On Point: 4. Procedure

Rivers v. Guerrero, USSC No. 23-1345, 6/12/2025; Scotusblog page (with links to briefs and commentary)

A unanimous SCOTUS held that a habeas petitioner’s second filing asserting a new claim for relief, submitted after the district court entered judgment with respect to the first filing but while the first filing was pending on appeal, qualifies as a “second or successive” petition and must be approved by the court of appeals before considered by the district court.

Jacob Alan Powers v. Jon Noble, No. 24-2134, 3/25/25

The Seventh Circuit found that Jacob Powers was competent to stand trial in a Wisconsin court in 2006 for sexual assault of a child and child enticement.  Although Powers’ IQ was in the borderline/mild mental retardation range; his trial testimony, trial counsel’s decision not to challenge his competency, and two experts’ findings that he was competent convinced the Court that he reasonably understood the charges against him, trial procedures, and could assist his lawyer in his defense.  The Court therefore affirmed the district court’s order denying Powers’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

Breion S. Woodson v. Bradley Mlodzik, No. 22-3153, 2/28/25

Although Woodson has new evidence seeming to suggest he was sentenced on the basis of inaccurate information, the complex procedural rules of habeas litigation require affirmance.

Graham L. Stowe v. Gregory Van Rybroek, No. 23-3345, 8/21/24

This habeas appeal is limited to a facial challenge to the NGI conditional release statute, Wis. Stat. § 971.17(4)(d). The Seventh Circuit rejects Stowe’s argument, concluding that he cannot show that there are no circumstances under which the law’s application would be valid.

Rodney Lass v. Jason Wells, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 23-2880, 6/26/24

Lass was charged with multiple felony counts after his first trial on misdemeanor domestic abuse charges ended in a mistrial. During state postconviction and appeal proceedings, he raised claims of vindictive prosecution, ineffective assistance, and violation of his 6th amendment rights. The 7th Circuit denied relief as to Lass’s IAC and 6th amendment claims as procedurally defaulted, and rejects the vindictive prosecution claim because the Wisconsin courts already considered and reasonably rejected Lass’s same “fact-based arguments.”

State ex rel. Antonio S. Davis v. Circuit Court for Dane County, the Honorable Ellen K. Berz and State of Wisconsin, 2024 WI 14, 3/26/24; case activity

A majority of the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirms the court of appeals’ denial of Davis’ petition for a supervisory writ after concluding the the circuit court had no “plain duty” to treat Davis’ request for substitution as timely under Wis. Stat. § 971.20(4). The court also uses the decision to clarify that a petition for a supervisory writ is not the preferred vehicle to seek appellate review of a circuit court’s denial of a request for substitution that was filed after arraignment. Op, ¶11.

Graham L. Stowe v. Gregory Van Rybroek, 18-CV-400-wmc (W.D. Wis. 11/6/23).

Having recently prevailed on a judicial bias claim in state court, Stowe makes a return appearance to the blog on his 2018 federal habeas petition. Unfortunately, the Western District of Wisconsin denied the petition, which had been pending for close 5 years. The petition sought relief from the Wisconsin courts’ denial of his 2016  petition for conditional release under Wis. Stat. § 971.17(4)(d). In a novel reading of a nearly three-decades old Wisconsin Supreme Court decision, State v. Randall, 192 Wis. 2d 800, 532 N.W.2d 94 (1995) (“Randall I”), the federal court concludes that “one can reasonably read Randall I to require a showing of both mental illness and dangerousness.”

Jones v. Hendrix, 143 S.Ct. 1857, 599 U.S. __ (June 22, 2023); Scotusblog page (containing links to briefs and commentary)

The Court, in a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Thomas, holds that the savings clause in 28 U.S.C.  2255(e) bars a prisoner from using an intervening change in the interpretation of a federal criminal statute to circumvent AEDPA’s restrictions on successive Section 2255 motions by filing a habeas petition under Section 2241.

Shinn v. Ramirez, USSC No. 20-1009, 5/23/22, reversing Ramirez v. Ryan, 937 F.3d 1230 (9th Cir. 2019); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

You can read at Scotusblog quite a bit of commentary on this most recent entry in the present Court’s war on habeas. At oral argument, the lawyer for the state told the court that “innocence isn’t enough” to merit relief for one of the death-row inmates in this case to gain relief. And the Court now agrees. The reason: the likely innocent inmate’s state-provided postconviction counsel didn’t make a good enough record that his trial counsel was ineffective.

Jones v. Hendrix, USSC No. 21-857; cert. granted 5/16/22; Scotusblog page (containing links to briefs and commentary)

Question presented:

The question presented is whether federal inmates who did not—because established circuit precedent stood firmly against them—challenge their convictions on the ground that the statute of conviction did not criminalize their activity may apply for habeas relief under § 2241 after this Court later makes clear in a retroactively applicable decision that the circuit precedent was wrong and that they are legally innocent of the crime of conviction