On Point: 22. Habeas corpus

James R. Todd v. Kess Roberson, 7th Circuit Cout of Appeals Case No. 14-3430, 2016 WL 3568107, 7/1/16

Todd claims his trial lawyer was ineffective for inducing him to plead to a charge carrying a minimum of 6 years and a maximum of 60 years in exchange for the state capping its sentencing recommendation at 10 years when there was no such cap. His claim fails because the record shows he understood there was no 10-year cap.

Anastazia Schmid v. Steven McCauley, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-2974, 2016 WL 3190670, 6/8/16

Because the record discloses Schmid suffers from some sort of mental disability and may have been hindered by counsel’s failure, the district court acted too hastily in dismissing Schmid’s untimely habeas petition; instead it should have appointed counsel and, if necessary, held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Schmid’s deadline was subject to equitable tolling.

Eric Blackmon v. Tarry Williams, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3059, 2016 WL 3007212, 5/24/16

Two eyewitnesses to the murder of Tony Cox were shown a photo array and live line-up, and both independently identified Eric Blackmon—a man they did not know—as one of two gunmen who shot and killed Cox. The judge at Blackmon’s bench trial relied heavily on the two eyewitness identifications. (Slip op. at 3-11). While Blackmon’s trial lawyer put on two alibi witnesses, Blackmon alleges he failed to interview and present six additional alibi witnesses. The Seventh Circuit holds this allegation entitles Blackmon to a hearing to take testimony from the missing alibi witnesses and trial counsel.

Rashaad A. Imani v. William Pollard, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3407, 2016 WL 3434673, 6/22/16

Imani tried to exercise his right to self-representation under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), but the Wisconsin trial judge prevented him from doing so. In State v. Imani, 2010 WI 66, 326 Wis. 2d 179, 786 N.W.2d 40, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the trial judge properly found Imani wasn’t competent to represent himself and that he hadn’t made a knowing and voluntary choice to represent himself. The Seventh Circuit now holds that even under the stringent standard for federal habeas relief, SCOW’s decision was wrong, and Imani is entitled to a new trial.

Questions presented:

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) found the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(B)(ii)(defining “violent felony”) unconstitutionally vague. That clause is identical to the residual cause in the career-offender provision of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2)(defining “crime of violence”)

(1) Whether Johnson v. United States applies retroactively to collateral cases challenging federal sentences enhanced under the residual clause in United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) § 4B1.2(a)(2) (defining “crime of violence”);

(2) whether Johnson‘s constitutional holding applies to the residual clause in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), thereby rendering challenges to sentences enhanced under it cognizable on collateral review; and

(3) whether mere possession of a sawed-off shotgun, an offense listed as a “crime of violence” only in commentary to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, remains a “crime of violence” after Johnson.

Question presented:

Duane Buck’s death penalty case raises a pressing issue of national importance: whether and to what extent the criminal justice system tolerates racial bias and discrimination. Specifically, did the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit impose an improper and unduly burdensome Certificate of Appealability (COA) standard that contravenes this Court’s precedent and deepens two circuit splits when it denied Mr. Buck a COA on his motion to reopen the judgment and obtain merits review of his claim that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for knowingly presenting an “expert” who testified that Mr. Buck was more likely to be dangerous in the future because he is Black, where future dangerousness was both a prerequisite for a death sentence and the central issue at sentencing?

Deborah K. Johnson v. Donna Kay Lee, 578 U.S. __ (2016)(per curiam); SCOTUS docket

Like Wisconsin, California has a rule that a defendant may not raise a claim for the first time on on state collateral review if he could have raised it on direct appeal. Wisconsin calls it the “Escalona bar.” California calls it the “Dixon bar.” The issue in this case was whether the California Supreme Court’s application of the “Dixon bar” provided an independent and adequate state ground for barring federal habeas review.  SCOTUS answered “yes.”

Lee’s litigation strategy is interesting. After losing her direct appeal in California state courts, she skipped state postconviction review and filed a federal habeas petition. The federal court stayed her petition and directed her to exhaust her state-court remedies. She filed a state habeas petition, which the California Supreme Court denied in a summary order that cited Dixon.

Scott R. Schmidt v. Deborah McCulloch, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3651, 5/27/16

The Seventh Circuit upholds the denial of a Wis. Stat. ch. 980 detainee’s habeas corpus petition.

Tony Thomas v. Tarry Williams, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-2610, 5/18/16

Thomas’s federal habeas petition argued the state withheld potentially exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), but didn’t raise this claim in his state postconviction proceeding so he can’t raise it in his federal habeas petition.

Kernan v. Hinojosa, USSC No. 15-833, 2016 WL 2842454 (May 16, 2016) (per curiam), reversing Hinjosa v. Davey, 803 F.3d 412 (9th Cir. 2015); Scotusblog page

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the California courts hadn’t made a determination of Hinojosa’s claim on the merits and therefore applied de novo review rather than AEDPA’s highly deferential standard. The supreme court summarily holds the court of appeals’ conclusion was wrong, and that AEDPA does apply.