On Point: B. Recusal

Wisconsin Judicial Commission v. Kenneth W. Gorski, 2020 WI 5, imposing a public reprimand on a court commissioner; case activity

Gorski, a part-time court commissioner, earns a public reprimand for failing to recuse himself from a case being handled by a lawyer who is a close friend and for his treatment of the pro se litigant in that case.

Williams v. Pennsylvania, USSC No. 15-5040, 2016 WL 3189529 (June 9, 2016), vacating and remanding Commonwealth v. Williams, 105 A.3d 1234 (Pa. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

When he was district attorney of Philadelphia, Ronald Castille authorized a subordinate to seek a death sentence in Terrance Williams’s murder trial. Thirty years later, as Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Castille refused to recuse himself from the commonwealth’s appeal of Williams’ successful habeas petition, which alleged that the DA’s office had withheld exculpatory information contrary to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled against Williams; SCOTUS now holds that Castille’s participation in that decision deprived Williams of due process.

Questions Presented:

1. Are the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments violated where the presiding Chief Justice of a State Supreme Court declines to recuse himself in a capital case where he had personally approved the decision to pursue capital punishment against Petitioner in his prior capacity as elected District Attorney and continued to head the District Attorney’s Office that defended the death verdict on appeal; where, in his State Supreme Court election campaign, the Chief Justice expressed strong support for capital punishment, with reference to the number of defendants he had “sent” to death row, including Petitioner; and where he then, as Chief Justice, reviewed a ruling by the state postconviction court that his office committed prosecutorial misconduct under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), when it prosecuted and sought death against Petitioner?

2. Are the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments violated by the participation of a potentially biased jurist on a multimember tribunal deciding a capital case, regardless of whether his vote is ultimately decisive?

State v. Jesse L. Herrmann, 2015 WI 84, 7/15/15, afffirming an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

All seven justices agree Herrmann’s due process right to an impartial judge wasn’t violated in this case, as the sentencing judge’s remarks didn’t establish the judge was was objectively biased against Herrmann. Two separate concurrences consisting of four justices, however, express displeasure with (or attempt to limit, at least with respect to recusal) the objective bias test as established in previous Wisconsin and U.S. Supreme Court cases.

State v. Ouati K. Ali, 2011AP2169, District 4, 11/1/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Postconviction Proceedings – Right to Counsel 

A defendant has no constitutional right to counsel outside the direct appeal period, therefore Ali’s argument that failure to appoint counsel counsel to pursue DNA testing deprived him of due process is a non-starter.

¶12      Ali does not claim that the public defender erroneously exercised its discretion in declining to appoint him counsel for the purpose of pursuing his motion for postconviction DNA testing.  

Memorandum Decision on Recusal in: Wisconsin Judicial Commission v. David T. Prosser, Jr., 2012 WI 104 (Justice Gableman);  case activity; companion decisions: 2012 WI 103; 2012 WI 69, 2012 WI 43

¶1   On May 8, 2012, I received a letter from Kevin P. Reak, counsel for Justice David T. Prosser, Jr., filed with the court, requesting that I recuse myself from participation in the captioned matter.  

Memorandum Decision on Recusal in: Wisconsin Judicial Commission v. David T. Prosser, Jr., 2012 WI 103 (Justice Ziegler);  case activity; companion decisions: 2012 WI 69, 2012 WI 43

Justice Ziegler, like Justice Roggensack and unlike Justice Crooks, recuses herself from a pending judicial complaint against Justice Prosser.

¶2   The highly unusual issue each justice is called upon to decide is whether he or she,

State v. Circuit Court for Dane County / Ismael R. Ozanne v. Jeff Fitzgerald, 2012 WI 82, declining to grant motion to reopen 2011 WI 43; case activity; companion case: Adams v. State, 2012 WI 81

The court splits 3-3 on, and therefore does not grant, District Attorney Ozanne’s motion to reopen the decision in 2011 WI 43 (the Act 10,

order denying motion for reconsideration of in: State v. Dimitri Henley, 2011 WI 67; for Henley: Keith A. Findley; case activity; additional history: 2010 WI 12 (memorandum decision, Roggensack, J.); court order (5/24/10)

Henley’s motion to reconsider, though directed formally to the decision reversing grant of new trial, as a practical matter is directed to reconsideration of Justice Roggensack’s prior refusal to disqualify herself (on the ground she had previously “handled”

State v. Morris L. Harris, 2009AP2833-CR,  District 1, 10/13/10

court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Harris: Gary Grass; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Lesser-Included Instruction – Battery

Harris not entitled to instruction on simple battery as lesser included of substantial battery; the medical evidence established without contradiction that the victim suffered a fractured rib, therefore no reasonable jury could have acquitted him of the greater offense,