On Point: 22. Habeas corpus

Ladarius Marshall v. Scott Eckstein, No. 15-CV-008 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 22, 2020)

Marshall pleaded to homicide and other charges. Before he did so, though, he moved to suppress statements he’d made during more than 12 hours of interrogation at the police station (he was 16 years old at the time). The trial court and our court of appeals held that the interrogating officers “scrupulously honored” Marshall’s multiple assertions that he didn’t want to talk with them anymore. The federal district court finds this conclusion unreasonable because the officers deflected his refusals to talk and cajoled him into continuing. What’s more, the court says that even his later statements–given to officers who did follow Miranda‘s rules–must be suppressed because they were too closely connected to his original, unlawfully-taken statements.

Terez Cook v. Brian Foster, Warden, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 18-2214, 1/29/2020

Pursuing a federal writ of habeas corpus is always a long shot; in non-capital cases fewer than 1% of petitions are successful. Terez Cook gets it done here, convincing the Seventh Circuit his lawyer was ineffective at his trial for a home-invasion robbery (and that the Wisconsin court of appeals’ decision to the contrary was not just wrong, but unreasonable). The federal court is puzzled by a few aspects of our state court’s denial of Cook’s claims. But the thing that seems to push that denial over the line into unreasonableness–AEDPA‘s stringent requirement for habeas relief–is that it got a crucial fact wrong. The state court’s opinion relies on a confession by Cook–a confesssion for which there’s apparently no evidence. How did our court go astray? Well, the state described the (non-existent) confession in its brief, and then Cook’s direct-appeal counsel apparently didn’t check the facts, and neither did the court of appeals.

State ex rel. Wren v. Richardson, 2017AP880-W, 2019 WI 110, affirming a court of appeals unpublished memorandum opinion; case activity (including briefs)

Two weeks ago, we posted “SCOW holds defendants abandoned by counsel to same standards as licensed lawyers,” calling State v. Pope “the most absurd decision this term (still time for worse).” Behold an even more absurd decision: even teenagers who read at 2nd grade level are held to the same standard as licensed lawyers. And, sadly, there’s still time for worse.

State ex rel. Milton Eugene Warren v. Michael Meisner, 2019AP567-W, petition for review granted 10/16/19; reversed and remanded 6/10/20; case activity

Issue (composed by On Point based on the petition for review)

Whether under State v. Starks, 2013 WI 69, Warren’s § 974.06 postconviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel by the lawyer appointed on direct appeal should be heard in the circuit court or the Court of Appeals.

Walker v. Pollard, 18C0147, Eastern District of Wisconsin, 9/4/19

Montgomery Walker is a pro se habeas petitioner who alleges that his postconviction/appellate counsel should have raised a claim of juror bias. In an order granting Walker an evidentiary hearing, the U.S. District Court holds that our supreme court was wrong, in State v. Starks, 2013 WI 69, 349 Wis. 2d 274, 833 N.W.2d 146, to say an appellate lawyer can’t be ineffective for failing to raise a claim unless that claim is “clearly stronger” that claims the lawyer did raise. The decision explains that SCOW misread Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000), as imposing such a rule.

Banister v. Davis, USSC No. 18-6943, certiorari granted 6/24/19

Question presented:

Whether and under what circumstances a timely Rule 59(e) motion should be recharacterized as a second or successive habeas petition under Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005).

State ex rel. Ezequiel Lopez Quintero v. Dittmann, 2019 WI 58, reversing and remanding a court of appeals memorandum opinion, case activity (including briefs)

Go Remington Center for the 5-2 win in SCOW! The court of appeals dismissed R.C.’s habeas petition ex parte because it did not allege why Lopez Quintero waited 9 years to file it in violation of State ex rel. Smalley v. Morgan, 211 Wis. 2d 795, 565 N.W.2d 805 (Ct. App. 1997).  This overrules Smalley and holds that a habeas petitioner need not allege timeliness in his petition.

State ex rel. Joshua M. Wren v. Reed Richardson, 2017AP880, review of an unpublished court of appeals order granted 5/14/19; case activity

Issue (from the petition for review):

Whether a criminal defendant who was denied a direct appeal and consequently was also deprived of counsel on appeal due to his trial counsel’s failure to file a notice of intent was properly denied habeas corpus relief based on the State’s assertion of a laches defense.

State v. Maries D. Addison, 2018AP55-57-CR, 3/26/19, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals agreed that the 17-month delay in bringing Addison to trial was presumptively prejudicial, but based on the unique facts of this case, it held that his speedy trial rights weren’t violated. Addison did a fine job representing himself (he got “not guilty” verdicts on 5 of 22 counts) so his “incompetency to proceed pro se” claim went nowhere. Plus his freedom of religion claim (right to have a Bible with him during trial) failed because his argument was insufficiently developed. 

Scott Schmidt v. Brian Foster, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 17-1727, 12/20/18, reversing panel decision of 5/29/18

Schmidt, as we discussed in our post on the Seventh Circuit’s (now reversed) habeas grant, was summoned into chambers and questioned by the judge about the testimony he wanted to give in his defense. His lawyer was allowed to be there but was forbidden, outside of a brief limited consultation, to participate. A majority of the en banc court, over sharp dissent, now says that even though that was pretty clearly unconstitutional, Schmidt’s conviction stands because of the AEDPA standard.