On Point blog, page 4 of 11
Inevitable discovery doctrine precludes habeas relief
Darryl J. Sutton v. Randy Pfister, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-2888, 2016 WL 4446561, 8/24/16
Sutton filed a habeas petition challenging his sexual assault conviction on the ground the evidence connecting him with the crime was obtained by the state through a conceded violation of the Fourth Amendment in a different case. The district court ruled in his favor, but the court of appeals holds there’s no Fourth Amendment violation because the evidence would inevitably have been discovered.
Counsel not ineffective for failing to seek recusal of trial judge
Raymond E. King v. Randy Pfister, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3389, 2016 WL 4446105, 8/24/16
The presiding judge at King’s 2004 murder trial was a former public defender who represented King in a criminal case in 1986. KIng’s pretrial pro se efforts to get the judge recused were rebuffed. After exhausting his state court remedies, King filed a habeas petition arguing his state trial and appellate lawyers were ineffective for failing to litigate a claim that the trial judge should have been substituted from King’s case. The Seventh Circuit rejects the argument.
Witness’s statement made during continuing emergency isn’t “testimonial” for Confrontation Clause purposes
Steven D. Lisle, Jr., v. Guy Pierce, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3047, 2016 WL 4245489, 8/11/16
Lisle sought federal habeas relief from his murder and aggravated battery convictions, arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated by the admission of a hearsay statement identifying him as the man who shot two people, one fatally. But the state courts reasonably applied clearly established federal law on the question, so his quest for relief is denied.
Court rejects habeas petitioner’s claim that his plea was involuntary
Kenneth Morris v. Bryan Bartow, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3482, 2016 WL 4207960, 8/10/16
Morris claims his guilty plea to first degree reckless homicide was involuntary, and that his appellate attorney was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of involuntariness in his no-merit appeal. The Seventh Circuit rejects his claims.
Brendan Dassey conviction overturned
Brendan Dassey v. Michael A. Dittmann, U.S. District Court (E.D. Wis.) No. 14-CV-1310, 2016 WL 4257386, 8/12/16
Brendan Dassey was charged with homicide and sexual assault after confessing to being involved in the murder of Teresa Halbach along with his uncle, Steven Avery. He challenged his confession, arguing it was involuntary, but the trial court and court of appeals disagreed. In a lengthy, fact-intensive decision, a federal magistrate holds that the state courts’ conclusions involve both an unreasonable determination of the facts and an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
Habeas petitioner entitled to hearing on “textbook” improper vouching claim
Joseph J. Jordan v. Randall R. Hepp, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3613, 2016 WL 4119862, 8/3/16
Jordan claims the Wisconsin courts unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when they held that he was not denied the right to represent himself and that his trial lawyer was not ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s improper vouching for a police witness’s credibility. The Seventh Circuit okays the state courts’ decision on self-representation but orders a hearing on Jordan’s ineffective assistance claim.
New evidence didn’t support hearing on actual innocence, IAC claims
Glenn Patrick Bradford v. Richard Brown, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-3706, 2016 WL 4136957, 8/4/16
In a state postconviction proceeding Bradford presented new evidence from an arson expert named Carpenter supporting Bradford’s claim that he couldn’t have set the fire that was the basis for his murder and arson conviction. After the state courts denied relief Bradford filed a federal habeas petition, asking for an evidentiary hearing on his claims of actual innocence and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. In a fact-depending ruling, the Seventh Circuit holds he isn’t entitled to a hearing.
Collateral attack on plea fails; no evidence of plea deal defendant claims induced him to plead
James R. Todd v. Kess Roberson, 7th Circuit Cout of Appeals Case No. 14-3430, 2016 WL 3568107, 7/1/16
Todd claims his trial lawyer was ineffective for inducing him to plead to a charge carrying a minimum of 6 years and a maximum of 60 years in exchange for the state capping its sentencing recommendation at 10 years when there was no such cap. His claim fails because the record shows he understood there was no 10-year cap.
Failure to investigate alibi witnesses might have been ineffective
Eric Blackmon v. Tarry Williams, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3059, 2016 WL 3007212, 5/24/16
Two eyewitnesses to the murder of Tony Cox were shown a photo array and live line-up, and both independently identified Eric Blackmon—a man they did not know—as one of two gunmen who shot and killed Cox. The judge at Blackmon’s bench trial relied heavily on the two eyewitness identifications. (Slip op. at 3-11). While Blackmon’s trial lawyer put on two alibi witnesses, Blackmon alleges he failed to interview and present six additional alibi witnesses. The Seventh Circuit holds this allegation entitles Blackmon to a hearing to take testimony from the missing alibi witnesses and trial counsel.
Seventh Circuit: SCOW decision on self-representation is “flatly contrary” to Faretta
Rashaad A. Imani v. William Pollard, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3407, 2016 WL 3434673, 6/22/16
Imani tried to exercise his right to self-representation under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), but the Wisconsin trial judge prevented him from doing so. In State v. Imani, 2010 WI 66, 326 Wis. 2d 179, 786 N.W.2d 40, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the trial judge properly found Imani wasn’t competent to represent himself and that he hadn’t made a knowing and voluntary choice to represent himself. The Seventh Circuit now holds that even under the stringent standard for federal habeas relief, SCOW’s decision was wrong, and Imani is entitled to a new trial.