On Point: 25. Jury

Oconto County v. Jonathan E. Van Ark, 2015AP1415, 8/23/16; District 3 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Van Ark was sitting in his parked pickup truck when a deputy approached him, smelled alcohol, saw his glossy, blood-shot eyes, and observed his slow, slurred speech.  A subsequent hospital blood draw indicated that Van Ark had a .237 BAC. The State charged him with OWI and operating with a Prohibited Alcohol Concentration and moved for directed verdicts on both counts. The circuit court denied a directed verdict on the OWI charge, but granted it on the PAC charge. The court of appeals reversed based on WIS JI–CRIMINAL 2660A.

State v. Rodell Thompson, 2015AP1764-CR, District 4, 8/4/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The trial court didn’t erroneously exercise its discretion in deciding to admit other-acts evidence in Thompson’s trial for sexual assault, false imprisonment, and battery, and Thompson’s IAC claims fail for want of prejudice.

Attorney Michael Cicchini and Professor Lawrence White previously documented here that jurors who were told to “search for the truth” were much more likely to convict a defendant even if they had reasonable doubt about his guilt than those who were properly instructed on reasonable doubt. In other words, truth-related language lowers the State’s burden of proof. Their new study confirms their earlier findings, discusses the cognitive link between jury instructions and conviction rates,

McDonnell v. United States, USSC No. 15-474, 2016 WL 3461561 (June 27, 2016), reversing United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478 (4th Cir. 2015); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

While he was governor of Virginia, Bob McDonnell, along with his wife, accepted gifts and favors worth about $175,000 from a businessman who was trying to get the state medical schools to run studies on a nutritional supplement his company had developed. As discussed in our post on the cert grant, a jury convicted McDonnell of various honest services fraud and extortion counts in relation to various actions he undertook related to the supplement, including arranging and attending meetings with other government officials about the supplement and hosting a private lunch with the businessman at which checks were given to university researchers.

Dietz v. Bouldin, USSC No. 15-458, 2016WL3189528 (June 9, 2016), affirming Dietz v. Bouldin, 794 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2015); SCOTUSblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

In a 6-2 decision, SCOTUS holds that a federal district court has limited inherent authority to rescind a jury discharge and to recall the jury for further deliberations in order to address an error in its verdict. The court specifically limits this decision to civil cases.

Foster v. Chatman, USSC No. 14-8349, 2016 WL 2945233 (May 23, 2016); reversing an unpublished order of the Supreme Court of Georgia; Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Timothy Foster, who is black, was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by an all-white jury. Long after his conviction, his attorneys obtained documents from the prosecutors’ files showing their heavy reliance on race in deciding which jurors to strike. Seven of the eight justices now side with Foster and reverse the state courts’ rejection of his habeas claim under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

State v. Michael W. Bryzek, 2016 WI App 48; case activity (including briefs)

Bryzek had already completed most of his alleged acts when a 2010 statute broadened the definition of theft by a bailee; the court of appeals agrees with the circuit court that the jury should have been instructed on the narrower element.

State v. Jeffrey P. Lepsch, 2015AP2813-CR, petition for review granted 5/11/16; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (composed by On Point)

Were one or more jurors at Lepsch’s trial objectively or subjectively biased because they did not provide “unequivocal assurances” that they could set aside prior beliefs (about, e.g., the guilt of the defendant and the greater credibility of police) and decide the case solely on the evidence?

Did the prior beliefs of some jurors, and the lack of sufficient inquiry into their ability to set them aside, create an appearance of bias sufficient to deny Lepsch’s due process right to an impartial jury?

Were Lepsch’s rights to be present and to a public trial violated when the prospective jurors were sworn in the jury assembly room, outside the presence of the court and counsel?

Was Lepsch denied due process or the effective assistance of counsel by the trial court’s failure to give him the 7th peremptory strike to which he was entitled and by failing to strike 5 jurors for cause, forcing him to use 5 of his 6 strikes to remove them?

United States v. Lemurel E. Williams, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-1194, 4/26/16

Williams is entitled to a new trial because under the totality of the circumstances, the jury’s continued deliberations after an aborted delivery of the initial verdict were impermissibly coercive.

Donovan M. Burris v. Judy P. Smith, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-2891, 4/28/16

Burris’s claim that a supplemental instruction to the jury about how to determine “utter disregard for human life” doesn’t present a claim for federal habeas relief because it presents only a claim about an error of state law, not a claim that the instruction violated federal constitutional law.