On Point: 4. Procedure

Michael Carter v. Stephen Duncan, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 13-2243, 3/30/16

Carter sought habeas relief on the ground his trial lawyer was ineffective for failing to investigate what two defense potential witnesses had to say and failing to present their testimony at his murder trial. The Seventh Circuit holds that although the state court “stumble[d] in some respects” in determining that the failure to present the proffered testimony wasn’t prejudicial, that determination was not unreasonable under AEDPA’s deferential standard of review.

Arthur Mitchell v. Donald Enloe, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-2946, 3/24/16

The Seventh Circuit rejects Mitchell’s claims that the lawyer representing him at his state murder was ineffective because he should have asked for a provocation instruction as well as a self-defense instruction, because the two defenses were inconsistent and the jury clearly rejected the testimony on which provocation would have been based.

David Conrad v. United States, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3216, 3/4/16

Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013), held that the ex post facto clause prohibits a sentencing court from using a Sentencing Guideline in effect at the time of sentencing instead of the Guideline in effect at the time of the offense if the new version of the Guideline provides a higher applicable sentencing range than the old version. The Seventh Circuit holds Peugh shouldn’t be applied retroactively to allow resentencing in a case that was final before Peugh was decided.

Cesar Flores-Ramirez v. Brian Foster, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Case No. 15-1594, 1/22/16 (per curiam)

Flores-Ramirez is not entitled to a certificate of appealability in his challenge to the denial of his second federal habeas petition because two of his claims should have been brought in his first petition and the third claim doesn’t provide a basis for habeas relief.

Bernard McKinley v. Kim Butler, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Case No. 14-1944, 1/4/16

McKinley failed to raise an Eighth Amendment claim in his state court challenges to the sentence he received for a murder he committed at the age of 16. That means he procedurally defaulted the claim for purposes of his federal habeas challenge to the sentence. But instead of affirming the district court’s dismissal of McKinley’s habeas petition, a majority of this Seventh Circuit panel stays the habeas proceeding and, based on reasoning that could be useful to other juveniles seeking to challenge long sentences, gives McKinley a chance to go back to state court to challenge his sentence under Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).

White v. Wheeler, USSC No. 14-1372, 2015 WL 8546240, 12/14/15 (per curiam), reversing Wheeler v. Simpson, 779 F.3d 366 (6th Cir. 2015); docket

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals failed to give proper deference to the state courts’ rulings when it granted habeas relief on the ground that the state courts unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent regarding removal of a juror in a death penalty case.

Vernard Crockett v. Kim Butler, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Case No. 14-2320, 11/17/15

Crockett procedurally defaulted his insufficient evidence and confrontation clause claims by failing to preserve the claims at various stages of his direct appeals in state court.

Paysun Long v. Kim Butler, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Case No. 13-3327, 10/27/15

Long is entitled to habeas relief because the prosecutor in his state murder trial failed to correct perjured testimony given by a state’s witness.

Question presented

Did the Seventh Circuit violate 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and a long line of this Court’s decisions by awarding habeas relief in the absence of clearly established precedent from this Court?

Mark D. Jensen v. Marc Clements, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-1380, 9/8/15, affirming Jensen v. Schwochert, No. 11-C-0803 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 18, 2013)

At Jensen’s trial for the murder of his wife Julie the State introduced Julie’s handwritten letter to the police, written two weeks before her death, in which she wrote she would never take her life and that her husband should be the suspect if anything should happen to her. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals assumed the admission of the letter violated Jensen’s right to confrontation but found the error harmless. The Seventh Circuit holds that the court of appeals’ decision was an unreasonable application of the Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), harmless error standard, and that the erroneous admission of the hearsay evidence had a substantial and injurious influence or effect in determining the jury’s verdict, thus satisfying the actual prejudice standard under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).