On Point: B. Procedure and colloquy

Review of an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity

Issues (derived from the court of appeals opinion):

Whether, in order to get an evidentiary hearing, a defendant’s postconviction motion to withdraw his plea because he did not understand the “read-in” concept  must allege that he would have pled differently if  he had understood the “read-in” concept? See State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996).

State v. Shata, 2015 WI 74, 7/9/15, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision, 2013AP1437-CR; majority opinion by Ziegler, dissenting opinion by Bradley (joined by Abrahamson); case activity (including briefs)

State v. Ortiz-Mondragon, 2015 WI 73, 7/9/15, affirming a published court of appeals decision, 2013AP2435-CR, majority opinion by Justice Ziegler, dissenting opinion by Bradley (joined by Abrahamson); case activity (including briefs)

In a pair of 5-2 decisions, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that defense attorneys provided adequate advice about immigration consequences.  In each case, the defendant sought withdrawal of his guilty plea because he had not been properly advised regarding the mandatory adverse immigration consequences of conviction.

As described below, the cases presented different circumstances regarding the nature of the convictions and the advice given by the attorney.  Nonetheless, the following points seem clear regarding the court’s interpretation of Padilla v. Kentucky: 1) the court is narrowly interpreting the obligations of defense attorneys under Padilla; 2) the court does not believe that deportation is ever automatic or mandatory; and 3) if the information or advice provided was accurate, the court will find that the attorney’s performance was adequate, regardless of extent of legal research that the attorney conducted.

DeBartolo v. United States, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3579, 6/26/15

DeBartolo pleaded guilty to violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) by growing more than 100 marijuana plants, “[b]ut unbeknownst to DeBartolo, and also it seems to his lawyer, the prosecutors, and the judge, his conviction of the drug offense made him deportable (‘removable’ is the official term) and, were he ordered removed, would prevent him from applying for cancellation of removal.” (Slip op. at 3). Trial counsel was deficient for failing to advise DeBartolo of the deportation consequences, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), but—in light of the strength of the state’s case and the very favorable plea agreement DeBartolo received—has he shown prejudice? Yes, says a three-judge panel, in an opinion worth reviewing if you are litigating a similar issue.

Question presented:

Whether a state offense constitutes an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), on the ground that the state offense is “described in” a specified federal statute, where the federal statute includes an interstate commerce element that the state offense lacks.

State v. Andre M. Chamblis, 2015 WI 53, 6/12/15, reversing an unpublished per curiam decision of the court of appeals; opinion by Justice Crooks; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court unanimously holds that when the parties in an OWI prosecution are disputing the number of prior offenses, the circuit court can require the dispute to be resolved before it accepts the defendant’s plea; it doesn’t have to wait till sentencing to determine the number of prior offenses. And even if the court errs in denying the state the chance to prove an additional prior OWI conviction at sentencing, it violates due process to allow the circuit court to resentence the defendant on the basis of the additional conviction if the additional conviction would increase the penalty that could be imposed.

Mellouli v. Lynch, USSC No. 1034, 2015 WL 2464047 (June 1, 2015), reversing Mellouli v. Holder, 719 F.3d 995 (8th Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Resolving a split between federal circuit courts of appeal, the Supreme Court holds that the statute providing for deportation based on a violation of a state drug crime “relating to a controlled substance” is limited to “controlled substance” listed in the federal controlled substances schedule under 21 U.S.C. § 802. Thus, the Eighth Circuit was wrong to hold that any drug offense triggers the removal statute, without regard to the appearance of the drug on a § 802 schedule.

Review of a court of appeals summary disposition; case activity

Issue (composed by On Point)

May a defendant seek to withdraw his guilty plea by claiming that his trial lawyer was ineffective for failing to advise him that, as a consequence of his plea, he could be subject to lifetime commitment as a sexually violent person under ch. 980?

On certification by the court of appeals; review granted 11/26/13; circuit court reversed 1/29/16; click here for docket and briefs

Issue (composed by the court of appeals):

How definite or imminent must deportation be in order for it to be “likely,” such that a defendant may withdraw a guilty or no contest plea on the basis that he or she was not informed of the immigration consequences at the plea colloquy?  If, in order to withdraw the plea, the defendant must show that deportation proceedings are underway, how does this standard fit in with the time limits for a motion to withdraw the plea?

State v. Jeromy Miller, 2014AP1246-CR, 2/24/15, District 2 (not recommended for publication); click here for docket and briefs

This decision smells like SCOW bait.  Miller pleaded guilty believing that he had the right to appeal the circuit court’s denial of his pre-trial motion to dismiss. Both the court and defense counsel told him so. The State concedes they were wrong. The court of appeals held the error harmless because the motion had no merit. In doing so it bungled case law re plea withdrawal and the “prejudice” prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

State v. Nelson Luis Fortes, 2015 WI App 25; case activity (including briefs)

A “misunderstanding” about what sentence the state could recommend under the plea agreement did not entitle Fortes to plea withdrawal or resentencing because after the misunderstanding became evident at the sentencing hearing, Fortes elected to proceed rather than seek an adjournment with a possible eye toward plea withdrawal.