On Point: H. Deliberations

Leon Carter v. Lizzie Tiegels, No. 23-1266, 4/24/25

In a knotty habeas case, the complexities of habeas corpus law mean that Carter’s challenges to how COA handled his no-merit appeal and an underlying (and unique) claim of juror intrusion do not merit relief.

State v. Conrad M. Mader, 2022AP382-CR, District 2, 6/7/23 (recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Mader was convicted of repeated sexual assault of his stepdaughter. He argues his trial lawyer was ineffective in numerous ways. The court of appeals agrees trial counsel performed deficiently in three respects, but holds trial counsel’s mistakes weren’t prejudicial and therefore Mader isn’t entitled to a new trial.

State v. Isiah O. Smith, 2015AP1645-CR, 11/15/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Two guys walk into an apartment complex and leave a short time later. One carried a gun and a cell phone; the other a cell phone. They got into a car belonging to a friend of the guy carrying only the cell phone and drove off. A surveillance video captured these movements but not the  shooting death that occurred in the complex at about the same time. Was there sufficient evidence to convict the guy holding just the cell phone of 2nd degree reckless homicide as a party to a crime? 

Dietz v. Bouldin, USSC No. 15-458, 2016WL3189528 (June 9, 2016), affirming Dietz v. Bouldin, 794 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2015); SCOTUSblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

In a 6-2 decision, SCOTUS holds that a federal district court has limited inherent authority to rescind a jury discharge and to recall the jury for further deliberations in order to address an error in its verdict. The court specifically limits this decision to civil cases.

Question presented:

Whether, after a judge has discharged a jury from service in a case and the jurors have left the judge’s presence, the judge may recall the jurors for further service in the same case.

State v. Vaughn Caruth Gilmer, 2014AP1873-CR, District 1, 8/18/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court properly exercised its discretion in allowing the deliberating jury to have a bag of marijuana that had been admitted into evidence because it aided the jury in assessing the credibility of the witnesses’ testimony.

State v. Aaron Schaffhausen, 2014AP2370-CR, District 3, 7/14/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

It was error for the circuit court to tell jurors at the mental-responsibility phase of Schaffhausen’s NGI trial that they would decide whether a defense psychiatrist and psychologist were qualified as expert witnesses, but the error was harmless. In addition, the circuit court did not misuse its discretion in denying the jury’s request during deliberations to provide it with the expert witnesses’ reports.

State v. Chase M.A. Boruch, 2013AP925-CR, District 3, 1/22/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

While deliberating on the charge that Boruch killed his mother, the jury asked the judge for the “autopsy report.” (¶¶4, 8). The parties agreed to send back the preliminary and final reports done by Corliss, the state’s pathologist, along with a toxicology report; however, the judge refused Borcuch’s request to send the jury the report of Randall,

State v. Michael T. Grant, 2013AP515-CR, District 2, 1/15/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Grant was on trial for two counts of sexual assault involving two different victims. (¶¶1, 4-6). During deliberations the jury advised the court it had reached a verdict on one count but could not agree on the other. (¶8). In response the judge suggested taking the verdict the jury reached on the one count,

State v. Steven A. Avery, 2011 WI App 124 (recommended for publication); for Avery: Martha K. Askins, Suzanne L. Hagopian, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Search Warrant – Execution – Reasonableness 

Warrant-based search of Avery’s property was a reasonable continuation of the original search 3 days earlier.

General statement:

¶18      Generally, searches are subject to the “one warrant, one search” rule.