On Point: B. Federal

Questions presented:

1. Whether the Michigan Supreme Court’s recognition that a state statute abolished the long-maligned diminished-capacity defense was an “unexpected and indefensible” change in a common-law doctrine of criminal law under this Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence. See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001).

2. Whether the Michigan Court of Appeals’ retroactive application of the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision was “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement”

Chaidez v. United States, USSC No. 11-820, affirming 655 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011)

Issue:  We know that Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) requires counsel to advise a defendant about the risk of deportation arising from a guilty plea.  The question presented by Chaidez is whether or not that rule applies retroactively so that a person whose conviction became final before Padilla can benefit from it. 

Ryan v. Gonzales, USSC No. 10-930; Tibbals v. Carter, USSC No. 11-218, 1/8/13

United States Supreme Court decision, reversing In re Gonzalez, 623 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 2010), and reversing and remanding Carter v. Bradshaw, 644 F.3d 329 (6th Cir. 2011)

These two cases present the question whether the incompetence of a state prisoner requires suspension of the prisoner’s federal habeas corpus proceedings.

Martin Woolley v. Rednour, 7th Cir No. 10-3550, 12/14/12

seventh circuit decision

Habeas Review – Issue Left Unaddressed by State Court

Where, on state (Illinois) postconviction review of an IAC claim, the trial court ruled that counsel’s performance had been deficient but not prejudicial, and the state appellate court affirmed solely on the basis of prejudice without reaching deficient performance, habeas review of counsel’s performance is de novo (that is,

Robert Dietrich v. Smith, 7th Cir No. 12-1672, 12/4/12

seventh circuit decision, on habeas review, affirming 2011C117 (E.D. Wis 2/23/12); prior history: State v. Dietrich, Wis. App. 2008AP1697-CR

After the trial court denied his request for an in camera inspection of the sexual assault victim’s mental health records, State v. Green, 2002 WI 68,

Elliot D. Ray v. Clements, 7th Cir No. 11-3228, 11/19/12

seventh circuit decision, appeal following remand in 592 F.3d 793 (7th Cir 2010) (summarized in prior post)

… (W)e hold that in cases where the pro se prisoner’s post-conviction motion is not received, the petitioner must submit a sworn statement and some evidence to support his claim that he timely delivered the filing to a prison official,

Question Presented:

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) contains a one-year statute of limitations for filing a habeas petition. In Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2562 (2010), this Court affirmed that a habeas petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of that one-year period “only if he shows: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” 

seventh circuit decision (html) (90-page pdf download: here), granting habeas relief in 904 N.E.2d 1077 (Ill. App. 2009)

A significant decision in several respects – not least, attorney performance – that a summary post cannot hope to capture, save broad highlights. Executive summary: Harris was convicted of killing her 4-year-old son Jaquari, against a defense of accidental death (self-strangulation with an elastic band). The defense had potential,

seventh circuit decision, denying habeas relief in 641 N.E.2d 371 (Ill. 1994) and 521 N.E.2d 38 (1988)

Habeas Review – 6th Amendment Attachment of Counsel – State Court Findings

The Seventh Circuit rejects, on habeas review of his Illinois conviciton, Thompkins’ challenge to admissibility of his statement. Thompkins made his statement after his arrest and, according to the state court, before his initial bond hearing.

seventh circuit decision

Habeas – Jury Exposure to Extraneous Information 

Subsequent to trial, Hall discovered that a juror’s son was a fellow inmate of Hall who initially told the juror that Hall was likely innocent, but later indicated that he “and several co-inmates had changed their mind about Hall and thought him guilty.” The (Indiana) state court ruled that this extrinsic information wasn’t prejudicial: the burden to show actual prejudice from exposure to extraneous information is on the defendant and,