On Point blog, page 3 of 9
Court rejects habeas petitioner’s claim that his plea was involuntary
Kenneth Morris v. Bryan Bartow, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3482, 2016 WL 4207960, 8/10/16
Morris claims his guilty plea to first degree reckless homicide was involuntary, and that his appellate attorney was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of involuntariness in his no-merit appeal. The Seventh Circuit rejects his claims.
SCOW reinvigorates Bangert; holds commutation isn’t alternative remedy to plea withdrawal
State v. Timothy L. Finley, Jr., 2016 WI 63, affirming a published court of appeals decision, 2015 WI App 79, 365 Wis. 2d 275, 872 N.W.2d 344; case activity (including briefs)
Reaffirming the long-standing law governing plea withdrawal that was established in State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986), and limiting the reach of two recent cases that muddied the Bangert procedure, the supreme court holds, 5 to 2, that Finley is entitled to withdraw his plea because the circuit court misadvised Finley of the maximum penalty during the plea colloquy and the state failed to prove Finley knew the actual maximum penalty.
SCOW clarifies Nelson/Bentley test and read-in procedure; muddles rules on petitions for review again
State v. Richard J. Sulla, 2016 WI 46, 6/14/16, reversing an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Sulla entered a plea agreement requiring him to plead “no contest” to two counts and the State to dismiss and “read in” two other counts for purposes of sentencing and restitution. But after he was sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment, Sulla moved for plea withdrawal arguing that he was misinformed of, and did not understand, the effect that a read-in charge could have at sentencing. The circuit court denied the motion without a hearing. Don’t be fooled. SCOW’s decision here affects more than plea withdrawal. It changes appellate procedure.
Factual findings doom ineffective assistance claims
State v. Henry J. Bloedorn, 2015AP953-CR, 4/6/2016, District 2 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Henry Bloedorn brought three ineffective assistance claims regarding the attorney who represented him during his plea and sentencing. That attorney’s unchallenged testimony at the Machner hearing convinced the circuit court, and now the court of appeals, that his performance gave no cause for complaint.
State v. Timonty L. Finley, Jr., 2014A2488-CR, petition for review granted 1/11/16
Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Issue (from the State’s petition for review)
When a defendant who pleads guilty or no contest is misinformed that the maximum penalty that could be imposed is lower than the maximum actually allowed by law, and the sentence imposed is more than the defendant was told he could get, is the defendant entitled to withdraw his plea, or may the defect be remedied instead by reducing the sentence to the maximum the defendant was informed he could receive?
Plea withdrawal and ineffective assistance claims based on sentence credit error rejected
State v. Stephen Toliver, 2014AP2939-CR, 12/15/15, District 1 (not recommended for publication);case activity
Here, in Wisconsin’s very own Jarndyce v. Jarndyce, the court of appeals upholds the denial of Toliver’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the circuit court’s refusal to vacate his felony murder plea, and the circuit court’s denial of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
When defendant is misinformed that maximum sentence is less than allowed by law, commutation isn’t alternative remedy to plea withdrawal
State v. Timothy L. Finley, Jr., 2015 WI App 79, petition for review granted, 1/11/16, affirmed, 2016 WI 63; case activity (including briefs)
In an important decision addressing how to apply State v. Taylor, 2013 WI 34, 347 Wis. 2d 30, 829 N.W.2d 482, the supreme court’s recent muddling of plea withdrawal standards, the court of appeals holds that when a defendant is mistakenly told the maximum sentence is less than the law allows, the error “is not curable, after the fact, by ‘commutation’ of an otherwise lawful sentence down to the maximum amount of punishment the defendant was incorrectly informed he or she faced at the time of the plea.” (¶37).
Defendant failed to show why he would have gone to trial but for counsel’s deficient performance
State v. Shaun M. Clarmont, 2014AP1043-CR, District 3, 5/19/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Even if trial counsel failed to investigate a defense to the charge to which Clarmont pled, Clarmont has not shown why he would have gone to trial and face the possibility of multiple convictions, including for two felony offenses, rather than accept a plea offer of a single misdemeanor conviction along with a very favorable sentencing recommendation from the state.
Court of appeals affirms plea though defendant misunderstood appellate rights; trips over law governing plea withdrawal and IAC
State v. Jeromy Miller, 2014AP1246-CR, 2/24/15, District 2 (not recommended for publication); click here for docket and briefs
This decision smells like SCOW bait. Miller pleaded guilty believing that he had the right to appeal the circuit court’s denial of his pre-trial motion to dismiss. Both the court and defense counsel told him so. The State concedes they were wrong. The court of appeals held the error harmless because the motion had no merit. In doing so it bungled case law re plea withdrawal and the “prejudice” prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Proceeding to sentencing despite misunderstanding about plea agreement defeats claims for plea withdrawal, resentencing
State v. Nelson Luis Fortes, 2015 WI App 25; case activity (including briefs)
A “misunderstanding” about what sentence the state could recommend under the plea agreement did not entitle Fortes to plea withdrawal or resentencing because after the misunderstanding became evident at the sentencing hearing, Fortes elected to proceed rather than seek an adjournment with a possible eye toward plea withdrawal.