On Point blog, page 3 of 5
Guilty plea — factual basis; value of stolen property; breach of the plea agreement
State v. Lisa A. Brabazon, 2012AP1171-CR, District 4, 3/28/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Guilty plea — factual basis; value of stolen property
The victim’s statements as to the value of the stolen property (which were set forth in the complaint) provided a sufficient factual basis for concluding that the value exceeded the $5,000 threshold for felony theft:
¶19 ….
Obstructing an officer, § 946.41 – “Officer” includes jailer or correctional officer
State v. Mark A. Gierczak, 2012AP965-CR, District 4, 12/13/12
court of appeals decision (1 judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
For purposes of obstructing an officer § 946.41, “officer” includes someone with authority “to take another into custody,” and therefore includes a correctional officer at a county jail, ¶¶11-12. The court of appeals thus rejects Gierczak’s challenge to the factual basis for his obstructing plea where as a county jail inmate,
Search & Seizure – Consent; Guilty Plea – Factual Basis Review; Postconviction Discovery
State v. Robert Edwin Burkhardt, 2009AP2174-CR, District 1/4, 12/6/12
court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Search & Seizure – Consent
Consent to search isn’t vitiated by nonpretextual threat to obtain a search warrant:
¶16 … (I)t is well established that, “[t]hreatening to obtain a search warrant does not vitiate consent if ‘the expressed intention to obtain a warrant is genuine … and not merely a pretext to induce submission.’” Artic,
Conspiracy, § 939.31 (to Commit Homicide) – Agreement
State v. Frederick L. Lucht, 2011AP1644-CR, District 4, 9/27/12
court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
The record supports the existence of an agreement between Lucht and another to commit the crime of first-degree intentional homicide.
¶28 Lucht refers us to cases standing for propositions that a conspiracy cannot be based on a mere “agreement to negotiate,” see United States v.
Sex Offender Registration: Out-of-State Convictions – “Misdemeanor Treatment,” § 301.45(6)(a)2
State v. Yancy D. Freland, 2011 WI App 80 (recommended for publication); for Freland: Michael D. Zell; case activity
Conviction for an out-of-state sex offense comparable to a misdemeanor in Wisconsin will be treated as a misdemeanor for sex offender registration purposes, § 301.45(6).
¶12 Wisconsin Stat. § 301.45(1d)(am)1. specifically defines has been “[f]ound to have committed a sex offense by another jurisdiction” to include a person who has been convicted “for a violation of a law of another state that is comparable to a sex offense.”[7] Taken as a whole,
Conspiracy, § 939.31: “Overt Act”; Guilty Plea Factual Basis: de novo Review
State v. Eliseo Peralta, 2011 WI App 81(recommended for publication); for Peralta: Martin J. Pruhs; case activity
Conspiracy, § 939.31 – “Overt Act”
The “overt act” element of conspiracy, though it must go “beyond mere planning and agreement,” may be “virtually any act,” even if “insignificant,” ¶¶19-21. Thus, Peralta’s “communication to an undercover police detective that a large quantity of cocaine was ready for immediate delivery”
Recusal – Waiver; Guilty Plea – Factual Basis – Sexual Intercourse with Child
State v. Roger D. Godwin, No. 2009AP2999-CR, District 4, 8/5/10
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); pro se
Recusal – Waiver
¶10 Godwin argues that Judge VanDeHey should have recused himself from the case because one of the judge’s colleagues, Judge Curry, and other courthouse staff were Godwin’s victims in the bomb threat case. The State argues that the judge was not required to recuse under WIS.
Using Computer to Facilitate Child Sex-Crime, § 948.075(3) – Element of Act “Other Than … Computerized Communication”
State v. Eric T. Olson, 2008 WI App 171
For Olson: Byron C. Lichstein
Issue/Holding: The “act other than element” of § 948.075(3) isn’t satisfied by either transmission of live video of the shirtless defendant, or by his prior sexual encounters with others he met on-line:
¶11 Accordingly, we read the statute to require that, before the State may obtain a conviction under WIS. STAT.
§ 948.08, Causing Child to Practice Prostitution – Repeated Sex Acts in Exchange for Cocaine
State v. Lawrence Payette, 2008 WI App 106, PFR filed 6/30/08
For Payette: Robert R. Henak; Amelia L. Bizzaro
Issue: Whether repeated “dope dating” (giving a minor cocaine on multiple occasions in exchange for sex) amounts to causing the child to practice prostitution within the meaning of § 948.08.
Holding1: “Practice” prostitution:
¶15 Payette is charged with violating Wis. Stat. § 948.08,
Guilty Pleas – Procedure – Factual Basis – Consideration of “Whole” Record
State v. Lawrence Payette, 2008 WI App 106, PFR filed 6/30/08
For Payette: Robert R. Henak; Amelia L. Bizzaro
Issue/Holding:
¶26 As our supreme court explained in White, “[i]n applying the manifest injustice test on review, this court may consider the whole record since the issue is no longer whether the guilty plea should have been accepted, but rather whether there was an [erroneous exercise] of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the motion to withdraw.” Id.