On Point: D. Plea withdrawal

State v. Santos Lee Hernandez, 2017AP62-CR, 7/11/17, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Hernandez filed a postconviction motion arguing that he pled guilty to lewd and lascivious behavior while he was drunk–so drunk that he incorrectly told the court that he had not consumed alcohol within the previous 24 hours, that he understood the rights he was waiving, and that there was a factual basis for his plea. In rejecting his claim, the court of appeals commits an error that continues to dog postconviction motions.

Jae Lee v. United States, USSC No. 16-327, 2017 WL 2694701 (June 23, 2017), reversing Lee v. United States, 825 F.3d 311 (6th Cir. 2016); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Lee’s lawyer told him he would not be deported if he pleaded guilty to a drug charge. His lawyer was wrong, so he performed deficiently under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). But can Lee establish his lawyer’s indisputably wrong advice prejudiced him, i.e., that he would have gone to trial had he known he would be deported even though he had no real prospect of acquittal? Yes, says a majority of the Supreme Court, rejecting the approach urged by the Government and adopted by some federal circuits.

State v. DeAnthony K. Muldrow, 2017 WI App 47, petition for review granted 10/17/17, affirmed, 2018 WI 52; case activity (including briefs)

Muldrow tried to withdraw his plea to sexual assault charges because the circuit court did not advise him during the plea colloquy that his pleas would subject him to lifetime GPS monitoring under § 301.48. The court of appeals holds that lifetime GPS monitoring isn’t “punishment” and therefore the court wasn’t required to advise Muldrow that he’d be subject to the requirement as a consequence of his pleas.

State v. Julius Lee Sanders, 2014AP2644, 6/6/2017, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Julius Sanders appeals from his judgment of conviction and the denial, without a hearing, of his postconviction motion.

State v. Eugene B. Santiago, 2016AP1267, District 2, 5/3/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including state’s brief)

Santiago’s trial lawyer missed a charging error that led to an overstatement of the penalties Santiago faced; this failure doesn’t allow Santiago to withdraw his plea, however, because he fails to sufficiently allege that he would not have entered a plea if his lawyer had caught the mistake.

State v. Erika Lisette Gutierrez, 2014AP1983-CR, 3/7/2017 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Gutierrez pleaded guilty to intentional physical abuse of a trial and had a bench trial on her plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. She asserts she should be allowed to withdraw her guilty plea because the circuit court didn’t give the full § 971.08(1)(c) immigration warning and because her plea was premised on incorrect advice from her lawyer. The court of appeals disagrees.

State v. William J. Drake, II, 2016AP724-CR, District 4, 2/2/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

It may be that Drake’s lawyer could have done a better job of looking into and advising him about the possibility his Huber privileges would be revoked, but that doesn’t mean counsel was ineffective. Thus, Drake doesn’t get to withdraw his pleas.

Petition for review of State v. Jose Alberto Reyes Fuerte, 2016 WI App 78, granted 1/18/2017; case activity (including briefs)

Issue presented (from the State’s petition for review):

Now that criminal defense attorneys are obligated to advise their clients about the immigration consequences of their pleas, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), should the Wisconsin Supreme Court overturn its decision in State v. Douangmala, 2002 WI 62, 253 Wis. 2d 173, 646 N.W.2d 1, and reinstate the harmless error rule to prohibit a defendant who was aware of the potential immigration consequences of his plea from being able to withdraw the plea just because the circuit court failed to give a statutory immigration warning that complied with Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c)?

State v. Shannon Olance Hendricks, 2015AP2429-CR, 12/15/2016, District 1/4 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 5/15/17, affirmed, 2018 WI 15 ; case activity (including briefs)

A defendant pleading to a sexual assault involving sexual contact (as opposed to sexual intercourse) is required to understand the meaning of “sexual contact.” If he or she does not, he or she is entitled to plea withdrawal. State v. Jipson, 2003 WI App 222, ¶9, 267 Wis. 2d 467, 671 N.W.2d 18. Here, the court of appeals holds that a defendant pleading to child enticement with a purpose to engage in a sexual assault by “sexual contact” need not understand the meaning of this phrase.

Lee v. United States, USSC No. 16-327, cert. granted 12/14/16

Question presented (based on the cert. petition):

To establish prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), a defendant who has pleaded guilty based on deficient advice from his attorney must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). Under this standard, is it always irrational for a noncitizen defendant with longtime legal resident status and extended family and business ties to the United States to reject a plea offer despite strong evidence of guilt because the plea would result in mandatory deportation or permanent exclusion?