On Point: f. Read-ins

State v. William C. MacDonald, 2020AP605-CR, 10/14/21, District 4 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Section 973.042(2) mandates a $500 surcharge for each image “associated with the crime” of possession of child pornography. The State charged MacDonald with 10 counts of possessing child porn. He pled “no contest” to a single charge. The State dismissed and read in 9 charges at sentencing. It then requested a $5,000 surcharge for the 10 images supporting the conceded and read-in charges. But it also requested (and received) $45,000 for MacDonald’s possession of an additional 90 images for which he was not charged.

State v. Anthony M. Schmidt, 2021 WI 65, 6/18/21, on bypass from the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

“We also conclude that the child pornography surcharge applies to images of child pornography that form the basis of read-in charges of sexual exploitation of a child or possession of child pornography, so long as those images of child pornography are connected to and brought into relation with the convicted individual’s offense of sexual exploitation of a child or possession of child pornography.” (¶61). What does it mean for images to be “brought into relation with” an offense? What kind of inquiry is it? Factual? Legal? We don’t know, the partial dissent doesn’t know, and as it observes, the majority seems also not to know, as they refrain from addressing any facts but the ones before them. The most reliable SCOW imperative–upholding criminal sanctions–seems once again to have made the “law development” function an afterthought.

State v. Richard J. Sulla, 2016 WI 46, 6/14/16, reversing an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Sulla entered a plea agreement requiring him to plead “no contest” to two counts and the State to dismiss and “read in” two other counts for purposes of sentencing and restitution. But after he was sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment, Sulla moved for plea withdrawal arguing that he was misinformed of, and did not understand, the effect that a read-in charge could have at sentencing. The circuit court denied the motion without a hearing. Don’t be fooled. SCOW’s decision here affects more than plea withdrawal. It changes appellate procedure.

Review of an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity

Issues (derived from the court of appeals opinion):

Whether, in order to get an evidentiary hearing, a defendant’s postconviction motion to withdraw his plea because he did not understand the “read-in” concept  must allege that he would have pled differently if  he had understood the “read-in” concept? See State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996).

State v. Michael L. Frey, 2012 WI 99, affirming unpublished decision; case activity

Sentencing Discretion – Reliance on Dismissed Charge 

The sentencing court may consider charges “dismissed” or “dismissed outright” (as opposed to read-ins)

¶47  To discharge its obligation to discern a defendant’s character, “[a] sentencing court may consider uncharged and unproven offenses,” State v. Leitner,

State v. Charles A. Clayton-Jones, 2010AP2239-CR, District 4, 12/15/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Clayton-Jones: Martin E. Kohler, Craig S. Powell; case activity

 Clayton-Jones resolved a 2006 charge (involving sexual assault of a boy) with a plea bargain, in which the state was to recommend 12 years initial confinement. Before sentencing, he allegedly violated bond conditions, and the state sought to be relieved of its bargained-for allocution limit.

State v. Henry Edward Reed, Jr., 2009AP3149-CR,  District 1, 1/11/11

court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Reed: Basil M. Loeb; case activity; Reed BiC; State Resp.

Guilty Plea Colloquy – Plea Questionnaire

Reed’s claim that he didn’t understand the significance of read-in offenses is defeated by their coverage in the plea questionnaire, and the plea court’s eliciting “that Reed had not only read the form,

State v. David G. Straszkowski, 2008 WI 65, affirming summary order
For Straszkowski Philip J. Brehm

Issue: Whether, for a guilty plea to be “knowing and intelligent,” the defendant must be aware that a read-in is deemed an admission for sentencing purposes.

Holding:

¶3   We conclude that the record clearly demonstrates that neither the State, nor trial defense counsel, nor the circuit court referred to the read-in charges as admitted or deemed admitted for sentencing purposes or for any other purpose. 

State v. David G. Straszkowski, 2008 WI 65, affirming summary order
For Straszkowski Philip J. Brehm

Issue: Whether a guilty plea colloquy must include an explicit warning that the defendant’s agreement to read in a dismissed charge will be deemed an admission of that charge for sentencing purposes.

Holding:

¶5   Although the case law on read-in charges is neither consistent nor clear,

State v. Monika S. Lackershire, 2007 WI 74, reversing 2005 WI App 265
For Lackershire: Steven P. Weiss, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: ¶27 n. 7:

This court explained the procedure for read-in charges in Austin v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 727, 183 N.W.2d 56 (1971). When charges are read in during sentencing, the defendant admits to having committed the underlying crimes, but does not plead guilty to the charges,