On Point: 22. Habeas corpus

Hatem M. Shata v. Denise Symdon, No. 16-CV-574 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 12, 2018)

Shata’s case was one of two our supreme court decided on the same day–both held counsel not ineffective for failing to give accurate advice on immigration consequences. You can see our prior post for the facts and our analysis of those decisions. Basically, counsel told Shata that pleading to the charged drug count would carry a “strong chance” of deporation, when in fact deportation was mandatory. Unlike our supreme court, the federal court now says that this wasn’t good enough–and further, that the supreme court’s conclusion that it was good enough was an unreasonable application of the law that SCOTUS clearly established in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).

State ex rel. Ezequiel Lopez-Quintero v. Michael A. Dittman, 2018AP203-W, petition for review of a memorandum opinion granted 6/11/18; case activity

Issue (from the petition for review)

Can the court of appeals apply an irrebuttable presumption of prejudice and deny ex parte a sufficiently pled petition for writ of habeas corpus solely for untimeliness, under Wis. Stat. § 809.51?

Scott Schmidt v. Brian Foster, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 17-1727, 5/29/18, reversing Schmidt v. Pollard, No. 13-CV-1150 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 20, 2017); reversed en banc 12/20/18

A criminal defendant is entitled to counsel at all “critical stages” of the case. You probably think that a hearing, before a murder trial, that determines whether the accused will get to present his only defense counts as such a “critical stage.” The Wisconsin Court of Appeals, however, “easily reject[ed]” that notion in this (published) case. The Seventh Circuit now disagrees, saying the Wisconsin decision “unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent and, frankly, ignored reality.”

State ex rel. Gregory S. Gorak v. Michael Meisner, Warden, 2017AP39, District 1, 2/27/18 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court denied Gorak’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus after deciding it was procedurally barred because the issues it raised had already been litigated and decided.  The court of appeals holds that is not the case. 

Judge Lynn Adelman, Eastern District of Wisconsin,  wrote an article by that name.  SSRN recently posted it online. An excerpt from the abstract is pasted in below. Don’t hold back. The article is short, and you won’t regret reading the whole thing . . . unless perhaps you’re Newt Gingrich, Bill Clinton, or a state appellate judge. 🙂

Dassey v. Dittman, 2017 WL 6154050, (7th Cir. 12/8/17)

This is the decision Making a Murderer watchers have been waiting for. Critics and ivory tower dwellers will celebrate the result (a 4-3 win for the prosecution) but also the concise, dispassionate exposition of the law on involuntary confessions and its application to a hypothetical Brendan Dassey–someone mature, intelligent, unsusceptible to manipulation or coercion by “interviewers.” Documentary fans and lawyers having real world experience representing clients with diminished mental capacity will prefer Chief Judge Diane Wood’s biting dissent. She nails the flaws in the majority’s reasoning and applies the law to the human Dassey–a 16-year old with an IQ in the low 80s.

Erick Daniel Davila v. Lorie Davis, USSC No. 16-6219, 2017 WL 2722418 (June 26, 2017), affirming Davila v. Davis, No. 15-70013 (5th Cir., May 31, 2016) (unpublished); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Supreme Court holds that ineffective assistance of counsel in state postconviction proceedings does not provide cause to excuse, in a subsequent federal habeas proceeding, a procedurally defaulted claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

Brendan Dassey v. Michael A. Dittman, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 16-3397, 2017 WL 2683893, 6/22/17, affirming Dassey v. Pittman, 201 F.Supp.3d 963 (E.D. Wis. 2016).

Over a dissent, the Seventh Circuit holds that the Wisconsin court of appeals unreasonably applied clearly established federal law when they decided that Brendan Dassey voluntarily confessed to being involved with Steven Avery in the murder of Teresa Halbach.

Charlotte Jenkins v. Percy Hutton, USSC No. 16-1116, 2017 WL 2621321 (June 19, 2017) (per curiam), reversing Hutton v. Mitchell, 839 F.3d 486 (2016)( 6th Cir. 2016); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Hutton filed a federal habeas petition challenging his death sentence on the grounds that the jury at the penalty phase of his trial hadn’t been sufficiently instructed to consider only the aggravating factors that had been proven during the guilt phase. But he didn’t object to the instructions at trial and didn’t raise instructional error on direct appeal, so his claim was procedurally defaulted. (Slip op. at 1-3). The Sixth Circuit reached the merits of his claim anyway, excusing the default because the jury hadn’t found the existence of aggravating factors and under Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992). The Sixth Circuit was wrong to do so, says the Supreme Court.

Virginia v. Dennis LeBlanc, USSC No. 16-1177, 2017 WL 2507375 (June 12, 2017), reversing LeBlanc v. Mathena, 841 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2016); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Although this is a per curiam decision and it’s decided under the rubric of federal habeas review, the upshot of this opinion is that states won’t have to do too much to satisfy the requirement under Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010), that a state give a juvenile serving life without parole “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on a demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”