On Point blog, page 1 of 1
SCOTUS: Circuit precedent did not create “clearly established federal law” for AEDPA purposes
Lopez v. Smith, USSC No. 13-946, 10/6/14 (per curiam), reversing Smith v. Lopez, 731 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 2013); docket
When a state prisoner seeks federal habeas relief on the ground that a state court, in adjudicating a claim on the merits, misapplied federal law, a federal court may grant relief only if the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). We have emphasized, time and again, that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), … prohibits the federal courts of appeals from relying on their own precedent to conclude that a particular constitutional principle is “clearly established.” …. Because the Ninth Circuit failed to comply with this rule, we reverse its decision granting habeas relief to respondent Marvin Smith. (Slip op. at 1).
Terry stop — reasonable suspicion based on presence at house that was subject to surveillance and scene of earlier transaction. Jury instruction — PTAC; identifying person defendant was alleged to be aiding or abetting.
State v. Roland Derliel Graham, 2013AP440-CR, District 1, 12/29/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Reasonable suspicion for seizing defendant
¶15 We conclude that under the totality of the circumstances described by [Officer] Wiesmueller, there was reasonable suspicion to stop Graham. Graham was stopped on property that had been the subject of DEA and police surveillance for suspected drug activity. Earlier on the day of Graham’s arrest,
Reasonable Suspicion; Instructions – Party to a Crime – Evidentiary Support; Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
State v. Jermaine Kennard Young, 2010AP2959-CR, District 1, 3/6/12
court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Young: Robert N. Meyeroff; case activity
Reasonable suspicion existed to justify investigative stop of Young, based on a tip from confidential informant that someone matching Young’s description would be at a specified time and place to sell drugs.
¶13 When determining the reliability of a CI’s tip,