On Point: h. Retroactivity of law

Edwards v. Vannoy, USSC No. 19-5807, 141 S.Ct. 1547 (May 17, 2021), affirming 2019 WL 8643258 (5th Cir. May 20, 2019) (denying certificate of appealability); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

This decision alters the long-standing doctrine for deciding whether new rules of criminal procedure established by a decision of the Supreme Court apply retroactively to cases that are final and, therefore, require the defendant to seek collateral review of his or her conviction. The result is that new rules of criminal procedure will no more forever apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.

Questions presented:

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) found the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(B)(ii)(defining “violent felony”) unconstitutionally vague. That clause is identical to the residual cause in the career-offender provision of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2)(defining “crime of violence”)

(1) Whether Johnson v. United States applies retroactively to collateral cases challenging federal sentences enhanced under the residual clause in United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) § 4B1.2(a)(2) (defining “crime of violence”);

(2) whether Johnson‘s constitutional holding applies to the residual clause in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), thereby rendering challenges to sentences enhanced under it cognizable on collateral review; and

(3) whether mere possession of a sawed-off shotgun, an offense listed as a “crime of violence” only in commentary to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, remains a “crime of violence” after Johnson.

Michael Miller v. Dushan Zatecky, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-1869, 4/26/2016

An Indiana state court sentenced Michael Miller to a total of 120 years in prison on three counts of child molestation. On direct appeal, his lawyer raised challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the admission of other-acts evidence, but did not contest the length of his sentence. Miller then filed a state collateral attack, alleging his original appellate counsel was ineffective for not attacking the sentence.

Welch v. United States, USSC No. 15-6418, 2016 WL 1551144 (April 18, 2016), vacating and remanding an unpublished order of the 11th Circuit; Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Associate Federal Defender Shelley Fite has kindly agreed to provide her take on the high court’s latest:

Federal defenders and procedure wonks naturally appreciate Welch v. United States, in which the (7–1) Supreme Court held that Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), applies retroactively to cases on collateral review.  But (read on!) the case does have some application for state practitioners—at least those who do post-conviction work.

David Conrad v. United States, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3216, 3/4/16

Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013), held that the ex post facto clause prohibits a sentencing court from using a Sentencing Guideline in effect at the time of sentencing instead of the Guideline in effect at the time of the offense if the new version of the Guideline provides a higher applicable sentencing range than the old version. The Seventh Circuit holds Peugh shouldn’t be applied retroactively to allow resentencing in a case that was final before Peugh was decided.

Bernard McKinley v. Kim Butler, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Case No. 14-1944, 1/4/16

McKinley failed to raise an Eighth Amendment claim in his state court challenges to the sentence he received for a murder he committed at the age of 16. That means he procedurally defaulted the claim for purposes of his federal habeas challenge to the sentence. But instead of affirming the district court’s dismissal of McKinley’s habeas petition, a majority of this Seventh Circuit panel stays the habeas proceeding and, based on reasoning that could be useful to other juveniles seeking to challenge long sentences, gives McKinley a chance to go back to state court to challenge his sentence under Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).

Benjamin Price v. United States, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-2427, 8/4/15

Price seeks to bring a successive collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) to the enhancement of his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act. He claims that Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which held that the imposition of an enhanced sentence under the residual clause of ACCA violates due process, announces a new substantive rule of constitutional law that the Supreme Court has categorically made retroactive to final convictions. The Seventh Circuit agrees.

Chaidez v. United States, USSC No. 11-820, affirming 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011)

Issue:  We know that Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) requires counsel to advise a defendant about the risk of deportation arising from a guilty plea.  The question presented by Chaidez is whether or not that rule applies retroactively so that a person whose conviction became final before Padilla can benefit from it. 

Question Presented (from cert petition): 

In Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), this Court held that criminal defendants receive ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment when their attorneys fail to advise them that pleading guilty to an offense will subject them to deportation. The question presented is whether Padilla applies to persons whose convictions became final before its announcement.

seventh circuit court of appeals decision; cert granted, 4/30/12

Padilla v. Kentucky: Retroactivity – Habeas Review 

The holding of Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010), that as in incident of effective representation, “counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation,” is a “new rule”