On Point blog, page 1 of 2
COA: though you can’t intend a reckless homicide, you can intend reckless endangerment
State v. Antonio Darnell Mays, 2022 WI App 24; case activity (including briefs)
Mays was accused of forcing his way into an apartment with and firing a gun at at least one of its occupants. One occupant fired back; in the end, two people were dead. The state initially charged Mays with, among other things, a reckless homicide for each of the deaths. But when, at trial, the evidence suggested that one of the decedents had been shot not by Mays, but by the occupant returning fire at Mays, the state moved to amend the information as to that death to charge felony murder instead. Mays opposed the amendment, and ultimately the state instead convinced the court to instruct the jury on felony murder as a lesser-included offense of reckless homicide. The jury convicted Mays of this lesser-included (and other counts).
SCOW affirms new trial in unusual homicide case involving a self-defense claim
State v. Alan M. Johnson, 2021 WI 61, 6/16/21, affirming in part and reversing in part a published decision of the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)
In a case presenting a highly unusual set of facts, the supreme court agrees with the court of appeals that Johnson is entitled to a new trial because the circuit court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on perfect self-defense. However, the supreme court reverses the court of appeals’ decision as to the admissibility of other-acts evidence relating to the victim.
Defense win in unusual self-defense homicide case
State v. Alan M. Johnson, 2020 WI App 50, state’s petition for review granted, 9/16/20, affirmed in part, reversed in part, 2021 WI 61; case activity (including briefs)
Johnson killed his brother-in-law, K.M., while he was in K.M.’s house, uninvited, to look to see whether K.M. had child porn on his computer. The court of appeals orders a new trial for Johnson because the trial court erred in denying Johnson’s perfect self-defense instruction and lesser-included offense instruction and in excluding evidence that there was, in fact, child porn on K.M.’s computer.
Imperfect self-defense mitigates a charge of 1st-degree intentional homicide, not a charge of 1st degree-reckless homicide
State v. Devin T. White, 2016AP119-CR, 4/10/18, District 1, (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
White was convicted of 1st-degree reckless homicide. He argued that the trial court misapplied the law governing self-defense and improperly instructed the jury. The court of appeals repeatedly struggled to determine the thrust of his argument, but it appeared to be this:
¶15 Under White’s interpretation of the law, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not have these actual beliefs; therefore, the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury of the State’s burden and that White could not be found guilty if the State did not prove he did not have these actual beliefs. Under White’s interpretation of the law, his actual belief controls, not whether his belief was reasonable.
The court of appeals also admonished White’s appellate counsel.
Disorderly conduct isn’t a lesser included of unlawful use of a computerized communication system
State v. James C. Faustmann, 2017AP1932-CR, District 2, 3/7/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Under the test for lesser included offenses under § 939.66(1), disorderly conduct in violation of § 947.01(1) isn’t a lesser-included offense of unlawful use of a computerized communication system in violation of § 947.0125(2)(a).
Forgoing lesser-included instruction a reasonable strategic choice
State v. Terry S. Shannon, 2015AP922, 12/7/2016, District 2 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Terry Shannon appeals the denial of his Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion. He was convicted, at trial, of first-degree intentional homicide; he alleges his trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting that the jury be instructed on second-degree intentional.
No error in failure to give instructions on lesser included homicide charges where defendant’s trial testimony didn’t support them
State v. Tammy S. Cole, 2013AP947-CR, District 4, 2/27/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
The trial court did not err in declining to instruct on second-degree reckless homicide or homicide by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon, as Cole requested at her trial on one count of first degree intentional homicide for shooting Evans, her boyfriend:
¶14 The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to Cole does not support submission of these lesser-included offenses.
Double Jeopardy – Establishing Final Verdict
Alex Blueford v. Arkansas, USSC No. 10-1320, 5/24/12, affirming 2011 Ark. 8
Double Jeopardy doesn’t bar retrial on greater offenses, despite jury foreperson’s report of unanimous votes against those charges, after ensuing deadlock resulted in mistrial.
Blueford’s primary submission is that he cannot be retried for capital and first-degree murder because the jury actually acquitted him of those offenses. See Green v.
Counsel – Challenge to Effectiveness – Machner Hearing
State v. William Martin, 2011AP2168, District 1, 5/8/12
court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); pro se; case activity; prior history: unpublished decision (2007AP1293-CR)
Because the record conclusively demonstrated that Martin wasn’t entitled to relief, State v. Love, 2005 WI 116, ¶26, 284 Wis. 2d 111, 700 N.W.2d 62, the circuit court properly denied without a hearing his claim that postconviction counsel was ineffective (for failing to argue appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness in several respects).
Reasonable Suspicion; Instructions – Party to a Crime – Evidentiary Support; Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
State v. Jermaine Kennard Young, 2010AP2959-CR, District 1, 3/6/12
court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Young: Robert N. Meyeroff; case activity
Reasonable suspicion existed to justify investigative stop of Young, based on a tip from confidential informant that someone matching Young’s description would be at a specified time and place to sell drugs.
¶13 When determining the reliability of a CI’s tip,