On Point: B. Procedure and colloquy

State v. William C. MacDonald, 2020AP605-CR, 10/14/21, District 4 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Section 973.042(2) mandates a $500 surcharge for each image “associated with the crime” of possession of child pornography. The State charged MacDonald with 10 counts of possessing child porn. He pled “no contest” to a single charge. The State dismissed and read in 9 charges at sentencing. It then requested a $5,000 surcharge for the 10 images supporting the conceded and read-in charges. But it also requested (and received) $45,000 for MacDonald’s possession of an additional 90 images for which he was not charged.

State v. Anthony M. Schmidt, 2021 WI 65, 6/18/21, on bypass from the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

“We also conclude that the child pornography surcharge applies to images of child pornography that form the basis of read-in charges of sexual exploitation of a child or possession of child pornography, so long as those images of child pornography are connected to and brought into relation with the convicted individual’s offense of sexual exploitation of a child or possession of child pornography.” (¶61). What does it mean for images to be “brought into relation with” an offense? What kind of inquiry is it? Factual? Legal? We don’t know, the partial dissent doesn’t know, and as it observes, the majority seems also not to know, as they refrain from addressing any facts but the ones before them. The most reliable SCOW imperative–upholding criminal sanctions–seems once again to have made the “law development” function an afterthought.

State v. Jacob Richard Beyer, 2021 WI 59, 6/15/21, on certification from the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

On Point is proud to present a guest post by Tom Aquino of the Madison appellate office:

State v. Kevin L. Nash, 2020 WI 85, 11/19/20, affirming a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Before accepting a plea entered under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), a circuit court must determine whether there is “strong proof of guilt” sufficient to “substantially negate” the defendant’s claims of innocence. State v. Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d 845, 859-60, 532 N.W.2d 111 (1995); State ex rel. Warren v. Schwartz, 219 Wis. 2d 615, 645, 579 N.W.2d 698 (1998).  The supreme court declines to exercise its superintending authority to require circuit courts to employ a specific procedure to establish a sufficient factual basis for an Alford plea.

State v. Jonathan N. Reiher, 2019AP2321-CR, District 4, 10/29/20 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals rejects the defendant’s claim that his pleas to reckless endangerment lacked a factual basis.

State v. Jeffrey T. Ziegler, 2019AP858-CR & 2019AP859-CR, District 4, 7/23/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

To commit invasion of privacy in violation of § 942.08(2)(d), a person must, among other things, look into another’s dwelling “for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification….” § 942.08(2)(d)1. Contrary to Ziegler’s claim, the allegations in the complaints in his cases provided a sufficient factual basis for this element, and thus his guilty pleas stand.

State v. Russell L. Wilson, 2019AP49, 6/23/20, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Wilson was charged with repeated second-degree sexual assault of a child under Wis. Stats. §§ 948.02(2) and 948.025(1)(e). That’s a Class C felony carrying a max of 25 in and 15 out. But the state alleged that he also qualified for the repeater enhancer in Wis. Stat. § 939.618(2)(b). That would change the max to life without the possibility of parole or ES. Everybody–Wilson, his lawyer, and the judge–apparently believed the repeater applied, but, after Wilson pleaded and was sentenced, DOC informed the court that it did not. So the correct max IC term for the crime Wilson pleaded to was 25 years, not life. He moved to withdraw his plea, alleging the error meant it wasn’t knowing, voluntary and intelligent. The circuit court denied the motion, and the court of appeals now reverses.

State v. Kody K. Johnson, 2019AP1058-CR, District 4, 1/9/19, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Johnson accepted a negotiated disposition of 3 contempt charges stemming from his interference with child custody. He then moved to withdraw his plea arguing that the charges had no factual basis and were multiplicitous.

According to a cert petition that SCOTUSblog has named a “petition of the week,” courts are split on this issue. See the question presented below. This petition is pending (not granted). We’ll keep you posted on its status.

In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) and Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017), this Court held that lawful permanent residents that received deficient advice regarding immigration-law consequences of a plea can assert claims under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Although this Court has not yet addressed how these precedents apply to unlawfully present aliens, the lower courts are deeply divided as to how they do.

James P. Moran v. Wisconsin Department of Justice, 2019 WI App 38; case activity (including briefs)

James Moran was convicted of a felony in Virginia. That state has a procedure by which a person can petition to have his or her right to own a gun restored, and Moran’s petition was successful. So he can buy a gun there. Can he buy one here?