Reyes Fuerte, 2017 WI 104, reversing a published court of appeals decision, 12/19/17; case activity (including briefs)

A judge taking a guilty or no contest plea is required by § 971.08(1)(c) to warn the defendant that if he or she is not a U.S. citizen the plea might result in deportation, inadmissibility, or denial of naturalization. If the judge doesn’t comply with § 971.08(1)(c) and the defendant shows the plea is likely to result in one of those immigration consequences, the defendant can move to withdraw the plea under § 971.08(2). State v. Douangmala, 2002 WI 62, 253 Wis. 2d 173, 646 N.W.2d 1, held that harmless error principles don’t apply to § 971.08(2), so the defendant is entitled to withdraw the plea even if the state claims the defendant actually knew the immigration consequences. This decision overrules Douangmala and holds that the judge’s failure to comply with § 971.08(1)(c) in Reyes Fuerte’s case was harmless.

State v. Irvin Perez-Basurto, 2016AP2136, 7/18/2017, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Irvin Perez-Basurto was born in Mexico and brought to the United States by his mother when he was 14. He had been approved by the Homeland Security for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals status (he is, in common parlance, a “dreamer”) and was thus permitted to remain in this country.

Jae Lee v. United States, USSC No. 16-327, 2017 WL 2694701 (June 23, 2017), reversing Lee v. United States, 825 F.3d 311 (6th Cir. 2016); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Lee’s lawyer told him he would not be deported if he pleaded guilty to a drug charge. His lawyer was wrong, so he performed deficiently under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). But can Lee establish his lawyer’s indisputably wrong advice prejudiced him, i.e., that he would have gone to trial had he known he would be deported even though he had no real prospect of acquittal? Yes, says a majority of the Supreme Court, rejecting the approach urged by the Government and adopted by some federal circuits.

Juan Esquivel-Quintana v. Jefferson B. Sessions, USSC No. 16-54, 2017 WL 2322840 (May 30, 2017), reversing Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019 (6th Cir. 2016); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

A non-citizen convicted of an “aggravated felony” is subject to virtually automatic deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). One of the crimes listed as an aggravated felony is “sexual abuse of a minor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A). In this case the Supreme Court holds that “in the context of statutory rape offenses that criminalize sexual intercourse based solely on the age of the participants, the generic federal definition of sexual abuse of a minor requires that the victim be younger than 16.” (Slip op. at 4). Because Esquivel-Quintana was convicted under a statute prohibiting sexual intercourse with a victim under the age of 18, he was not convicted of “sexual abuse of a minor” for purposes of the Immigration and Naturalization Act.

State v. Erika Lisette Gutierrez, 2014AP1983-CR, 3/7/2017 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Gutierrez pleaded guilty to intentional physical abuse of a trial and had a bench trial on her plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. She asserts she should be allowed to withdraw her guilty plea because the circuit court didn’t give the full § 971.08(1)(c) immigration warning and because her plea was premised on incorrect advice from her lawyer. The court of appeals disagrees.