On Point: 22. Habeas corpus

Christeson v. Roper, USSC No. 14-6873, 2015 WL 232187 (January 20, 2015) (per curiam); docket

The Supreme Court holds that the lower courts failed to properly apply Martel v. Clair, 565 U. S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1276 (2012), when they denied Christeson’s request to substitute appointed counsel in his federal habaeas case.

Carl C. Gilbert, Jr., v. Deborah McCulloch, No. 13-3460 (7th Cir. Jan. 12, 2015)

Gilbert was committed as a sexually violent person while he was still in prison serving a criminal sentence, so he was not transferred to the ch. 980 treatment facility till he finished the sentence. The state courts upheld his commitment and the Seventh Circuit now rejects Gilbert’s habeas challenge, holding the state court’s decision was not clearly contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992).

Jennings v. Stephens, USSC No. 13-7211, 2015 WL 159277 (January 14, 2015), reversing Jennings v. Stephens, 537 Fed. Appx. 326 (5th Cir. July 22, 2013); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

A federal district court granted Jennings’s habeas relief, ordering a new sentencing hearing based on two of the three theories of ineffective assistance of counsel that Jennings raised. The state appealed, and Jennings defended the district court judgment on all three theories. The Fifth Circuit held that Jennings’s claim on the third theory was procedurally barred because it was rejected by the district court and Jennings hadn’t cross-appealed or obtained a certificate of appealability. In a majority opinion authored by Justice Scalia the Supreme Court reverses, holding that Jennings may defend the district court’s judgment based on the third theory.

Questions presented:

I.   Whether a state court that considers the evidence presented at a petitioner’s penalty phase proceeding as determinative of the petitioner’s claim of mental retardation under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), has based its decision on an unreasonable determination of facts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

II.   Whether a state court that denies funding to an indigent petitioner who has no other means of obtaining evidence of his mental retardation has denied petitioner his “opportunity to be heard,”

Glebe v. Frost, USSC No. 14-95, 11/17/14 (per curiam), reversing Frost v. Van Boening, 757 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc); docket and Scotusblog page

Supreme Court precedent has not clearly established that improper restriction of a defendant’s closing argument is structural error, so the Ninth Circuit erred in granting habeas relief on that ground.

Questions presented:

(1) Whether a state court’s rejection of a claim of federal constitutional error on the ground that any error, if one occurred, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt is an “adjudicat[ion] on the merits” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), so that a federal court may set aside the resulting final state conviction only if the defendant can satisfy the restrictive standards imposed by that provision; and

(2) Whether the court of appeals properly applied the standard articulated in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).

Lopez v. Smith, USSC No. 13-946, 10/6/14 (per curiam), reversing Smith v. Lopez, 731 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 2013); docket

When a state prisoner seeks federal habeas relief on the ground that a state court, in adjudicating a claim on the merits, misapplied federal law, a federal court may grant relief only if the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). We have emphasized, time and again, that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), … prohibits the federal courts of appeals from relying on their own precedent to conclude that a particular constitutional principle is “clearly established.” …. Because the Ninth Circuit failed to comply with this rule, we reverse its decision granting habeas relief to respondent Marvin Smith. (Slip op. at 1).

Thomas Socha v. Gary Broughton, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 12-1598, 8/14/14

In Socha’s previous appeal of the dismissal of his federal habeas petition, the Seventh Circuit held the district court was not compelled to dismiss the petition just because it was filed after the one-year AEDPA deadline because there were a couple possible theories—specifically, equitable tolling or equitable estoppel—for finding the petition was timely filed. Socha v.

State ex re. Lorenzo D. Kyles v. William Pollard, 2013 WI 38, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity

Settling a somewhat obscure but still important point of appellate procedure, the supreme court unanimously holds that when a defendant seeks to reinstate the deadline for filing a notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief under § 809.30(2)(b) based on an allegation that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely notice, he should file a habeas petition in the court of appeals as provided under State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992).

Randy White v. Robert Keith Woodall, USSC No. 12-794, 4/23/14, reversing and remanding Woodall v. Simpson, 685 F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 2012); case activity

It’s getting harder and harder to win a habeas case.  Woodall requested an instruction forbidding jurors from drawing adverse inferences from his decision to not testify during the penalty phase of his capital murder trial.  The majority opinion, authored by Scalia, held that SCOTUS precedent requiring a “no adverse inference” instruction was clearly established for the guilt phase of a trial, but not the penalty phase.