On Point: B. Procedure and colloquy

State v. Lee Roy Cain, 2010AP1599-CR, District 4, 8/11/11, affirmed, 2012 WI 68

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication), affirmed, 2012 WI 68; case activity

If, during a (non-Alford) guilty plea colloquy, the defendant denies the existence of an element of the charged the offense, the court must refuse to accept the plea:

¶28      However,

on certification; for Soto: Shelley Fite, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity; prior post

Issues (composed by On Point):

Whether a defendant has a non-waivable right to be physically present at a §§ 971.04(1)(g) and 885.60.

If the right to physical presence at the plea proceeding can be waived or forfeited, whether a formal colloquy is nonetheless required before the defendant enters a plea via video conferencing.

State v. Yancy D. Freland, 2011 WI App 80 (recommended for publication); for Freland: Michael D. Zell; case activity

Conviction for an out-of-state sex offense comparable to a misdemeanor in Wisconsin will be treated as a misdemeanor for sex offender registration purposes, § 301.45(6).

¶12      Wisconsin Stat. § 301.45(1d)(am)1. specifically defines has been “[f]ound to have committed a sex offense by another jurisdiction” to include a person who has been convicted “for a violation of a law of another state that is comparable to a sex offense.”[7] Taken as a whole,

State v. Eliseo Peralta, 2011 WI App 81(recommended for publication); for Peralta: Martin J. Pruhs; case activity

Conspiracy, § 939.31 – “Overt Act”

The “overt act” element of conspiracy, though it must go “beyond mere planning and agreement,” may be “virtually any act,” even if “insignificant,” ¶¶19-21. Thus, Peralta’s “communication to an undercover police detective that a large quantity of cocaine was ready for immediate delivery”

State v. Robert S. Powless, 2010AP1116-CR, District 3/4, 2/24/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Powless: Leonard D. Kachinsky; case activity

At an evidentiary hearing on a “Hampton” violation (failure to assure defendant knows the judge isn’t bound by the plea agreement), the State satisfied its burden of proving that Powless in fact knew the judge could exceed the State’s sentencing recommendation.

¶37      Our conclusion is based on the following. 

State v. Henry Edward Reed, Jr., 2009AP3149-CR,  District 1, 1/11/11

court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Reed: Basil M. Loeb; case activity; Reed BiC; State Resp.

Guilty Plea Colloquy – Plea Questionnaire

Reed’s claim that he didn’t understand the significance of read-in offenses is defeated by their coverage in the plea questionnaire, and the plea court’s eliciting “that Reed had not only read the form,

State v. Roger D. Godwin, No. 2009AP2999-CR, District 4, 8/5/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); pro se

Recusal – Waiver

¶10      Godwin argues that Judge VanDeHey should have recused himself from the case because one of the judge’s colleagues, Judge Curry, and other courthouse staff were Godwin’s victims in the bomb threat case. The State argues that the judge was not required to recuse under WIS.

State v. Kurt D. Neis, No. 2009AP1287-CR, District IV, 7/15/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Neis: Jacquelyn L. Wolter; BiC; Resp.; Supp. Resp.

Guilty Pleas – Collateral Consequence – Federal Gun Ban

Although Neis’s guilty plea to disorderly conduct, § 947.01, subjected him to the automatic federal firearm ban given the circuit court’s finding that the conduct related to domestic violence,

7th circuit court of appeals decision (en banc)

Second Amendment – Categorical Ban on Possession

Categorical legislative bans on gun possession are permissible under the second amendment, including those for convictions of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence per 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which the court now upholds.

District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) and McDonald v. Chicago,

State v. Travis Vondell Cross, 2010 WI 70, on bypass; for Cross: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate; BiC; Resp.; Reply; Cross Supp.; AG Supp.

¶4 We hold that where a defendant is told that he faces a maximum possible sentence that is higher, but not substantially higher, than that authorized by law,