On Point: B. Federal

7th Circuit decision

Abstention – SVP Proceeding

The Younger v. Harris abstention doctrine applies to pending ch. 980 proceedings.

What is true is that a person who is in state custody awaiting a determination by the state courts of the legality of his custody may seek federal habeas corpus to challenge that custody without being barred by the Younger doctrine if immediate federal intervention is necessary to prevent the challenge from becoming moot.

John Ebert v. Gaetz, 7th Circuit No. 09-1627, 6/23/10

7th circuit court of appeals decision

When the ineffective assistance claim is based on counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress, as it is here, the defendant must also prove “that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice.” Kimmelman v.

seventh circuit court of appeals decision

Ineffective Assistance – NGI Defense – Habeas Review

Counsel performed deficiently by failing to: adequately prep his NGI expert witness, who had performed only a competency evaluation of Wilson and wasn’t given the opportunity for a reinterview with the distinct purpose of an NGI evaluation; present testimony of family members familiar with Wilson’s mental deterioration; and retain another expert.

Given the gravity of the charge against Wilson and the ample evidence that he was driven to kill Fischer by an insane delusion,

Holland v. Florida, USSC No. 09-5327, 6/14/10

Habeas – Filing Deadline – Equitable Tolling, Generally

The 1-year limitations period for filing an 18 U.S.C. §2254 habeas petition is subject to “equitable tolling”:

We have not decided whether AEDPA’s statutory limitations period may be tolled for equitable reasons. … Now, like all 11 Courts of Appeals that have considered the question, we hold that §2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases.

7th circuit court of appeals decision

Habeas Review – Exculpatory Evidence
Statements of three eyewitnesses, not disclosed to the defendant, that would have implicated the state’s principal eyewitness and otherwise impeached his credibility and that of 2 other state’s witnesses was “material.” It is reasonably probable that disclosure would have netted a different result, and the state court’s contrary conclusion unreasonably applied clearly established law.

The court stresses,

Renico v. Lett, USSC No. 09-338, 5/3/10

The state court’s conclusion of manifest necessity for mistrial where the foreperson reported inability to reach unanimity wasn’t unreasonable, hence grant of habeas relief is vacated:

… (T)rial judges may declare a mistrial “whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity” for doing so. Id., at 580. The decision to declare a mistrial is left to the “sound discretion” of the judge,

Berghuis v. Smith, USSC No. 08-1402, 3/30/10

Defendants have Sixth Amendment right to impartial jury drawn from fair cross section of community. To establish prima facie violation of this “fair-cross-section,” requirement, a defendant must prove that: (1) a group qualifying as “distinctive” (2) is not fairly and reasonably represented in jury venires, and (3) “systematic exclusion” in the jury-selection process accounts for the underrepresentation. Various methods have been proposed to test underrepresentation,

7th circuit court of appeals decision; habeas review of: Wis court of appeals decision, 03AP3252

Habeas – Supplement Record

… Although we generally decline to supplement the record on appeal with materials not before the district court, we have not applied this position categorically. See, e.g., Ruvalcaba v. Chandler, 416 F.3d 555, 562 n.2 (7th Cir. 2005) (in habeas case,

Johnbull K. Osagiede v. USA, 7th Cir No. 07-1131, 9/9/08

Issue/Holding: Counsel’s ignorance of VCCR Art. 36 rights available to foreign national client was deficient:

Osagiede’s claim is a common one in Sixth Amendment cases. In essence, Osagiede argues that his lawyer should have been aware of his legal rights under Article 36 and should have acted to protect them: “All lawyers that represent criminal defendants are expected to know the laws applicable to their client’s defense.” Julian v.

Donald Calloway v. Montgomery, 512 F. 3d 940, No. 07-1148, 1/14/08

Issue/Holding: Where the Supreme Court has expressly declined to rule on the issue (or on one in a very similar) context) to the issue on habeas review, there is no clearly established precedent within the meaning of AEDPA.

Andrew Lockhart v. Chandler, 446 F.3d 721 (7th Cir 2006) (challenge to lack of knowledge of mandatory additional term of supervised release not cognizable) followed.