On Point: b. Sex offender registration

State v. D.J.A.R., 2017AP52, District 4, 8/3/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

After D.J.A.R. was adjudicated delinquent for second degree child sexual assault under § 948.02(2), the circuit court ordered him to register as a sex offender. (¶¶4-6). It relied on § 938.34(15m)(am)1., which requires finding that the juvenile’s conduct was sexually motivated and that registration is in the interest of public protection. That was a mistake, because D.J.A.R.’s offense is governed by § 938.34(15m)(bm), which mandates registration unless the requirements of § 301.45(1m) are met. (¶¶11-14). The mistake was harmless, however. (¶15).

State v. F.B., 2016AP497, 11/1/16, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

F.B. seeks reversal of the circuit court’s denial of a permanent stay of his obligation to register. No briefs are available and it is difficult to tell what his argument might have been; in any case the court of appeals holds the circuit court properly exercised its discretion.

State v. D.C.M., 2016AP1205-FT, 10/5/16, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

The stay of a dispositional order in a juvenile case cannot be lifted unless the parties and the court follow the notice and hearing requirements of §938.34(16).  They failed to do so in this case, so the court of appeals reversed the circuit court’s order lifting the stay on D.C.M.’s sex offender registration.

City of Milwaukee v. D.S., 2015AP1634, 2/2/16, District 1 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

D.S., a juvenile, was ordered to register as a sex offender for life. On appeal, he argued that the circuit court relied on two types of inaccurate information: (1) a report, prepared by Dr. Paul Hesse, regarding the recidivism rate for juvenile sex offenders at Lincoln Hills, and (2) misinformation about the meaning of D.S.’s JSOAP-II scores.  He lost on both counts.

State v. M. E.-T., 2015AP625, 1/20/15, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Despite the circuit court’s rather evident prejudgment of the outcome, its “lengthy and well-reasoned” decision showed that it properly exercised its discretion in denying M. E.-T.’s motion to stay the requirement that he register as a sex offender.

State v. Ali H., 2015AP41, District 1, 7/28/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Though the juvenile court judge “was perhaps imprecise with its language,” the court of appeals concludes the judge did not erroneously apply adult sentencing considerations of punishment and deterrence when it decided to order Ali placed at Lincoln Hills.

State v. Jermaine C., 2014AP467, District 1, 10/21/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court’s decision at Jermaine’s disposition hearing to stay the sex offender registration requirement wasn’t a permanent stay of the requirement under § 938.34(16) and State v. Cesar G., 2004 WI 61, 272 Wis. 2d 22, 682 N.W.2d 1, because the record shows the circuit court was only deferring a final decision on a permanent stay pending reviews of Jermaine’s progress.

State v. Niko C., 2013AP1393, District 1, 11/26/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court properly exercised its discretion in denying Niko’s request to stay the requirement that he register as a sex offender under State v. Cesar G., 2004 WI 61, 272 Wis. 2d 22, 682 N.W.2d 1.

First, the court considered the relevant factors under §§ 301.45(1m)(e) and 938.34(15m)(c) and (16).

State v. Albert A., 2013AP549, District 3, 10/15/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Albert sought to stay juvenile sex offender registration under State v. Cesar G., 2004 WI 61, ¶40, 272 Wis. 2d 22, 682 N.W.2d 1, but the circuit court denied the request. The court discounted a psychosexual evaluator’s opinion that Albert was low risk to reoffend because the judge believed the evaluator’s opinion reflected an actuarial assessment of group,