On Point: 4. After sentencing

State v. Victor Yancey, Jr., 2018AP802-CR, 1/8/19, District 2 (1-judge opinion, eligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Stormy applause for Godfrey & Kahn who took this appeal pro bono and then won it! The court of appeals held that Yancey alleged a prima facie claim for ineffective assistance of counsel when he pled guilty and was entitled to a Machner hearing.  It also held that the trial court incorrectly held that to establish prejudice Yancey had to show a “reasonable probability that he would have been able to mount a successful challenge to the State’s evidence at a trial.”

Hatem M. Shata v. Denise Symdon, No. 16-CV-574 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 12, 2018)

Shata’s case was one of two our supreme court decided on the same day–both held counsel not ineffective for failing to give accurate advice on immigration consequences. You can see our prior post for the facts and our analysis of those decisions. Basically, counsel told Shata that pleading to the charged drug count would carry a “strong chance” of deporation, when in fact deportation was mandatory. Unlike our supreme court, the federal court now says that this wasn’t good enough–and further, that the supreme court’s conclusion that it was good enough was an unreasonable application of the law that SCOTUS clearly established in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).

State v. Darrick L. Bennett, 2016AP2209-CR, 9/18/18, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Bennett was charged with 1st degree intentional homicide, but pled guilty to 1st degree reckless homicide. In a decision turning on facts specific to this case, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision denying (a) plea withdrawal without a hearing, (b) sentence modification based on a new factors, and (c) postconviction discovery of evidence that might have affected his sentence.

State v. Laron Henry, 2017AP939-CR & 2017AP940-CR, District 1, 6/19/18 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Henry sought to withdraw his guilty pleas to three crimes. He claimed that with respect to one of the crimes, he didn’t “ratify” his guilty plea, he didn’t understand one of the elements of the crime, and there wasn’t a factual basis for the plea to the crime. The court of appeals rejects his claims.

State v. Mario Douglas, 2018 WI App 12; case activity (including briefs)

Douglas got inaccurate advice about the prison time he faced if he went to trial instead of taking the State’s plea offer. The inaccurate advice makes his plea invalid.

State v. Donald L. White, 2017AP188-CR, 8/23/17, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

White argued that his plea colloquy was defective because the circuit court did not (1) sufficiently describe the nature of the charge against him, (2) ascertain his education or level of comprehension, especially of the constitutional rights that he was waiving, (3) advise him that he was not bound by the plea agreement and could impose the maximum penalty. He relied primarily on State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906. The court of appeals distinguished White from Brown and affirmed the decision to deny the motion for plea withdrawal without a hearing.

State v. Santos Lee Hernandez, 2017AP62-CR, 7/11/17, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Hernandez filed a postconviction motion arguing that he pled guilty to lewd and lascivious behavior while he was drunk–so drunk that he incorrectly told the court that he had not consumed alcohol within the previous 24 hours, that he understood the rights he was waiving, and that there was a factual basis for his plea. In rejecting his claim, the court of appeals commits an error that continues to dog postconviction motions.

State v. DeAnthony K. Muldrow, 2017 WI App 47, petition for review granted 10/17/17, affirmed, 2018 WI 52; case activity (including briefs)

Muldrow tried to withdraw his plea to sexual assault charges because the circuit court did not advise him during the plea colloquy that his pleas would subject him to lifetime GPS monitoring under § 301.48. The court of appeals holds that lifetime GPS monitoring isn’t “punishment” and therefore the court wasn’t required to advise Muldrow that he’d be subject to the requirement as a consequence of his pleas.

State v. Shannon Olance Hendricks, 2015AP2429-CR, 12/15/2016, District 1/4 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 5/15/17, affirmed, 2018 WI 15 ; case activity (including briefs)

A defendant pleading to a sexual assault involving sexual contact (as opposed to sexual intercourse) is required to understand the meaning of “sexual contact.” If he or she does not, he or she is entitled to plea withdrawal. State v. Jipson, 2003 WI App 222, ¶9, 267 Wis. 2d 467, 671 N.W.2d 18. Here, the court of appeals holds that a defendant pleading to child enticement with a purpose to engage in a sexual assault by “sexual contact” need not understand the meaning of this phrase.

State v. Matthew Allen Lilek, 2014AP784-CR, 10/4/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Lilek’s trial counsel raised his competency to stand trial and the court-appointed expert found him incompetent and unlikely to become so. The state, dissatisfied with that result, requested another evaluation, and the court obliged. This new evaluation reached the opposite conclusion, and Lilek was eventually found competent. Is this OK?