On Point: b. Doubtful fairness

State v. Edward Beck, 2010AP872-CR, District 4, 10/20/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); pro se; case activity

Circuit court is under no obligation to seek extension of the § 809.30(2) limitation period for its ruling on a postconviction motion.

¶6        Beck reads too much into the 2001 amendment to Wis. Stat. § 809.30(2)(i).  The amendment simply added language to § 809.30(2)(i) specifying the entities that may request an extension,

State v. Howard C. Carter, 2002 WI App 55
For Howard: Charles B. Vetzner, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Although review of a trial court’s determination of subjective (non-)bias of a prospective juror is generally deferential, here review is independent “because this is one of those rare situations where the prospective juror’s unambiguous response, rather than his demeanor, is the basis of his subjective bias.” ¶10. And, because the juror openly admitted his bias,

State v. Scot A. Czarnecki, 2000 WI App 155, 237 Wis.2d 794, 615 N.W.2d 672
For Czarnecki: Patrick M. Donnelly, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether the trial court should have granted the defense motion to remove a prospective juror who acknowledged believing that police officers would be more credible than other witnesses.

Holding: Juror bias is reviewed with deference to the trial court’s resolution. Because police credibility was never at issue,

State v. Nathaniel A. Lindell, 2000 WI App 180, 238 Wis.2d 422, 617 N.W.2d 500, affirmed on other grounds, State v. Nathaniel A. Lindell, 2001 WI 108
For Lindell: Russell L. Hanson; Timothy J. Gaskell

Issue: Whether the prospective juror’s allowing, “I think I could” make a fair determination, established subjective bias.

Holding: The trial court’s ruling of no subjective bias isn’t clearly erroneous.

State v. Marquis O. Gilliam, 2000 WI App 152, 238 Wis.2d 1, 615 N.W.2d 660
For Gilliam: Robert B. Rondini

Issue: Whether the trial court’s denial of a motion to remove a juror based on subjective bias was clearly erroneous.

Holding: The issue of a juror’s subjective bias is reviewed deferentially to the trial court’s resolution. Though this case is different from prior cases — here, “whether the juror has expressed a prejudice or predilection in the first instance”

State v. Jimmie R.R., 2000 WI App 5, 232 Wis.2d 138, 606 N.W.2d 196
For Jimmie R.R.: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether the trial court erred in refusing to strike for cause a potential juror who was equivocal on his ability to be fair.

Holding: The trial court did not err in finding no subjective bias.

 When asked if he could listen to the evidence and apply the law,

State v. Theodore Oswald, 2000 WI App 2, 232 Wis.2d 62, 606 N.W.2d 207
For Oswald: Jerome F. Buting, Kathleen B. Stilling

Issue: Whether prospective jurors’ expressions of predetermined guilt established either objective or subjective bias.

Holding: Applying a mixed standard of review, the court discerns no bias, in that the strength of these opinions changed during voir dire and, more importantly, because the defense conceded factual guilt.

State v. James E. Erickson, 227 Wis.2d 758, 596 N.W.2d 749 (1999), on certification
For Erickson: Glenn L. Cushing, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Though a juror gave a seemingly hedged answer (“I think so”) to whether she’d be fair and impartial, the trial court’s refusal to strike for cause is upheld given appellate deference to trial-level determination of no subjective bias. ¶¶37-44.

State v. Vance Ferron, 219 Wis.2d 481, 579 N.W.2d 654 (1998), affirming, as modified, 214 Wis. 2d 268, 570 N.W.2d 883 (Ct. App. 1997)
For Ferron: Jane Krueger Smith

Issue: Whether a prospective juror’s equivocations during voir dire required that he be struck for cause.

Holding: The trial court erred in refusing to strike for cause a potential juror who acknowledged only that he “probably” could set aside his opinion that a truly innocent defendant would testify.