On Point: B. Delinquency proceedings

State v. A.L. , 2019 WI 20, affirming a published court of appeals decision, 2017 WI App 72; case activity

This appeal centers on the proper interpretation of §938.30(5)(d) and §938.13 governing juveniles found not competent during a delinquency proceeding. SCOW holds a circuit court may resume suspended juvenile delinquency proceedings to reexamine the competency of a juvenile who was initially found not competent and not likely to become competent within the statutory period. It also holds that circuit courts retain competency over juvenile delinquency proceedings even after the accompanying JIPS order has expired.

State v. D.L.L., 2018AP1064-FT, District 2, 11/21/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

D.L.L., who was under a delinquency dispositional order placing him at his mother’s home, ran away for six days. The state moved for sanctions, alleging six violations of the dispositional order, one for each day he was gone. The juvenile court agreed that each day could be a separate violation. The juvenile court was wrong.

State v. J.P., 2017AP1905, District 1, 9/5/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

J.P. was adjudicated delinquent for calling in two bomb scares to his high school. The court of appeals rejects his claims that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him and unlawfully searched his phone and that his confession was involuntary. However, the court agrees with J.P. that part of the restitution order is invalid.

State v. A.L., 2016AP880, review of a published court of appeals decision granted 6/11/18; case activity

Where a juvenile has been found incompetent to stand trial, Wis. Stat. § 938.30(5)(e)1. says he or she can be later reevaluated–but only if he or she was found likely to regain competence. Nevertheless, the court of appeals, relying on a tendentious reading of the legislative history, decided even a juvenile who has been found unlikely to become competent can also be reevaluated.

This article by Elizabeth Scott, Natashal Duell and Laurence Steinberg  is one of the top downloads about criminal law on the SSRN this week. It looks at how a juvenile’s brain development and social environment affects his or her decision to engage in risky behavior and criminal activity. It responds to critics who note that all juveniles experience brain development but most don’t commit crimes. And it offers evidence to support more lenient sanctions for juveniles.

There seems to be a debate over this issue. If you practice juvenile law, you might was to weigh in here at the Cyntonia Brown and the “51 to life” project. Attorney Robert Donohoo already has.

State v. A.L., 2017 WI App 72, petition for review granted 6/11/18, affirmed, 2019 WI 20; case activity; review granted 6/11/18

The court of appeals holds that § 938.30(5) permits a juvenile court to order the re-evaluation of competency of a juvenile previously found not competent to proceed even though the juvenile was also found not likely to regain competence within the relevant statutory time frame (12 months, or the maximum criminal sentence for the offense, whichever is less).

State v. A.O., 2016AP2186, District 1, 8/22/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

In deciding whether to waive a juvenile into adult court a judge must consider the criteria set out in § 938.18(5). The judge has the discretion to determine how much weight to give to each criterion. J.A.L. v. State, 162 Wis. 2d 940, 960, 471 N.W.2d 493 (1991). According to A.O., the juvenile court in his case didn’t properly apply § 938.18(5)(c), which obliges the court to consider the adequacy and suitability of facilities and services available in the juvenile justice system to treat the juvenile and protect the public. According to the court of appeals, the juvenile court properly exercised its discretion.

State v. D.J.A.R., 2017AP52, District 4, 8/3/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

After D.J.A.R. was adjudicated delinquent for second degree child sexual assault under § 948.02(2), the circuit court ordered him to register as a sex offender. (¶¶4-6). It relied on § 938.34(15m)(am)1., which requires finding that the juvenile’s conduct was sexually motivated and that registration is in the interest of public protection. That was a mistake, because D.J.A.R.’s offense is governed by § 938.34(15m)(bm), which mandates registration unless the requirements of § 301.45(1m) are met. (¶¶11-14). The mistake was harmless, however. (¶15).

State v. J.J.S., 2016AP1519, 4/25/17, District 3 (1-judge appeal; ineligible for publication); case activity

The case appears to be an issue of first impression: Whether §938.34(5)(c), which provides that juveniles under 14 can’t be required to pay more than $250 in restitution, refers to the juvenile’s age when the State filed the delinquency petition or the juvenile’s age at the time of disposition. The court of appeals, choosing the time of disposition, upholds the $1,600 restitution award against J.J.S., even though he was just 13 when the filed its petition.