On Point: 3. Required knowledge

State v. Irvin Perez-Basurto, 2016AP2136, 7/18/2017, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Irvin Perez-Basurto was born in Mexico and brought to the United States by his mother when he was 14. He had been approved by the Homeland Security for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals status (he is, in common parlance, a “dreamer”) and was thus permitted to remain in this country.

State v. Santos Lee Hernandez, 2017AP62-CR, 7/11/17, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Hernandez filed a postconviction motion arguing that he pled guilty to lewd and lascivious behavior while he was drunk–so drunk that he incorrectly told the court that he had not consumed alcohol within the previous 24 hours, that he understood the rights he was waiving, and that there was a factual basis for his plea. In rejecting his claim, the court of appeals commits an error that continues to dog postconviction motions.

State v. Tydis Trinard Odom, 2015AP2525-CR; District 2, 6/28/17, certification granted 9/12/17, appeal voluntarily dismissed 2/22/18; case activity (including briefs)

Issue:

In determining whether the imposition of multiple DNA surcharges constitutes “potential punishment” under WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(a) so that a court must advise a defendant about the surcharges before a valid plea may be taken, is the “intent-effects” test, as applied in State v. Radaj, 2015 WI App 50, 363 Wis. 2d 633, 866 N.W.2d 758, and State v. Scruggs, 2017 WI 15, 373 Wis. 2d 312, 891 N.W.2d 786, to ex post facto claims, the same analysis that was applied in State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶16, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199, to a plea withdrawal claim?

If the analysis is the same, should Radaj be overruled in light of the supreme court’s recent decision in Scruggs?

We note that we previously certified the issue of whether multiple DNA surcharges constituted “potential punishment” under WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(a), such that a court’s failure to advise a defendant about them before taking his or her plea establishes a prima facie showing that the defendant’s plea was unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent. The supreme court declined to accept certification.

We certify again because, as explained below, the supreme court’s recent decision in Scruggs now suggests that the ex post facto analysis of Radaj, holding that multiple DNR surcharges are “punishment,” was incorrect.

Jae Lee v. United States, USSC No. 16-327, 2017 WL 2694701 (June 23, 2017), reversing Lee v. United States, 825 F.3d 311 (6th Cir. 2016); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Lee’s lawyer told him he would not be deported if he pleaded guilty to a drug charge. His lawyer was wrong, so he performed deficiently under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). But can Lee establish his lawyer’s indisputably wrong advice prejudiced him, i.e., that he would have gone to trial had he known he would be deported even though he had no real prospect of acquittal? Yes, says a majority of the Supreme Court, rejecting the approach urged by the Government and adopted by some federal circuits.

State v. DeAnthony K. Muldrow, 2017 WI App 47, petition for review granted 10/17/17, affirmed, 2018 WI 52; case activity (including briefs)

Muldrow tried to withdraw his plea to sexual assault charges because the circuit court did not advise him during the plea colloquy that his pleas would subject him to lifetime GPS monitoring under § 301.48. The court of appeals holds that lifetime GPS monitoring isn’t “punishment” and therefore the court wasn’t required to advise Muldrow that he’d be subject to the requirement as a consequence of his pleas.

State v. Cynthia Hansen, 2016AP2114-CR, 6/14/17, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Hansen beat up a car that was marital property between her and her wife. She pled to criminal damage to property of another; on appeal she claims, inventively, that the theft statute gave her the right to do just as she did. The court of appeals disagrees.

Juan Esquivel-Quintana v. Jefferson B. Sessions, USSC No. 16-54, 2017 WL 2322840 (May 30, 2017), reversing Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1019 (6th Cir. 2016); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

A non-citizen convicted of an “aggravated felony” is subject to virtually automatic deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). One of the crimes listed as an aggravated felony is “sexual abuse of a minor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A). In this case the Supreme Court holds that “in the context of statutory rape offenses that criminalize sexual intercourse based solely on the age of the participants, the generic federal definition of sexual abuse of a minor requires that the victim be younger than 16.” (Slip op. at 4). Because Esquivel-Quintana was convicted under a statute prohibiting sexual intercourse with a victim under the age of 18, he was not convicted of “sexual abuse of a minor” for purposes of the Immigration and Naturalization Act.

State v. Richard J. Scott, 2017 WI App 40; case activity (including briefs)

Richard Scott seeks to withdraw his pleas to one count of repeated sexual assault of the same child and one count of possessing child pornography. As to the sexual assault count, he was charged under the wrong statute–a prior version. As to the child pornography, he argues that the complaint lacked a factual basis for the plea. The court of appeals rejects both challenges.

State v. Shannon Olance Hendricks, 2015AP2429-CR, petition for review granted 5/15/17; review of an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (composed by On Point)

Do Wisconsin Statute § 971.08(1) and State v. Bangert require that a defendant entering a guilty plea to a crime with alternative modes of commission understand what the state needs to prove to meet its burden of proof on the mode (or modes) of commission the state has alleged?

State v. Erika Lisette Gutierrez, 2014AP1983-CR, 3/7/2017 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Gutierrez pleaded guilty to intentional physical abuse of a trial and had a bench trial on her plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. She asserts she should be allowed to withdraw her guilty plea because the circuit court didn’t give the full § 971.08(1)(c) immigration warning and because her plea was premised on incorrect advice from her lawyer. The court of appeals disagrees.