On Point blog, page 1 of 3
Seventh Circuit retrospectively evaluates habeas petitioner’s competence at his 2006 trial; despite low IQ and mental illness, court denies due process and IAC claims.
Jacob Alan Powers v. Jon Noble, No. 24-2134, 3/25/25
The Seventh Circuit found that Jacob Powers was competent to stand trial in a Wisconsin court in 2006 for sexual assault of a child and child enticement. Although Powers’ IQ was in the borderline/mild mental retardation range; his trial testimony, trial counsel’s decision not to challenge his competency, and two experts’ findings that he was competent convinced the Court that he reasonably understood the charges against him, trial procedures, and could assist his lawyer in his defense. The Court therefore affirmed the district court’s order denying Powers’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
SCOW affirms denial of supervisory writ, seeks to clarify “preferred” appellate procedure to challenge denied substitution request
State ex rel. Antonio S. Davis v. Circuit Court for Dane County, the Honorable Ellen K. Berz and State of Wisconsin, 2024 WI 14, 3/26/24; case activity
A majority of the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirms the court of appeals’ denial of Davis’ petition for a supervisory writ after concluding the the circuit court had no “plain duty” to treat Davis’ request for substitution as timely under Wis. Stat. § 971.20(4). The court also uses the decision to clarify that a petition for a supervisory writ is not the preferred vehicle to seek appellate review of a circuit court’s denial of a request for substitution that was filed after arraignment. Op, ¶11.
Untimely habeas petition might be saved by equitable tolling
Anastazia Schmid v. Steven McCauley, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-2974, 2016 WL 3190670, 6/8/16
Because the record discloses Schmid suffers from some sort of mental disability and may have been hindered by counsel’s failure, the district court acted too hastily in dismissing Schmid’s untimely habeas petition; instead it should have appointed counsel and, if necessary, held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Schmid’s deadline was subject to equitable tolling.
Federal habeas petition too conclusory to merit evidentiary hearing on whether equitable tolling applies
Brian K. Boulb v. United States, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-1383, 4/4/16
Boulb filed a § 2255 habeas petition challenging his federal conviction 16 months after the conviction was final. That was four months too late. Boulb argued he was entitled to equitable tolling of the 12-month filing deadline because of his mental incompetence, but his allegations aren’t sufficient to justify an evidentiary hearing on the question.
Even with tolling due to discovery of new evidence, habeas petition was untimely
Myron A. Gladney v. William Pollard, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 13-3141, 8/26/15
In 2013 Gladney filed a habeas petition challenging his state conviction, which became final in 1999. The district court properly dismissed the petition as untimely because even if the limitations period could have been tolled until Gladney found out about his counsel’s failure to interview a defense witness, his petition would still have been filed well outside the adjusted limitations period. Nor can Gladney satisfy the narrow “actual innocence” exception under Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), to disregard the time limits for seeking federal habeas relief.
SCOTUS: Habeas petitioner entitled to new attorneys who can argue that AEDPA filing deadline should be equitably tolled
Christeson v. Roper, USSC No. 14-6873, 2015 WL 232187 (January 20, 2015) (per curiam); docket
The Supreme Court holds that the lower courts failed to properly apply Martel v. Clair, 565 U. S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1276 (2012), when they denied Christeson’s request to substitute appointed counsel in his federal habaeas case.
Habeas petition timely under equitable tolling doctrine
Thomas Socha v. Gary Broughton, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 12-1598, 8/14/14
In Socha’s previous appeal of the dismissal of his federal habeas petition, the Seventh Circuit held the district court was not compelled to dismiss the petition just because it was filed after the one-year AEDPA deadline because there were a couple possible theories—specifically, equitable tolling or equitable estoppel—for finding the petition was timely filed. Socha v.
U.S. Supreme Court holds that a showing of “actual innocence” allows consideration of merits of habeas petition filed after expiration of time limit
McQuiggin v. Floyd Perkins, USSC No. 12-126, 5/28/13
United States Supreme Court decision, vacating and remanding Perkins v. McQuiggin, 670 F.3d 665 (6th Cir. 2012)
In Schlup v. Delo, 513 U. S. 298 (1995), and House v. Bell, 547 U. S. 518 (2006), the Court held that a convincing showing of “actual innocence” enabled habeas petitioners to overcome a procedural bar to consideration of the merits of their constitutional claims.
Habeas corpus – stay of proceeding due to petitioner’s incompetence
Ryan v. Gonzales, USSC No. 10-930; Tibbals v. Carter, USSC No. 11-218, 1/8/13
United States Supreme Court decision, reversing In re Gonzalez, 623 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 2010), and reversing and remanding Carter v. Bradshaw, 644 F.3d 329 (6th Cir. 2011)
These two cases present the question whether the incompetence of a state prisoner requires suspension of the prisoner’s federal habeas corpus proceedings.
Habeas Procedure – Filing Deadline – “Mailbox Rule”
Elliot D. Ray v. Clements, 7th Cir No. 11-3228, 11/19/12
seventh circuit decision, appeal following remand in 592 F.3d 793 (7th Cir 2010) (summarized in prior post)
… (W)e hold that in cases where the pro se prisoner’s post-conviction motion is not received, the petitioner must submit a sworn statement and some evidence to support his claim that he timely delivered the filing to a prison official,