On Point blog, page 1 of 2
COA rejects challenges to jury instructions: one good route to conviction is enough
State v. Dreama F. Harvey, 2022 WI App 60; case activity (including briefs)
A jury convicted Harvey of reckless homicide by the delivery of heroin. On appeal, she notes that the jury instructions would have permitted conviction on the theory that she either aided and abetted another supplier or was part of the chain of distribution–that is, that she supplied the person who actually sold the heroin to the decedent. But there was no evidence she’d done any of those things: if she’d committed the crime, all the evidence showed that it was by selling the heroin directly to the buyer, who ingested it and died. The verdict forms were general: the jury was asked only to determine guilt or innocence, not whether Harvey was the principal, an aider, or a higher-up in the chain. So, Harvey says, we can’t know whether the jury convicted her based on one of the other two theories for which there was no evidence, and her conviction must be reversed.
Exclusion of evidence didn’t violate defendant’s right to present defense; instruction on self defense adequately instructed the jury
State v. Sergio Moises Ochoa, 2022 WI App 35; case activity (including briefs)
Ochoa, charged with two counts of first degree intentional homicide, claimed self defense. The court of appeals rejects his claims that the circuit court violated his right to present his defense by excluding certain evidence he wanted to present. The court also rejects his claim that the circuit court erred by refusing to modify the pattern jury instruction applicable to his case.
Jury instruction on voluntary intoxication wasn’t erroneous
State v. Chidiebele Praises Ozodi, 2019AP886-CR, District 2, 12/16/20 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The legislature amended § 939.42 in 2013 Wis. Act 307 to eliminate the defense of voluntary intoxication when the intoxication negated the existence of a requisite mental state, like intent or knowledge. But because the state has the burden of proving every element of an offense, including the mental state, there’s a due process argument that evidence of intoxication that might negate that element is relevant and admissible, despite the absence of a statutory defense of voluntary intoxication. (¶27 & n.4). If that’s so, then what, if anything, should the court tell the jury about how to use that evidence?
Standard OWI jury instruction sufficiently conveyed meaning of “impaired”
State v. Kari E. Mravik, 2018AP2300-CR, District 4, 8/29/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
At her OWI 2d trial, Mravik asked the judge to modify Wis. J.I.—Criminal 2663’s definition of “under the influence of an intoxicant.” The trial judge declined. The court of appeals finds no error because the instruction as a whole conveys the correct meaning of the phrase.
SCOW rejects challenges to JI-140
State v. Emmanuel Earl Trammell, 2019 WI 59, May 31, 2019, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Trammell challenged Wis. JI—Criminal 140, Wisconsin’s standard instruction on the burden of proof in a criminal case, arguing it dilutes the state’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. His primary challenge was to the directives that “[w]hile it is your duty to give the defendant the benefit of every reasonable doubt, you are not to search for doubt. You are to search for truth.” The court rejects Trammell’s arguments, though two concurring justices ask the Criminal Jury Instruction Committee to consider whether the instruction should be modified because it lacks an explanation of the quantum of proof required.
SCOW finds no problem with problematic jury instructions on self-defense, accident
State v. Joseph T. Langlois, 2018 WI 73, 6/20/18, affirming a published court of appeals decision, 2017 WI App 44; case activity (including briefs)
A majority of the supreme court concludes that the jury instructions given in this case, when viewed in their entirety, accurately stated the law the jury needed to decide the case. Two dissenting justices disagree, concluding that when considered in their entirety, the instructions could have led the jury astray.
Imperfect self-defense mitigates a charge of 1st-degree intentional homicide, not a charge of 1st degree-reckless homicide
State v. Devin T. White, 2016AP119-CR, 4/10/18, District 1, (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
White was convicted of 1st-degree reckless homicide. He argued that the trial court misapplied the law governing self-defense and improperly instructed the jury. The court of appeals repeatedly struggled to determine the thrust of his argument, but it appeared to be this:
¶15 Under White’s interpretation of the law, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not have these actual beliefs; therefore, the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury of the State’s burden and that White could not be found guilty if the State did not prove he did not have these actual beliefs. Under White’s interpretation of the law, his actual belief controls, not whether his belief was reasonable.
The court of appeals also admonished White’s appellate counsel.
SCOW to address challenge to muddled jury instructions on self defense, accident
State v. Joseph T. Langlois, 2016AP1409-CR, petition for review of a published court of appeals decision granted 12/13/17; case activity (including briefs)
Issues (composed by On Point):
1. Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to object to the jury instructions for self defense and accident on the lesser included charge of homicide by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon?
2. Alternatively, is a new trial in the interest of justice warranted because the erroneous jury instructions on self defense and accident prevented the real controversy from being tried?
3. Did the erroneous instructions on self defense and accident violate due process by relieving the state of the burden to prove every element of the offense?
4. Was the evidence sufficient to support the jury’s verdict of guilty of homicide by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon?
Court of Appeals splits over mishmash approach to instructing jury, affirms homicide conviction
State v. Joseph T. Langlois, 2017 WI App 44, petition for review granted 12/13/17, affirmed, 2018 WI 73; case activity (including briefs)
We all know that an appellate court determines the accuracy of a trial court’s jury instructions by reviewing them as a whole, not in isolation. State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 637-638, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992). But surely this doesn’t mean that a “whole” that includes incomplete, inaccurate instructions for some charges is fine so long as it includes the correct instructions for other charges. Surely we don’t expect 12 people unfamiliar with the complex law of “self defense” and “accident” to determine which versions of these instructions are correct and whether the same version applies to three distinct charges. This split opinion says “sure we do.” Judge Reilly objects to the majority’s “as long as the correct words are in there somewhere” approach to instructing a jury. Hopefully, SCOW will too.
Challenges to sufficiency of evidence and self-defense instruction in reckless homicide case rejected
State v. Phillip Kareen Green, 2015AP1126-CR, 4/26/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Green argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of first degree reckless homicide because it didn’t prove he acted with utter disregard for human life. He also argues for a new trial in the interest of justice on the grounds that: 1) the jury wasn’t fully instructed about the interaction between self-defense and the utter disregard element; and 2) important facts were not introduced or placed in proper context. The court of appeals rejects Green’s claims in a decision heavy on facts and light on analysis.