On Point blog, page 4 of 9
Defendant didn’t show his mental illness rendered his guilty plea invalid
State v. Douglas E. Hanson, 2014AP623-CR, District 4, 12/11/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Hanson failed to present sufficient credible evidence that he did not understand the consequences of pleading guilty to second offense OWI.
SCOW: Defendant’s plea was invalid because he was mistakenly informed he faced life sentence if he went to trial
State v. Myron C. Dillard, 2014 WI 123, 11/26/14, affirming a published court of appeals decision, 2013 WI App 108; majority opinion by Chief Justice Abrahamson; case activity
Dillard accepted a plea bargain under which the state dropped a persistent repeater allegation, which carried a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of release. But Dillard was never really subject to the persistent repeater law. When he discovered this fact after he was sentenced, he moved to withdraw his plea on the ground his decision to accept the plea bargain was based on his mistaken belief—one shared by the prosecutor, his lawyer, and the court—that he was facing a mandatory life sentence if he was convicted after a trial. The supreme court holds he is entitled to plea withdrawal because his plea was not knowing and voluntary and because his trial lawyer was ineffective for failing to discover the persistent repeater law never applied to Dillard.
Court of appeals “sympathizes” with angst of dedicated criminal defense lawyers?!
State v. David M. Carlson, 2014 WI App 124; case activity
Note to trial courts: When ineffective assistance of counsel claims are based what trial counsel said to his client, hold an evidentiary hearing. Note to defense counsel: Data showing the sentences received by defendants charged with the same crimes as your client is about as useful as data showing a patient diagnosed with a lethal illness the survival rates of similarly-diagnosed patients. Note to all: A single, inaccurate, hyperbolic remark during the course of a long sentencing explanation is harmless even if the trial court relied upon it.
Circuit court properly denied plea withdrawal after it found witness recantations to be incredible and uncorroborated
State v. John Francis Ferguson, 2014 WI App 48; case activity
The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in denying Ferguson’s plea withdrawal motion, which was based on recantations by two witnesses who had previously said Ferguson fatally shot a man. The circuit judge applied the proper standard under State v. McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463, 561 N.W.2d 707 (1997), when it found the recantations were incredible as a matter of law and uncorroborated by other newly-discovered evidence, and its findings are not clearly erroneous.
State v. Myron C. Dillard, 2012AP2044-CR, petition for review granted 2/19/14
Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity
Issues (composed by On Point)
Whether Dillard is entitled to withdraw his plea because the primary feature of the plea bargain he accepted was the state’s dismissal of a persistent repeater enhancement, which would have mandated a sentence of life imprisonment without release, when in fact the persistent repeater enhancement never applied to him.
Whether Dillard is entitled to withdraw his plea on the alternative ground that his trial lawyer was deficient in failing to discern that Dillard was not subject to the persistent repeater enhancement.
Hearing on motion for plea withdrawal granted; trial court failed to ensure mentally-impaired defendant understood plea
State v. Matthew Allen Lilek, Appeal No. 2012AP1855, District 1; 11/13/13, (not recommended for publication), case activity
The dispositive issue in this appeal was whether the defendant, who is legally blind and has suffered cognitive disabilities his entire life, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered a no-contest plea to second degree sexual assault, with use of force, and to aggravated battery. During the plea colloquy, defense counsel assured the court that experts had examined his client and,
Probable cause finding establishes defendant’s breach of plea agreement; State chooses remedy of partial recission
State v. Carl A. Reed, 2013 WI App 132; case activity
Reed pled no contest to substantial battery in exchange for the State’s agreement to dismiss 3 other counts and to refrain from making a sentencing recommendation. The State also received the right to withdraw from the agreement if Reed “commits any new or additional crimes.” Reed was later charged with new crimes. So, the State presented a recommendation at sentencing.
Plea withdrawal granted because bargain was “illusory”
State v. Myron C. Dillard, 2013 WI App 108, petition for review granted, 2/19/14, affirmed, 2014 WI 123; case activity
Dillard accepted a plea bargain under which a persistent repeater allegation was dismissed, thus apparently reducing his maximum penalty exposure by avoiding a mandatory life sentence without prospect of release. But Dillard was not really subject to the persistent repeater law,
Plea withdrawal motion was insufficient to merit an evidentiary hearing, Wisconsin Supreme Court rules
State v. Julius C. Burton, 2013 WI 61, affirming unpublished court of appeals decision; unanimous opinion by Justice Prosser; case activity
In a case of interest primarily, if not exclusively, to lawyers handling postconviction proceedings in state courts, the supreme court holds Burton’s plea withdrawal motion was insufficient to merit an evidentiary hearing because it failed to allege sufficient facts to support either the ineffective assistance of counsel claim or the claim Burton’s plea was invalid because of a defective plea colloquy.
Plea withdrawal — newly discovered evidence
State v. Edward Devon Smart, 2012AP1178-CR, District 1, 5/7/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Smart is not entitled to plea withdrawal based on co-actor’s testimony that he coerced Smart to commit the crime because the coercion evidence could have been presented using other witnesses known to defendant before he entered his plea:
¶7 Smart argues that Rushing’s testimony is new because he did not know Rushing would testify that he forced Smart to rob the victims.