On Point: 4. Procedure

Thomas Socha v. Gary Broughton, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 12-1598, 8/14/14

In Socha’s previous appeal of the dismissal of his federal habeas petition, the Seventh Circuit held the district court was not compelled to dismiss the petition just because it was filed after the one-year AEDPA deadline because there were a couple possible theories—specifically, equitable tolling or equitable estoppel—for finding the petition was timely filed. Socha v.

Randy White v. Robert Keith Woodall, USSC No. 12-794, 4/23/14, reversing and remanding Woodall v. Simpson, 685 F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 2012); case activity

It’s getting harder and harder to win a habeas case.  Woodall requested an instruction forbidding jurors from drawing adverse inferences from his decision to not testify during the penalty phase of his capital murder trial.  The majority opinion, authored by Scalia, held that SCOTUS precedent requiring a “no adverse inference” instruction was clearly established for the guilt phase of a trial, but not the penalty phase.

Question Presented:

 Did the Fifth Circuit err in holding that a federal habeas petitioner who prevailed in the district court on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must file a separate notice of appeal and motion for a certificate of appealability to raise an allegation of deficient performance that the district court rejected even though the Fifth Circuit acquired jurisdiction over the entire claim as a result of the respondent’s appeal?

Burt v. Titlow, USSC No. 12-414, 11/5/13

United States Supreme Court decision, reversing Titlow v. Burt, 680 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2012)

When a state prisoner asks a federal court to set aside a sentence due to ineffective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining, our cases require that the federal court use a “‘doubly deferential’” standard of review that gives both the state court and the defense attorney the benefit of the doubt.

Questions presented:

1. Whether the Sixth Circuit violated 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) by granting habeas relief on the trial court’s failure to provide a no adverse inference instruction even though this Court has not “clearly established” that such an instruction is required in a capital penalty phase when a non-testifying defendant has pled guilty to the crimes and aggravating circumstances.

2. Whether the Sixth Circuit violated the harmless error standard in Brecht v.

McQuiggin v. Floyd Perkins, USSC No. 12-126, 5/28/13

United States Supreme Court decision, vacating and remanding Perkins v. McQuiggin, 670 F.3d 665 (6th Cir. 2012)

In Schlup v. Delo, 513 U. S. 298 (1995), and House v. Bell, 547 U. S. 518 (2006), the Court held that a convincing showing of “actual innocence” enabled habeas petitioners to overcome a procedural bar to consideration of the merits of their constitutional claims.

Carlos Trevino v. Thaler, USSC No. 11-10189, 5/28/13

United States Supreme Court decision, vacating and remanding 449 Fed. Appx. 145 (5th Cir. Nov. 14, 2011)

Last term in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), a case arising out of Arizona, the Court held that where a state’s rules of appellate procedure allowed a state prisoner to raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim only on collateral review,

Johnson v. Williams, USSC No. 11-465, 2/20/13

United States Supreme Court decision, reversing and remanding Williams v. Cavazos, 646 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2011)

When a defendant convicted in state court raises a federal claim and a state court rules against the defendant in an opinion that addresses some issues but does not expressly address the federal claim in question, the federal habeas court must presume (subject to rebuttal) that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits:

….AEDPA sharply limits the circumstances in which a federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner whose claim was “adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings.” 28 U.

Questions presented:

1. Whether the Michigan Supreme Court’s recognition that a state statute abolished the long-maligned diminished-capacity defense was an “unexpected and indefensible” change in a common-law doctrine of criminal law under this Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence. See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001).

2. Whether the Michigan Court of Appeals’ retroactive application of the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision was “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement”

Chaidez v. United States, USSC No. 11-820, affirming 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011)

Issue:  We know that Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) requires counsel to advise a defendant about the risk of deportation arising from a guilty plea.  The question presented by Chaidez is whether or not that rule applies retroactively so that a person whose conviction became final before Padilla can benefit from it.