On Point blog, page 1 of 8
SCOTUS: Second habeas petition filed while first petition pending on appeal must clear procedural hurdle before claim may be considered on its merits.
Rivers v. Guerrero, USSC No. 23-1345, 6/12/2025; Scotusblog page (with links to briefs and commentary)
A unanimous SCOTUS held that a habeas petitioner’s second filing asserting a new claim for relief, submitted after the district court entered judgment with respect to the first filing but while the first filing was pending on appeal, qualifies as a “second or successive” petition and must be approved by the court of appeals before considered by the district court.
Seventh Circuit retrospectively evaluates habeas petitioner’s competence at his 2006 trial; despite low IQ and mental illness, court denies due process and IAC claims.
Jacob Alan Powers v. Jon Noble, No. 24-2134, 3/25/25
The Seventh Circuit found that Jacob Powers was competent to stand trial in a Wisconsin court in 2006 for sexual assault of a child and child enticement. Although Powers’ IQ was in the borderline/mild mental retardation range; his trial testimony, trial counsel’s decision not to challenge his competency, and two experts’ findings that he was competent convinced the Court that he reasonably understood the charges against him, trial procedures, and could assist his lawyer in his defense. The Court therefore affirmed the district court’s order denying Powers’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
7th Circuit rejects facial challenge to § 971.17(4)(d)
Graham L. Stowe v. Gregory Van Rybroek, No. 23-3345, 8/21/24
This habeas appeal is limited to a facial challenge to the NGI conditional release statute, Wis. Stat. § 971.17(4)(d). The Seventh Circuit rejects Stowe’s argument, concluding that he cannot show that there are no circumstances under which the law’s application would be valid.
Federal court denies habeas relief for “sane but dangerous” NGI-acquittee; offers novel interpretation of Randall I
Graham L. Stowe v. Gregory Van Rybroek, 18-CV-400-wmc (W.D. Wis. 11/6/23).
Having recently prevailed on a judicial bias claim in state court, Stowe makes a return appearance to the blog on his 2018 federal habeas petition. Unfortunately, the Western District of Wisconsin denied the petition, which had been pending for close 5 years. The petition sought relief from the Wisconsin courts’ denial of his 2016 petition for conditional release under Wis. Stat. § 971.17(4)(d). In a novel reading of a nearly three-decades old Wisconsin Supreme Court decision, State v. Randall, 192 Wis. 2d 800, 532 N.W.2d 94 (1995) (“Randall I”), the federal court concludes that “one can reasonably read Randall I to require a showing of both mental illness and dangerousness.”
Legal innocence is not enough
Jones v. Hendrix, 143 S.Ct. 1857, 599 U.S. __ (June 22, 2023); Scotusblog page (containing links to briefs and commentary)
The Court, in a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Thomas, holds that the savings clause in 28 U.S.C. 2255(e) bars a prisoner from using an intervening change in the interpretation of a federal criminal statute to circumvent AEDPA’s restrictions on successive Section 2255 motions by filing a habeas petition under Section 2241.
SCOTUS may restrict federal habeas “safety valve”
Jones v. Hendrix, USSC No. 21-857; cert. granted 5/16/22; Scotusblog page (containing links to briefs and commentary)
Question presented:
The question presented is whether federal inmates who did not—because established circuit precedent stood firmly against them—challenge their convictions on the ground that the statute of conviction did not criminalize their activity may apply for habeas relief under § 2241 after this Court later makes clear in a retroactively applicable decision that the circuit precedent was wrong and that they are legally innocent of the crime of conviction
Seventh Circuit’s rare habeas grant notes COA misapplication of Strickland and upbraids state for false claims about the record
Terez Cook v. Brian Foster, Warden, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 18-2214, 1/29/2020
Pursuing a federal writ of habeas corpus is always a long shot; in non-capital cases fewer than 1% of petitions are successful. Terez Cook gets it done here, convincing the Seventh Circuit his lawyer was ineffective at his trial for a home-invasion robbery (and that the Wisconsin court of appeals’ decision to the contrary was not just wrong, but unreasonable). The federal court is puzzled by a few aspects of our state court’s denial of Cook’s claims. But the thing that seems to push that denial over the line into unreasonableness–AEDPA‘s stringent requirement for habeas relief–is that it got a crucial fact wrong. The state court’s opinion relies on a confession by Cook–a confesssion for which there’s apparently no evidence. How did our court go astray? Well, the state described the (non-existent) confession in its brief, and then Cook’s direct-appeal counsel apparently didn’t check the facts, and neither did the court of appeals.
SCOTUS to address second or successive habeas petition issue
Banister v. Davis, USSC No. 18-6943, certiorari granted 6/24/19
Whether and under what circumstances a timely Rule 59(e) motion should be recharacterized as a second or successive habeas petition under Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005).
SCOTUS suggests it might not take much to satisfy Graham’s “meaningful opportunity for release” standard for juveniles serving life
Virginia v. Dennis LeBlanc, USSC No. 16-1177, 2017 WL 2507375 (June 12, 2017), reversing LeBlanc v. Mathena, 841 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2016); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
Although this is a per curiam decision and it’s decided under the rubric of federal habeas review, the upshot of this opinion is that states won’t have to do too much to satisfy the requirement under Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010), that a state give a juvenile serving life without parole “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on a demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”
Is simply mentioning a defendant’s young age enough to satisfy Miller v. Alabama?
McKinley Kelly v. Richard Brown, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 17-1244, 3/16/17
Two judges on the Seventh Circuit apparently think so, based on their rejection of Kelly’s motion to file a second federal habeas petition so he can challenge his sentence under Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (mandatory life sentence for juvenile offenders is unconstitutional).