On Point blog, page 7 of 10
Court’s reliance on inaccurate information re juvenile’s risk of reoffending was harmless
City of Milwaukee v. D.S., 2015AP1634, 2/2/16, District 1 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity
D.S., a juvenile, was ordered to register as a sex offender for life. On appeal, he argued that the circuit court relied on two types of inaccurate information: (1) a report, prepared by Dr. Paul Hesse, regarding the recidivism rate for juvenile sex offenders at Lincoln Hills, and (2) misinformation about the meaning of D.S.’s JSOAP-II scores. He lost on both counts.
No misuse of discretion in ordering juvenile to register as sex offender
State v. M. E.-T., 2015AP625, 1/20/15, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Despite the circuit court’s rather evident prejudgment of the outcome, its “lengthy and well-reasoned” decision showed that it properly exercised its discretion in denying M. E.-T.’s motion to stay the requirement that he register as a sex offender.
Delinquency petition stated probable cause
State v. A.C., 2015AP1604, 1/20/16, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
A petition alleging A.C. was delinquent contained sufficient facts to establish probable cause that A.C. acted as a party to the crime of operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent.
Juvenile court applied proper standards when ordering disposition, despite “imprecise” language referring to adult sentencing standards
State v. Ali H., 2015AP41, District 1, 7/28/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Though the juvenile court judge “was perhaps imprecise with its language,” the court of appeals concludes the judge did not erroneously apply adult sentencing considerations of punishment and deterrence when it decided to order Ali placed at Lincoln Hills.
Credible victim supports adjudication on one count, but trial court’s mistake of law invalidates adjudication on second count
State v. Arron A.-R., 2014AP142, District 1, 6/2/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Arron delinquency adjudication for one count of first degree sexual assault is supported by the testimony of the victim, S.F., but the adjudication for a second count is reversed because the trial court erred in believing that the charge required only sexual contact, not sexual intercourse.
Waiver of juvenile to adult court upheld
State v. Juwon B., 2014AP2504, District 2, 2/11/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court properly exercised its discretion in waiving Juwon to adult court despite the fact Juwon lacked any prior record and was a “good kid who made a mistake.”
Circuit court properly exercised discretion in waiver juvenile to adult court
State v. Mariah E., 2014AP1788, District 2, 1/14/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The decision to waive a juvenile into adult court is reviewed for erroneous exercise of discretion, State v. Tyler T., 2012 WI 52, ¶24, 341 Wis. 2d 1, 814 N.W.2d 192, and in this case the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in waiving sixteen-year-old Mariah to adult court on charges of battery of a police officer, battery to an emergency worker, and resisting and obstructing.
Initial “stay” of juvenile sex offender reporting requirement wasn’t a permanent stay under § 938.34(16)
State v. Jermaine C., 2014AP467, District 1, 10/21/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court’s decision at Jermaine’s disposition hearing to stay the sex offender registration requirement wasn’t a permanent stay of the requirement under § 938.34(16) and State v. Cesar G., 2004 WI 61, 272 Wis. 2d 22, 682 N.W.2d 1, because the record shows the circuit court was only deferring a final decision on a permanent stay pending reviews of Jermaine’s progress.
Court of Appeals drains more meaning from the word “exigency”
State v. Joel I.-N., 2014 WI App 119; case activity
The unrecorded statement Joel I.N., a juvenile, gave to the police was admissible despite the fact the police failed to record the statement as required by §§ 983.195(2)(b) and 938.31(3)(b) because “exigent public safety circumstances” rendered recording his statement infeasible under § 938.31(3)(c)5. Joel also knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to remain silent.
SCOW: Court’s failure to specify crime for which probable cause found didn’t invalidate bindover of juvenile charged in adult court
State v. Cortez Lorenzo Toliver, 2014 WI 85, 7/23/14, affirming an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Prosser; case activity
When a juvenile is charged with a crime that gives the criminal court exclusive original jurisdiction, § 970.032(1) expressly requires the judge conducting the preliminary hearing to find probable cause for the specific felony that gives the court jurisdiction. In this case the supreme court addresses what happens when the trial judge doesn’t follow the statute’s clear mandate. On Point asked Eileen Hirsch, an attorney with the SPD’s Madison Appellate Office and all-around juvenile law guru, to discuss the decision. Here’s her take: